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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Despite the flows of global capital investment in the mining sector in Africa since early 2000, 
national and local communities have not benefitted, on the contrary the mineral revenues 
have fallen into the hands of political elites and MNCs (multinational companies) and this has 
furthered poverty, resource conflicts and even created resource curses (see Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005, Ferguson, 2006, Magrin, 2013, Le Billon, 2014, Schubert, and Engel and 
Macamo, 2017). Since 2000, there have been global, regional and local mining standards and 
acts to address this issue by setting binding rules in the mining sector to promote 
transparency and accountability, good mining practices, responsibility of MNCs in paying 
mineral taxes and royalties, good treatment of miners and contribution of MNCs to local 
community development. These standards are for instance the EITI (Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative) Mining Principles, OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) Due Diligence Guidance in mining, Dodd-Frank Acts (USA mining laws 
applied to countries of Central Eastern Africa) and the EAC member states’ own mining acts. 
However, the relative power of MNCs and new forms of extractive industry organisation 
compared to the socio-economic and political conditions in host countries hamper the 
implementation of advantageous regulation. On the contrary, MNCs controls the mineral rich 
zones in host countries, influence local decision-making and extract resources with little 
benefit to the host societies. Therefore, this research explores how the regulation of mining 
works in the EAC within the context of global and local mining standards and acts, and how 
efficient they are in addressing the above-mentioned issue.  
Different scholars have argued that despite the setting of global and national regulation, there 
have been challenges and limitations in bringing effective outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. 
One of the reasons is the position of African states in managing the flow of global capital 
investment in mining. Global capital flows create enclave territories, which are protected 
areas with private security guards, efficiently exploited and cut off from the rest of the mining 
vicinity. Both Ferguson (2006) and Agnew (2009) highlight that globalisation prompted 
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developing countries to lose some of their territorial sovereignty. In this context, states have 
been unable to control their mineral rich territories– a fact that disables their capacity to 
regulate and manage mining activities. The problem relies on the fact that even though MNCs 
have the right to control mineral rich territories and share sovereignty with the state, they do 
not replace entirely the functions of state, such as distributing mineral resources, correcting 
injustices in mining sector, and regulating wages to miners and other human and labour 
rights. Companies use that power of territorial control for financial profit. They do so by 
dodging international and local standards, dodging such things as paying tax and royalties, 
corporate social responsibilities, and local content. Companies repatriate profit and avoid 
responsibility for local human and labour rights; Le Billon (2001) refers to that as injustice 
that occurs through globalisation processes. 
More specifically in sub-Saharan Africa MNCs which started in the 1990s during the 
liberalisation process of the mining sector have gained access to mines at a low cost, with low 
tax and royalties (normally between 2 and 3 percent) so that states do not benefit from the 
revenues (see Campbell, 2004, p.82). Sub-Saharan African states did not only loose mineral 
revenues from the mining sector but also the authority to control mineral rich zones managed 
by private companies (see Agnew 2009, pp. 27-28). In this research we intend to find out 
whether the flow of global capital investment in EAC member states, especially in Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda, have had a similar effect on the mining sector, infringing on their 
sovereignty, their ability to regulate and control resource rich territories.  
This research uses political ecology to explain how regulation of mining sector work in EAC 
member states. Political ecology approach emphasizes on “the intersection and relationship 
between the political, broadly understood, and environmental and ecological phenomena” 
(Pankaj, 2016, p. 102). The term derives from Frank Thone who wrote in 1935 an article 
entitled “Nature Ramblings, We Fight for Grass”, reflecting also the way people fight for 
minerals. As far as mining is concerned, the discovery of expensive and strategic minerals, 
such as gold, diamonds, metals and oil induce both global and local actors to fight for access 
and control of mineral resources – a process that triggers violence (see Le Billon, 2014). 
There are three statements from political ecology: (1) opportunities and changes in 
environment affect the society in different ways and, social, economic and political 
differences induce an uneven distribution of cost and benefit. (2) Changes in the environment 
induce changes in the political and economic status quo. (3) Unequal distribution of cost and 
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benefits increase or decrease pre-existing social and economic inequalities, and this induces 
changes in power relations (Bryant and Baily, 1997, p. 28).  
The problem with these assumptions manifests itself when new uneven distributions of 
power, resulting from accessing resource benefits, become the means of further resource 
control. In this case, regulations have become hard to implement as those who do it also have 
the power to shape the standards to the detriment of others. This happens when MNCs and 
political elites all have access to power benefits from mineral resources at the expense of the 
rest of the population, while they are indeed the ones who would enforce and implement 
mining regulations. This research therefore explores these difficulties and challenges in the 
regulation of the mining sector between the power relationships of several actors: MNCs, 
ASMs, global powers involved in the region, EAC member states and local people. Thus, this 
research hinges on these two approaches, and analyses the efficiency of regulation as a matter 
of both institutions and actors interested in the extraction of specific types of minerals found 
in EAC member states. This helps to address the research question that analyses the way 
regulation of mining work in EAC member states. 
There are academic questions now on how the global regulation of mining works at a local 
level and for local and national benefits. Campbell (2004, p 82) argues that for global 
regulations to work, local institutions, especially states, need to be empowered to dominate 
the will of MNCs and to increase tax and royalties, corporate social responsibility and local 
content, which most of the states in Africa have done since early 2010. Based on intended 
findings in EAC member states, this research contributes to the academic debate on whether 
or not levying tax and loyalties, putting pressure to MNCs, nationalising mines, and setting 
up tough reforms, as empowering local states seems to be the solution to improving mining 
sector regulation in Africa. 
There are two controversial academic discussions on resource governance in Africa. Some 
scholars support global power initiatives in regulation, while others criticize this regulatory 
framework. McFerson (2009, p. 1529) argues that due to internal institutional corruption, the 
effectiveness of regulation and resource governance work if global powers such as the USA 
take the initiative to intervene. By comparing scopes and ways of functioning of global 
initiatives in EAC member states, we contribute to the academic debate about whether the 
interests of countries or the local societies drive the global regulatory process and whether 
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this processes of global and national regulation answer problems of local people caused by 
mining malpractices, resource conflicts or resource curse in generals.   
Some scholars criticize global regulation mechanisms which focus on Western norms and 
standards. For instance, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance is rigorous about sanctions and 
compliance, but the guidance does not coincide well with local realities. Carisch and Rickard-
Martin (2013, p.6) argue that the UN 1952 resolution (2010) in collaboration with the OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance established standards on responsible supply chain management of 
minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Even though DRC, ICGLR (including all 
EAC member states) have endorsed these standards, the implementation has been very 
limited. “Still political support for these measures remains feeble (…) and despite repeated 
recommendations to the Sanction Committee for designations, no individual or entity has 
been targeted with sanctions for failing to comply with the UN’s due diligence principles” 
(Carisch and Rickard-Martin 2013, p.6). They argue that these standards do not consider local 
realities including the south-south mineral trading networks and the fact that local states do 
not adequately register and control all minerals produced and exported, such as the gold 
export from the eastern DRC (see Carish and Rickard-Martin, 2013, p. 6).  
Börzel and Hönke (2012) also highlighted that the MNCs enforcement in matters of human 
and labour rights remain a matter of voluntary work as there is no will from the state of origin 
to set up a binding contract on compliance while local states are sometimes reluctant to 
respect those rights. However, they do not discuss why this reluctance exists on both sides 
and, to what extent this affects the implementation of global and national mining standards 
with regards to human and labour rights, security as well as within the domain of mining 
(mal) practices. This research then contributes to this debate and explores whether EAC 
member states have had the same problem in the implementation of global and national 
mining standards and discusses more simply whether the regulation of mining in EAC 
member states is working. 
This research question is important for the effective regulation of mining. Otherwise, there 
would be a continuous lack of benefit from mineral resources at the local and national level, 
which exacerbates poverty, resource conflicts and violence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1.2. Contribution of research 
 
Most scholars, such as Ferguson (2006), Ross (2012), Börzel & Hönke (2012), Magrin, 
(2013) and Carish and Rickard-Martin (2013), focus on a single case to analyse issues of 
governance of mineral resources or issues of regulation. They centre mainly on cases of 
Angola, Chad and the DRC. However, there is much complexity and difference in both 
global mining regulations, agents, types of minerals, nature and behaviour of MNCs, and 
socio-economic and political conditions of the host countries. Therefore, analysis of a single 
country cannot provide a real picture of how globalisation of resource governance and 
regulation work. This research contributes by confronting three cases of EAC member states 
in order to get specific pictures on each case and to compare all three cases.  
Besides this, the research compares regulations of mining at the global and national level but 
also delineates the types of those mining standards and acts and analyses their functioning for 
different MNCs, different types of minerals and different territory of EAC member states. 
The reason for focusing on the EAC is that the member states have been signatories of 
different global standards of mineral resource governance but are also endowed with types of 
resource conflict minerals such as gold, oil, diamond and metals. In addition to that, most of 
the EAC member states including Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have been involved in 
regional conflicts in eastern DRC sustained by mineral resource endowment.  
The research also compares regulation applied to different types of minerals based on 
strategic and important ones highlighted by other scholars such as international institutions 
(see Basedau, 2006). These are metals, gold, oil and gemstone – for instance the case of 3TGs 
(tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) highlighted in IGLR, OECD Due Diligence Guidance, and 
in Dodd-Frank Act. At global level, EITI, ICGLR and Dodd-Frank Act work especially in 
addressing the local benefit issues of mineral resources and preventing resource conflict and 
violence. However, these standards are also different in their nature, the actors involved and 
their purpose. This research then depicts through comparison the different ways these 
standards are reflected in their implementation and effectiveness.  
The challenges of resource governance and regulation in the Global South have been 
discussed in the framework of the Resource Curse hypothesis. These challenges are the lack 
of national benefit from mineral resource endowment and the occurrence of resource conflicts 
and violence. There exists a discussion on and controversies about the resource curse 
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hypothesis (Basedau, 2006; Carish and Rickard-Martin, 2013), although resource abundance 
is not a curse per se, pre-resource extraction conditions matter, such as a general level of 
development, relation between identity groups and political systems, for example. Resource 
specific condition matters: type, location, mode of extraction, degree of abundance and 
dependence, and resource revenue management. The political economy of natural resources 
must capture the complexity beyond that distinction (Basedau, 2006). In this framework, the 
research contributes to the academic discussion by assessing these conditions and 
complexities that affect resource management and regulation in EAC member states. It 
therefore enlarges the scope of mineral types that are critical in terms of triggering a resource 
conflict or a resource curse. This will provide a deeper knowledge on how regulation is 
applied to globally sensitive minerals found in the East African Community and in central 
African states, mainly the 3TGs (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold), the battery minerals and 
gemstones such as diamond and tanzanite (which is exclusively found in Tanzania).   
This study contributes to the analysis of global standards and national mining acts and their 
efficiency within the scope of EAC. As the global and national forms of regulation aim at 
countering a resource curse or resource conflict, this thesis looks at the implementation of 
such regulation in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda. The comparison of these cases helps to 
understand the similarities and differences of mineral resource regulation in these three 
countries and to explore what works, what does not and why.  
The justification of comparison that states have quite similar types of minerals and geological 
endowment while they are differently managing and producing their mineral resource 
extraction. They also tackle differently the issues related to mining including mineral 
conflicts and enforcement of global, regional and national mining acts. Therefore, the 
research focuses on this similarity and differences to understand relationship between 
resources governance and other factors that affect regulation of mining including political 
decision making; functioning of governments; and the implementation of mining acts and 
standards. The research takes into consideration the specific mining focus of the selected 
EAC states, for instance gold in Tanzania, 3Ts in Rwanda and new oil industry in Uganda. 
There is also differences in MNCs mining practices that operate in EAC territory which affect 
the regulation of the sector in general. All these similarities and differences give an 
understanding of how regulation of mining in a region work given the particularities of each 
country and the particularity in the use of mining standards existing in the same regional 
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jurisdiction. Without this comparison it would be difficult to know what works, what does not 
and why. 
Indeed, regulation came as way to counterbalance the political and economic resource curse 
cases. Therefore, the link is that assessing resource curse case in EAC mining community 
allow to analyse whether the existing global and national mining acts and standards that are 
applied in EAC territory are implemented in such way that they are effective to curb the 
particular resource curse cases 
 
1.3. The statement of the problem 
 
Mining regulation in the 21st Century appeared to be able to solve major extraction industry 
issues in Africa; however, the practice has mostly brought in other challenges that have 
thwarted its implementation. While the global trends focus on liberalising the mining sector, 
and on increasing transparency and accountability, the reality on the ground is something 
else. These realities range from MNCs and bad company-resident relationships, the closure of 
mines or “nationalisation”, increased smuggling, the lack of CSR and local content, and the 
abuse of human and labour rights. Lack of efficiency in regulation of mining induces serious 
problems of poverty, inequality and misery in the livelihood of people affected by this 
industry. Cases of forced evacuation of people in the mining sector and sometimes without 
compensation are the outcome of a lack of proper regulation of mining. As far as EAC is 
concerned, poverty and illiteracy exist at local and national levels as well as resource 
conflicts, especially in the extraction of its specific minerals such as tantalum, tin, gold, 
diamond, tanzanite and oil. Moreover, EAC states such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi 
faced mineral conflicts because of illegal trading of mineral conflicts that fuelled cross-border 
conflicts around the eastern DRC and nurtured rebel movements of the said EAC countries 
operating in eastern DRC and the other military factions that depend largely on mineral 
resources for armament and survival.  Conflict of interests between MNCs and local 
populations can trigger violence and human right abuses. In the EAC for instance, one 
incident between an MNC and the local population caused an outbreak of violence, which 
took the lives of hundreds of civilians.   
There is also conflict between local people and states in terms of mineral resource 
governance whereby people feel marginalised by their government due to a lack of 
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distribution of the mineral resource revenue. Some leaders and agencies have received bribes 
from multinational companies in exchange for mining licences and other benefits. Therefore, 
the cost of inefficiency and lack of proper regulatory framework have furthered poverty, 
conflict and violence at local and national levels.  
 
1.4. Research question 
 
How do global and national regulations of mining work in East African Community member 
states? 
 
1.4.1. Specific Research questions: 
 
1. What is the probability of a resource curse in EAC member states, especially in the 
case of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda? 
2. What are the main international, national mining standards applied to EAC member 
states, and how are they enforced? 
3. What are the major MNCs and ASMs practices and malpractices in extractive 
industry in EAC member states, especially for Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda? 
4. What are the major challenges that EAC member states face, especially in regulating 
mining sector, inducing local and national benefits, and holding MNCs and ASMs 
accountable and transparent?   
5. What is the similarity and difference of the cases of EAC member states with regard 
to mining regulation? 
 
1.5. Research objective 
 
This research aims at assessing whether global and local mining standards and acts work to 
counterbalance the probability of resource curse in EAC especially related to resource 
conflicts and violence that arise among mining stakeholders. Given the facts that the region 
has been identified as mineral conflict sensitive due to its geological component of Kibalan 
belt mainly composed of conflict mineral identified as 3TGs (see ICGLR, OECD, Dodd-
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Frank Acts and the EU), we find it crucial to embark on this research to assess whether 
established global, regional and national mechanism of mining regulation work and to 
identify the existing shortcomings or challenges.   
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
1.6.1. Sources 
 
This research is based on a review of existing literature on resource governance in sub-
Saharan Africa and fieldwork results. The fieldwork was conducted in Tanzania and Rwanda 
from April to May 2018 and consists of techniques of data collection, including observation, 
interviews and desk research. This has helped to consolidate the interpretation of three case 
studies of EAC community member states, chiefly Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.  
The literature review focuses on the political ecology approach (see Le Billon, 2014, 
Schubert, Engel and Macamo, 2017). In this framework, the approach of this research  relies 
on the assumption that mining regulation is influenced by the relevance of minerals and 
metals in the international market and needs, the struggle of actors to access and control 
mineral rich zones..  
The source of the literature draws on existing academic literature on resource governance and 
the effect of globalisation to national sovereignty. As far as the mining sector is concerned 
key literature came from Agnew (2009) Globalization and Sovereignty; Basedau & Mehler 
(2005) Resource politics in sub-Saharan Africa; and Campbell (2004) on Regulating Mining 
in Africa: For Whose Benefit?.  
Moreover, this research hinges on the theories and hypothesis of James Ferguson (2006) 
Global Shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order, more particularly on “Governing 
Extraction: new specialization of order and disorder in neoliberal Africa”. The research 
explores the resource governance literature by referring to literature on mining in the Great 
Lakes Region such as that of Jana Hönke (2009) on Transnational Pockets of Territoriality: 
Governing the Security in Katanga (DRC). In addition to that, I refer to the work of Muriel 
Côte and Benedikt Korf (2018) on Making Concession: Extractive enclaves entangled 
Capitalism and Regulative Pluralism at the Gold Mining Frontier in Burkina Faso. I will 
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also refer to the work on processes of enclaving under the global condition: the case of 
Burkina Faso (see Katja Werthmann and Diana Ayeh, 2017).  
 
1.6.2. Conceptualisation 
 
Resource regulation is here understood as a mechanism of correcting mining malpractices, 
resource conflict or more generally the resource curse related issues resulting from 
inefficiencies in sharing and distributing mineral revenues among different actors from local 
to global level. This process occurs mainly through three types of governance: hybrid 
governance, multi-level governance and state-centred governance. Hybrid governance was 
first established during the neoliberal era as the state shared its role with private companies or 
the market. Hybridity means the political and economic activities resulting from the 
collaboration and voluntary and strategic initiatives between states and the market (Aliu and 
Aliu, 2014, p.1). Nowadays these activities are for instance joint development projects from 
public-private partnership, corporate social responsibility, security, political decision making, 
etc. In the context of this research, forms of hybridity occur in mineral resource governance 
as private companies and market institutions play a role in mineral resource governance and 
regulations. These are for instance ITRI (International Tin Research Institute) through its 
ITSCI (International Tin Supply Chain Initiatives), and EITI (Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative). This research recognises such forms of hybridity in the EAC and so 
assesses their role in the regulation of the mining sector.  
Multilevel governance is a system in which there is a combination of national, international 
and supranational forms of decision-making and laws. The concept originates from the EU 
(European Union) where the community became a political federation of independent states, 
which surrendered some powers to its governing body and therefore resulting in a federation 
and confederation at the same time. In this time, specifically within the globalising world, 
states endure supranational diligences from different angles, such as the UN, partner states, 
and intergovernmental organisations such as ICGLR, OECD and AU. The EAC mining 
sector then is implicated in this system, supranational agencies have a direct effect on its 
member states. Therefore, to assess mining regulations of the EAC the multilevel character of 
governance must be examined.  
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State-centred governance means dominance of the state institution over market institutions in 
regulatory framework. The assumption is that when the state dominates the market it is easier 
to establish a welfare policy, regulate exchanges, provide market intervention and distribute 
collected revenues to the rest of the population. State-centred governance occurs when 
government institutions and agents intervene in setting mining acts that allow states capacity 
and decision-making on mining activities. However, because of globalisation and the 
liberalisation of the sector, this form of resource governance is seldomly seen, except in few 
cases of state resistance. Therefore, we conceive that the regulation of mining in the EAC is 
predominantly in the form of hybrid and multi-level governance and that mining regulation is 
an outcome of an interplay of these three levels of resource governance (see also Ferguson, 
2006; Börzel and Hönke, 2012; Carish and Rickard-Martin, 2013, Werthmann & Ayeh, 2017, 
Schubert, Engel and Macamo, 2017). 
 
1.6.3. Scope and type of research methods  
 
This research is exploratory, with mainly qualitative techniques of data collection, such as 
interviews and observation. Moreover, this study covers mainly the period from 2000 to 
2018. This period marks the era of new laws and standards that have been established from 
the global level to national levels following the increase in foreign direct investment in Africa 
and the privatisation of the sector.  
Among six EAC countries, only three were purposively chosen, these being Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The reason is that Rwanda is one of the quickest developing EAC 
member states and especially in the production of 3Ts (Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten), 
minerals that are on the list of mineral conflicts and highly valued in IT production. Uganda 
was chosen on account of its strong mining history in copper production and the new 
preparations in oil industry. And finally, Tanzania because it has been a giant of the industry 
since 1997 and is among the fourth biggest exporter of gold in Africa. Additionally, 
Tanzania’s extractive industry is the most developed of all EAC countries.  
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1.6.4. Technique of collection of data 
 
This research is a case study of EAC mining sector regulation and uses interviews, 
observation and document reviews to answer the research questions highlighted above. For 
the interviews the key informants were officials in mining regulatory institutions, miners, 
company leaders, and some experienced persons in the mining field in eastern Africa. In 
terms of document review, the research utilizes existing written mining acts and standards, 
such as UN resolutions, EITI reports and many others. To enable observation, desk research 
was carried out in the Rwanda Mining Board, and a field visit to the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals of Tanzania and to the Rutongo mines.  
In terms of sampling, I used purposeful sampling and snowball sampling to maximise 
information opportunities. The former consists of targeting well informed persons, such as 
people in charge of legal affairs, auditing, production, exploration and mining cadastre 
officers; the experienced people who are living close to mining sites and who have lived there 
for a long time; miners and company leaders. This enables them to differentiate different 
mining institutions established and their outcome in the mining vicinities. Miners were found 
in groups and so interaction allowed for group responses and discussion. Time allocated to 
each interview reached one hour in some cases or 20 minutes for other cases, a total number 
of 16 people were systematically interviewed. The interviews were conducted in French, 
English, Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili.   
During the interview, audio and video recording occurred, if allowed by the interviewee, and 
the interviews were later transcribed and coded for data interpretation. Whilst some 
informants accepted video recording, others accepted audio recording and fewer people 
refused these methods of documenting all together. Some explanations involved a 
confidential agreement between the respondent and I, as the mining sector involves sensitive 
information and therefore anonymization was used in the interpretation of data. 
The researcher made observations on materials such as the mineral traceability tool (see a 
photo of tags in annex), roads and other infrastructure, as well as behaviour in mining and 
work places. In the case of Tanzania, the country was amidst reform from 2016 – 2017 and 
the industry was going through a highly sensitive period following human right violations 
and tax evasion. New mining institutions in Tanzania have been establishing new 
infrastructure, new leaders and increasing the number of tools at their disposal such as the 
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mining laboratory. The mining laboratory would evaluate the quality and quantity of mineral 
resources that beforehand would have been determined instead by companies. This sensitivity 
and transition made for a more reticent atmosphere. 
Contrary to Tanzania, employees in Rwanda were more open about the state of the industry. 
This was further the case as I myself am Rwandan and therefore would be considered more 
trustworthy. Moreover, I was given an office near the human resource director and could 
meet with any of the informants I wished, depending on their availability. In the case of 
Uganda, however, I was not able to visit mining institutions; therefore, I used desk research 
on the case of Uganda and interviewed some Ugandan experts in the mining sector.  
During fieldwork, I interviewed 16 people in a systematic and formal way. On top of this I 
also held informal and friendly discussions with individuals or groups., They informed me 
about the way regulation works in the region (see the list of interviews in annex) in addition 
to one interactive discussion with miners, and a number of cases observed (see also 
observation guide in the attachment).  
The research also uses the technique of document analysis to triangulate or support 
interviews and observation. This technique consists of reading and analysing technical and 
non-technical documents including, press release, reports, acts, diaries and journals, 
newspapers, radio and television programme scripts, and other records (Bowen, 2009, pp 27-
28). All these records inform the study, and therefore the research used different mining 
codes, from both international and national levels, institutional reports, and websites. This 
allowed me to see the intention of rules in the mining acts, their provisions, and the political 
and economic environment of mining regulation.  I also used online information about 
mining regulation and activities in EAC through newspapers such as the East African, the 
New Times, New Visions, and broadcasting corporations.  This helped me to know what is 
happening and to interpret further the situation of law enforcement, incidents of corruption 
and negotiations between companies and EAC member state institution.  
1.7. Structure of the thesis 
 
This dissertation is subdivided into nine chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
Chapter Two discusses the literature on resource governance and the effect of globalisation to 
sovereignty, especially on the nature of global capital flows in the mining sector (see 
Ferguson, 2006). The objective is to analyse the existing literature on resource governance 
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and explore approaches taken by the former researchers while studying resource governance 
issues in sub-Saharan Africa. The main approaches used are the political ecology approach 
(see Le Billon, 2014). The former shows that resource conflicts and violence occur on 
important and strategic minerals once access to and control of extraction is not regulated to 
govern competing interests of global and national actors. The reason for referring to this 
theory is that most of the international standards focus on limiting the occurrence of conflict 
linked to 3TGs and minerals found and extracted in the EAC. Therefore, it is important to see 
the existing challenges posed by the type of minerals endowments of EAC in resource 
governance processes. It is also important to assess how the regulation of mining in the EAC 
work in this context of global and national mining standards and acts in counterbalancing 
resource conflicts or resource curse.   
Chapter Three highlights international standards applied in EAC territory. These include 
conflict mineral regulations (see ICGLR, Dodd-Frank and OECD mining standards) and 
accountability and transparency standards (see for instance EITI principles). It shows that 
Tanzania is the only member of EITI while the Rwanda mining sector embraced ICGLR, 
Dodd-Frank Act and OECD standards more than any other EAC member state. Uganda also 
recognises these resource conflict standards and is a member of these regional resource 
conflict rules, however, the implementation of them is still a problem. Moreover, the chapter 
shows the issues related to the content of mining acts, these include the enforcement capacity 
of regulatory institution such as EITI and the power of these international rules in engaging 
and sanctioning local mining malpractices.   
Chapter Four provides a historical overview of mining in eastern Africa. It shows how 
mining development occurred in East Africa, developing fast in Uganda and Rwanda in the 
1950s until the 1970s and then dropping in the 1980s due to nationalisation. It also shows that 
Tanzania was delayed in mining liberalisation due to its former policy of socialism under 
President Nyerere, which changed in 1997 when the country adopted more liberal politics. 
Mines were privatised and the important companies, such as Barrick Gold, through its 
subsidiary Acacia, were able to contract and invest in Tanzania mining since 2001. In Uganda 
and Rwanda liberalisation of mines happened in the early 2000s, and the Rutongo tin mine 
owned by TINCO in the case of Rwanda and Tibet Hima company in the case of Uganda, and 
other companies gained access to the metal mines. One could say that liberalisation of mining 
in the EAC started to be effective in the early 2000s and since, exploration and production of 
minerals with MNCs has grown in the region, with limited processing and benefit. The latter 
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effect is also triggering the return to nationalisation and the closure of mines. In Uganda, 
Tibet Hima has already closed while mining reforms in both Tanzania and Rwanda are 
increasingly focussing more on local content and benefit in mining acts.   
Chapter Five compares the national mining acts of all EAC member states. The aim is to 
show local regulation trends and their relevance in increasing the role of states in regulatory 
mechanism (see Campbell, 2004). Tanzanian mining acts give more power to the presidential 
office to decide on mines or nationalise mines without other institutional procedures. It also 
gives relatively low mining licence tenure: 10 years renewable, while others give around 25 
years renewable. Royalties are almost equal in the EAC ranging from 4 to 5 percent and the 
corporate income tax of 30%. However, only Kenya has royalty fees on metals equivalent to 
8% which is regionally quite high. Other aspects of CSR and local content are mentioned in 
all mineral acts of the EAC member states.     
Chapter Six is the assessment of Tanzania. Even though Tanzania has a different mineral 
endowment, the country has specific mineral resources including gold, diamond and 
tanzanite, whilst the gold export share is 33 % of the total export of the country. Despite 
export potentials, the benefit from mining is low due to corruption and company 
malpractices. Even though the country is more stable in the region, the extractive political 
elites facilitated the extractive MNCs to dodge tax systems and sometimes pay little tax and 
royalties compared to the real production and export bases. These MNCs and political elite 
networks allowed the company to violate human rights, including the rape of individuals and 
forcing locals to relocate without compensation. There has been violence and killing of local 
civilians in North Mara and other mines, especially those linked with Acacia. The probability 
of a resource curse is clearer in Tanzania. Mineral benefit is too low compared to other 
countries, which have fewer mining opportunities, but with high level of strategic resource 
governance like Botswana. Resource regulation does not work and most of the company has 
been involved in tax evasion, alongside a poor CSR strategy, except in the case of Anglo 
Gold Ashanti which participates and develops their local surroundings and residents in Geita.  
Chapter Seven elaborates the cases of Uganda. Uganda displays a similar case of corruption 
and a powerful elite within the industry. The Ugandan political and social condition has 
thwarted the chance of developing the mining industry since the liberalisation policy of 2001. 
The implementation of international mining standards is hard for Uganda, and the internal 
mining acts are not enforced because of corruption levels and the extractive leadership. 
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Again, human rights abuses are present in the setting, people have been forced to evacuate 
their land, people are being raped, and houses have been burned for new oil projects. The 
mining sector is dominated by ASMs at 90% of the total sector and 20 to 30 percent are 
women and children who are used as cheap labour in the mine (see a photo in the annex). The 
country has likewise lost sovereignty of a mineral rich territory to the west and southwest, 
neighbouring DRC and Rwanda. The Rwenzururu Kingdom has claimed secession from the 
Kampala government, whom they accuse of marginalising the region, the government has, as 
a result, used military force to address the issue. Incidentally, the kingdom is in the region of 
copper and cobalt mines which also have big reserves of iron and tin.   
Uganda is also a country which has a consortium in the extractive industry. The case of oil 
shows that CNOOC (Chinese offshore oil company), France Company Total and UK 
Company Tullow Oil have a joint venture in the oil project. It is still hard to make such a 
venture effective and successful if it lacks local shareholders. Furthermore, with the issues of 
politicisation of oil extraction already in place and an exorbitant budget and loans that the 
government is putting into the sector, the question of sustainability and benefit of the 
Ugandan mining practices must be posited.  
Chapter Eight provides the case of Rwanda. Rwanda has a unique mineral resource 
governance structure which appears more hybrid and with multi-level stakeholders. It is the 
only state in which private companies control the implementation of traceability and tagging 
mechanism of minerals to make sure the sourcing of minerals has no link with conflict. This 
is because Rwanda has been producing the 3Ts since 1950 and has since been involved in 
mineral conflict issues in eastern DRC. The government has agreed to follow international 
rules on mining, this gives the government and mining companies in Rwanda a relative 
advantage. One case of tin mines in Rutongo demonstrate the occurrence of malpractices in at 
least one Rwandan mine, such as the evasion of corporate income tax and avoidance of 
responsibility on labour rights of workers, especially with regards to the salary of miners and 
support team. Despite the engagement of the company in paying CSR, there is still a clear 
problem of planning on CSR projects to support local content in general. There was also a 
case of tin smuggling, the result of low pay and little benefit to locals, according to one 
information. The company pays 1 percent of the total price of tin on the international market, 
as indicated in the London Metal Exchange. The chapter also show little distribution of 
mineral revenues to the local vicinity, there existed a presidential initiative to return 5 to 10 
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percent of mineral revenues to the vicinity but how much revenue is in actuality returned to 
rural residents remains unknown.   
Chapter Nine includes the discussion and conclusion. Here the researcher highlights that 
mining regulation in the EAC does not work as designed except at least in the case of 
Rwanda. Tanzania has a probable domestic resource curse, meanwhile Uganda has both a 
probable regional and domestic resource curse. Rwanda has low probability of a resource 
curse, but the issue of distribution and regional resource conflict puts the country in a 
cautious situation regarding possible conflict.  
The chapter shows the theoretical and practical implication of the research. Theoretical 
implication is that the research concurs that the regulation of mining is difficult when local 
and national institutions have no inclusive character. Where institutions seem to be more 
extractive, resource benefits diminish (see case of Uganda and Tanzania) and government 
institutions such as police and army, parliament and ministries of mines have been enabling 
MNCs to carry out malpractices at the expense of state revenues or local human and labour 
rights (see case of Tanzania and Uganda).  
The chapter also shows another theoretical implication, the more the region is rich in 3TGs 
and oil, which are considered as conflict minerals, the more the regulation of mining becomes 
difficult to enforce and so involve powerful actors. However, so far, the legal and practical 
intervention of powerful actors, such as the global powers, has not shaped the regulation of 
mining in the EAC in a way that effectively benefits the local people and the state. Even 
though there has been relative peace at the regional level due to pressure to stop regional 
wars, there is no pressure on MNCs and states to mobilize mineral revenues and distribute 
them to poor local citizens or, to repair the damages caused by the extractive industry such as 
the violation of human rights. 
Furthermore, the chapter shows that some EAC member states are losing their sovereignty in 
mineral rich territories (see case of Uganda). States ask global powers involved in the region 
to protect their resource rich territory as Uganda asked France to support securing the Lake 
Albert and the west Uganda rich in metals and oil. Uganda also received special aid and loans 
from China as a supplementary force to enable longevity of the ruling elite and humanitarian 
security in the process of signing a new MoU with CNOOC – a Chinese oil company that 
leads the consortium of the UK and France MNCs involved in the nascent oil industry of 
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Uganda. This has meant the gradual loss of domestic sovereignty and the thus effects the 
regional stability of the EAC. 
Practically, the hybrid and multi-level governance applied in Rwanda has been more effective 
and more unique in the region than the state-centred mechanisms applied in both Tanzania 
and Uganda. The result of this is that it limits the relative capacity of MNCs to commit 
malpractices- reducing levels of violations of human rights in the mining vicinity. During 
fieldwork, Tanzanian officials mentioned the will to embrace a traceability system in tin and 
gold and so to embrace some forms of hybridity in resource management and regulation. 
Tanzania lost a lot of revenues two decade ago and the resource seems to be depleting 
without leaving a developmental legacy. Moreover, the countries are challenged by their 
ability to hold the MNCs accountable and transparent and induce local and national benefit. 
Especially in the case of Tanzania, political struggle and lack of tolerance between the elites 
from CCM and CHADEMA weakens further the instauration of other institutions, which 
would help to hold the MNCs accountable and transparent. 
Therefore, the research draws the conclusion that (1) globalization of mining regulation in 
EAC member states still has limitations to provide benefits at the local and national level: 
most of the MNCs still have malpractices including the evasion of tax, violation of human 
and labour rights and limited contribution to CSR and local content. (2) At least global 
standards mete out sanctions in enforcement mechanism such as ICGLR, Dodd-Frank Acts 
and UN backed OECD Due Diligence Guidance, however these are more informative than 
practical in terms of considering local realities. (3) States are indeed losing sovereignty at a 
larger scale as new strategic minerals, such as 3TGs, oil and gold, increase in the region and 
this increases the vulnerability of EAC member states to falling into resource curse. (4) The 
more vulnerable states to this globalisation of resource governance are those that are 
internally corrupt as the case of Tanzania and Uganda highlight. (5) Global flows of mining 
investment in EAC, especially in gold, oil and metals, has weakened institutions and 
threatened stability at the local, national and regional level. These are cases of violence from 
mining areas, corruption in the mining sector especially between incumbent leaders and 
MNCs, deadly conflicts of elites over mining policies and reforms, and regional conflicts of 
member states in relation to the increase of mining opportunities. Moreover, global powers 
and global actors in general are increasingly focussing on the region, which both shows signs 
of political reform favouring stability, but also risks falling into proxy conflicts and wars. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. RESOURCE GOVERNANCE, GLOBALISATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
  
This chapter discusses existing literature on resource governance in developing nations, more 
particularly the resource curse hypothesis (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, Auty, 2006, Ross, 
2012), and the issues associated with globalisation and sovereignty in Africa, specifically in 
the mining sector (see Ferguson, 2005, 2006, Honke, 2009, Agnew, 2009, Magrin, 2013, and 
Hansen, 2014). The aim is to understand existing knowledge on mineral resource rich 
countries and how they have failed to transform their mineral resource endowment into socio-
economic and political development and the framework that previous researchers adopted in 
addressing this issue. In discussing this framework systematically, gaps and controversies in 
the research area of resource governance or regulation in the context of globalisation will also 
be highlighted, this includes global and national mining standards and acts (see Campbell, 
2004).    
   
2.2. The resource curse hypothesis  
 
The resource curse hypothesis means that countries or regions that have a high mineral 
resource endowment tend to fail politically and economically because of the effect of the so-
called “paradox of plenty”. The latter means that mineral rich countries fail to develop other 
sectors of the economy because of an overreliance on huge mineral revenues and mineral 
rents, which thwarts the development of the education and manufacturing sector (Auty, 1993 
and 2006, Ross, 2012, Reno, 2001a, and Collier, 2005). Political institutions also become rent 
oriented and, the more the elites get mineral rents and bribes from mining companies, the 
more they are incentivised to stay in power and impose their will on the people and oppress 
opposition. Ross (2001, p.357) highlights that resource rents weaken the democratic 
processes and induce leaders to stop being accountable and transparent since they do not 
depend on them for tax but on the companies’ provisions, foreign aid and resource rents.  
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Furthermore, not only do institutions but also the type of resources matter in determining the 
possibility of a resource curse emerging (Basedau, 2006). Resources are expensive, scarce 
and sometimes concentrated in certain territories more than others and therefore, the scarcity 
and abundance increase the level of competition and possibility of conflict. The minerals 
resources that create the most conflicts are oil and metals such as tin, tungsten, tantalum and 
gold. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Angola are typical examples of 
resource curse cases, all these countries have economic and political difficulties related to 
management of mineral resources.   
 
2.2.1. Economic aspect of Resource curse  
 
The argument from the economic aspect of the resource curse is that most of the resource rich 
economies tend to perform badly and have delays in opening-up international trade due to 
lack of economic diversification (Auty, 1993). There are four economic reasons behind that. 
The first is an overreliance on resource commodity products or the “Dutch disease”. Second 
is resource rich countries who do not follow an export led growth (Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
Third is the weakness of the states to manage fiscal revenues and to use them rationally and 
developmentally. And, finally, fourth is the creation of counterproductive projects, namely 
the ‘white elephants’ and the lack of social welfare policies (Auty, 2006, Namkani, 1979).  
 
The overreliance on resource commodity export induces the lack of will for the state to 
improve other economic sectors including agriculture, education, and manufacturing (Auty, 
2001). This phenomenon is termed as ‘Dutch disease’ and means that the increase of 
economic development of the booming sector, such as natural resource exploitation, 
undermines the economic development of other tradeable sectors such as agriculture or 
manufacturing (Auty, 2001). The term ‘Dutch disease’ comes from the example of the 
Netherlands. The country found considerable gas reserves in Groningen in 1959 and its 
exploitation was so productive that other sectors of the economy declined. Dutch disease has 
two effects: (1) resource movement effect and (2) the spending effect. The resource 
movement effect stipulates that the booming resource exploitation induces big number of 
labourers to go into the mining sector and abandon other locally necessary activities 
including agriculture and education. The local economy in developing nations, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa, relies on economies of subsistence, the rush in gold and metal, for 
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instance, heavily undermine agricultural production and increases food prices, exacerbating 
the tenacity of poverty in mining vicinities.  
 
The spending effect occurs when the value of the national currency increases or appreciates 
compared to the real value of national economies merely because of an increase of national 
revenues from one type of resource for instance oil, gold or diamond. Once the money is not 
rationally used, inflation increases and the local people, who do not have access to loans and 
finances, find it hard to buy necessary commodities in their daily lives – the price shocks. 
Countries that are mineral rich can collect 50 to 80 percent of their total revenue from a 
single mineral type. This triggers the country to rely on imports to spend the money, so 
domestic production is forgotten about, making the export of manufactured goods, apart from 
natural resource commodities, not possible (Sachs and Warner, 2001). At the regional level, 
Dutch disease happens when there is overreliance on external products to survive while 
export products from that region become too expensive due to the appreciation of the 
domestic currencies in real exchange (Feenstra, 2004, Leamer, 1995, and Ohlin, 1967). The 
shift of capital and labour to the booming sector, such as mining and the non-tradeable sector 
including construction and service, increases the cost of production in the tradeable sector 
such as manufactured goods and food products. Since most of the sub-Saharan Africa has no 
structured manufacturing, the Dutch disease is effective in the degradation of the 
manufacturing industry and in the raising of imports which become cheaper.  
 
The effect of the Equatorial Guinea oil industry serves as an example. The country started to 
produce oil in 1996, the percentage of GDP from oil reached 60 percent from 1998 to 2000 
and become 88 percent from 2001 to 2005 (Same, 2008). At the same time, the percentage of 
GDP of agriculture products shrunk from 30 percent in 1995 to 1 percent in 2001. The 
implication for the lives of the population was that, despite the rise in oil GDP from US$346 
in 1995 to US$3391 in 2004, 66 percent of them did not have portable water, 60 percent were 
still illiterate, and the government remained reluctant to distribute and allocate oil revenues to 
its citizen (Same, 2008, p. 11). In addition to that, the current real exchange rate of Equatorial 
Guinea Franc (GNF) continued to increase and 1 USD cost 9.067,56 on 20/09/2017 and 
9.139,80 GNF in 18/03/2019 (Exchange Rates, 2019).  
 
Moreover, the more a country receives mineral revenues the harder it is for them to ensure 
macroeconomic stability.  For Ross (2012), oil revenues tend to create procyclical rather than 
 22 
 
countercyclical fiscal policies. This means that the state focuses on policies of adjusting 
periodical fluctuation of increase and decrease in huge oil revenues, which induces extra-
financial management tasks combined with indebtedness (Ross, 2012, p. 224, Collier, 2005). 
These management tasks include difficulties in the control of inflation, which result from a 
lack of domestic production in other sectors and a reallocation task of huge mineral revenues 
in those sectors. 
 
In addition to difficulties in macroeconomic stabilisation due to mineral resources, there is 
the issue of indebtedness of resource rich countries. Obtaining loans becomes easy for 
mineral rich countries because at least they have collateral to show the loaners. Countries 
such as the DRC, Nigeria and Angola have been able to attract foreign loans in exchange for 
mineral resources and land. Loans mostly come in the form of infrastructure development or 
new technology, as the example of China-Africa relations illustrates (see Brautigam, 2009). 
In the case of the DRC, China agreed in 2007 to build infrastructure, such as roads, schools 
and hospitals, in exchange for the country’s mines. The contract was valued at 5 billion USD, 
but the IMF stopped it because of DRC’s foreign debts. The contract also effected other 
mining companies coming from other parts of the world and not necessarily from China.  The 
China-DRC mining contact in exchange for infrastructure would otherwise have created a 
monopoly in the country, instead the country has hundreds of mining companies from 
different corners of the world.  
 
The economic aspect of the resource curse also exists when governments fails to manage the 
boom of mineral revenues, and instead carry out projects that are not sustainable or efficient 
for the alleviation of poverty. Countries may build huge dams, create lakes or build luxurious 
buildings that have little impact for the development of the country as a whole (Magrin, 
2013). These projects are known as “white elephants”. The term originates from Thailand and 
other Asian countries, it portrays a traditional white elephant as an expensive animal 
decorated and designed for worship and other luxurious uses. It is a burden to have and 
manage big and unprofitable projects for the local and national population. In the same way, 
the white elephant became a burden to the people and caused unhappiness to the Thai king. 
The gift was designed to punish the recipient by making them poorer and eventually 
bankrupt. In a similar vein, in developing nations the populations pay most of the costs of 
white elephant projects. The countries choose to build such projects just to balance money 
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with fiscal policies, diminishing the effect of inflation in the country or to trace areas of 
public attention to attract popular admiration.  
 
Looking at the economic aspects of the resource curse we learned that the regulation of the 
mining sector involves both macroeconomic strategies including improving the 
manufacturing level, setting up transparent budgeting, proper collection of mineral revenues 
and redistribution and allocation. The process also involves microeconomic ways of handling 
poverty and improving local livelihoods especially in rural mining vicinities. Most of the 
global and national mining standards and acts focus on these aspects but the implementation 
of these acts has been something else. In the case of EAC, the research explores whether the 
regulation of mining respects both macro and micro economic aspects of the resource curse.  
 
2.2.2. Political aspect of the resource curse 
 
There are three aspects of the political resource curse that affect regulation of the mining 
sector: (1) uneven distribution of resource benefits at the national level, (2) institutional 
problems resulting from mineral rents and corruption including retardation of 
democratisation, and (3) resource conflicts and wars. First, uneven distribution of resource 
revenues induces poverty and anger among the population which elicits violence with citizens 
hoping to change the status quo. Moreover, high levels of poverty trigger looting, which is 
used as an alternative to improve the individual’s economic conditions (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2005, p. 631).  
 
It has proven difficult for most of sub-Saharan Africa to regulate the distribution of mineral 
resources due to the involvement of political elites in accumulating resource wealth and using 
this for private enrichment. Reno (1998, p. 21) argues that political elites, especially those 
with minimum local legitimacy, have been involved in looting activities in their own country 
– a phenomena which has exacerbated the resource governance issues in most of sub-Saharan 
African states. Political elites have been depriving larger population from benefitting from 
resource wealth. For instance, there have been cases of looting in Central African Republic 
(CAR) and in DRC (former Zaire) under Mobutu, in Central African Republic (CAR) under 
Bokasa from 1966 to 1979, and in Nigeria in the period from 1983 to 1998 (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005, p. 631). In former Zaire, president Mobutu accumulated all the resource 
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wealth, both before and after nationalisation of the mining sector in 1973 but did not manage 
to distribute revenues in the east mineral rich territory. This triggered ethnic divisions in the 
eastern part of the country lacking social development, inclusive development and necessary 
infrastructure including roads and hospitals. During his regime period from 1965 to 1997, he 
amassed more than 5 billion USD, but did not manage to build a road joining the eastern and 
western part of the country. As a consequence, rebellion broke out in eastern Congo such as 
Mai Mai and the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Force for Liberation of Congo) let by 
Laurent Desire Kabila and toppled his regime in 1997.  
 
Lack of distribution induces people to look for livelihoods in a greedy way (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). Greed theory means that people balance the cost and benefit of joining 
rebellion, finding find that it is economically worth joining. The argument mostly supported 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2005) prevails its supremacy over the grievance; an argument 
that means that people recur to violence because of social injustices such as horizontal 
inequalities or ethnic marginalisation. In greed theory, combatants or conflicting factions 
choose to enter into war for economic profit. Therefore, global, regional and local standards 
of mining prevent the occurrence of such resource wars by tracing the origin of the minerals 
and ensuring that minerals are not created from greedy violence at the local level, for instance 
the ICGLR mineral traceability certification, OECD due diligence guidance and Dodd-Frank 
Act. Although these rules weaken the mineral trading in conflictual and greedy environments, 
they do not necessarily tackle the domestic problem related to distribution and allocation of 
mineral resources.  
 
Second, resource rents create conflict instead of growth. Mineral rents are money that MNCs 
pay to government officials as excess or part of their return during and after resource 
extraction. The effect is that the more rent paid the more political elites become opportunistic 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005, p. 632). The current efficiency in production of MNCs, as a 
result of technology and less expenditure of labour, increases the return and enables 
companies to pay rents to the government officials. In mineral rich zones of weak states, 
elites who have the authority on a mining territory have the opportunity to get more rents and 
accumulate more wealth. There are currently global and local mining standards to enhance 
transparency in mining deals in a way that clears the mineral revenue collection and avoids 
non-transparent use of resource revenues and rents, including the illegal transfer of money. 
Such initiatives are, for instance, the EITI principles, as will be discussed in the following 
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chapter. However, the enforcement of these global standards is not done across all mineral 
rich territories, and even where they exist, they do not have capacity to induce more 
transparency and accountability, especially when there is no political and administrative will 
among government officials and MNC leaders. For instance, the EITI covers only Tanzania 
in the whole of the EAC, and indeed, the mineral rents management issues and corruption 
have been an outcome of both MNCs and political and administrative elites’ malfunctions. 
These malfunctions are mostly beyond global and local mining standards.    
 
 
Third, resource conflicts arise over competition between different actors over access to and 
control of specific mineral endowment of the country, minerals which are highly valued in 
the global market – the strategic minerals (see Le Billon, 2013, Watts, 2010). Actors compete 
to access these minerals in the same environment and these trigger resource-based wars, 
especially in the case of oil in the Middle East and metals, gemstone and timber in sub-
Saharan Africa (see Le Billon, 2013, p. 1) (see case of diamond in Sierra Leone, or coltan and 
timber in Eastern DRC). In the international community, it is highlighted that among metals 
the most sensitive conflict minerals are 3TGs (tin, tantalum/coltan, tungsten, and gold); 
central east Africa is rich in 3TGS but also in oil. However, we find in the research cases a 
predominance of 3Ts in Rwanda, Gold in Tanzania, and the nascent oil and metal industry in 
Uganda. Even though the countries have different minerals reserves, these are the major 
specific resource conditions that have determined the resource extraction political economy 
of the EAC member states in the last two decades.  
 
Le Billon (2013, 2001) uses the political ecology approach to show that the endowment of the 
special type of mineral in certain environments promotes wars and furthers resource conflicts. 
“Contemporary resource-linked conflicts are rooted in the history of “resource” extraction 
successively translated by mercantilism, colonial capitalism, and state cryptocracy” (Le 
Billon, 2001, p.563). The awakening of the interest of this social group to certain type of 
resources determines the conflict and wars of interests.  
 
Mineral resources, though they might be abundant, deplete over time and, according to Le 
Billon, this triggers stress, fear of losing too much, and increases the tenacity of competition 
over resource control. Competing groups always think that the lack of control of resources 
means losing their livelihood. This sense of dependence over resources induces the use of 
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force and strategies to maintain access and ownership. Local factions may fight between 
themselves at the local level, or states may wage wars regionally to ensure resource control. 
Regional factions may also enter into wars with foreign forces. In EAC, there are no such 
groups yet that attack foreign companies or interests over resource territories, but forms of 
riot and resistance still exist. In Tanzania the researcher witnessed riots in North Mara against 
the control of gold mine owned by Acacia. The degree of awareness of interest in gold exists 
in North Mara, as most people used to mine gold in North Mara in the artisan way and 
depended heavily on gold to earn their financial livelihood. Once the company was 
established, the ring-fencing mechanism and forced resettlement in the region stripped local 
people of this livelihood and created a resource conflict that took the lives of hundreds of 
locals.   
 
Moreover, corruption in resource governance triggers the creation of shadow states. This 
means that power and influence in the decision-making process is in the hands of a group of 
people, the shadow state concept explains the relationship between formal states institutions 
and (informal) business dealers; it links corruption and politics – a form of autocratic rule, or 
neopatrimonialism, constructed behind formal state- sovereign institutions (Reno 2002, 
p.107). The relationship in shadow states between private syndicates, MNCs or other 
international actor is important and evolves around control and management of resources or 
public funds, or the control of the market. Therefore, it is important for the group within the 
government or private syndicate to make a powerful organ which controls the functioning of 
states or governments making it act against legitimate ways vested in the constitution. Doing 
so, the group has access to manipulate the normal functioning of the state and the government 
for their own interests. In neopatrimonialism, for instance, the leader’s cronies and their 
group have a big influence in decision-making, contrary to the will or interests of the rest of 
the population.  
Reno (1998, pp. ix-x) argues that in most of developing societies in Africa, command over 
resources come from specific individuals who serve their individual interests, far away from 
formal governance processes.  The network then extends to mercenaries, rogue generals, and 
civil servants and foreign entrepreneurs who must serve the interest of rulers for exchange of 
access to resources, opportunities, public goods and protection. Reno asserts that in that 
situation, it is hard to resist serving the rulers because of the guarantee of support that the 
ruler provides once one falls in conflict or competition with other actors. 
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Reno (1998, p. 21) asserts that rulers recur to corruption mostly because they do not have 
internal legitimacy and bureaucratic efficiency. In fact, rulers accumulate wealth by 
interfering in the market, and then transform that private wealth into political resources to 
buy off the opposition or distribute money for political purpose. The activities of 
accumulation and distribution occur through commercial partners rather than formal state 
institutions (see Reno, 1998, p. 21). This happens in the absence or process of lifting foreign 
aids, rulers may eventually recur to other ways of getting finance through mobilising 
resources such as informal ways and through selling country resources to private companies 
but through hidden ways. Companies may show themselves as they have fulfilled the 
procedure but having a tacit agreement of revenue shares with rulers. In this case, even the 
claims of institutions such as parliament, revenue authorities and general auditing offices 
become obsolete and irrelevant.  
Shadow states or “deeper states” work against the norms and standards set in recognised 
legitimate institutions, even though agents are mostly in public institutions, they work 
privately. Shadow state organisations include not only people in the system but also the mafia 
and rebel factions. Examples of shadow states in Africa are Liberia, Togo, Sierra Leone, and 
Nigeria; the most notorious shadow states being DR Congo, and Central African Republic 
(Reno, 2002). Shadow states are characterised by authoritarian leaders who accrue wealth 
through corruption, embezzlement and accumulation of public wealth to private coffers. In 
DRC, the former Zaire Mobutu controlled US $ 6 billion (Akin and Collins 1999). President 
Hasting Banda managed much of Malawi business activities and Samuel Doe of Liberia in 10 
years has already amassed half of the national GDP (Kowenhoven 1989). African 
Confidential (2000) reported that Sani Abaca amassed US $ 3billions in less than five years 
of rule (Beissinger and Young, 2002, p. 108).  
Mineral rents retard democracy in the Middle East and Africa (Ross, 2001, p. 357). In his 
empirical study, Ross concluded that mineral resources have a rentier effect, a repression 
effect and modernisation effects in developing societies. With the rentier effect, countries 
reduce tax and charges to the companies in order to reduce the burden of accountability and 
transparency. This facilitates the companies to collect more money from mines and manage 
the transfer of rents to government elites. States and companies pay the cost of compliance by 
reducing standards on accountability, whilst elites facilitate companies and states to escape 
from that burden in exchange for more rents. Informing the public on accurate mineral 
revenues may increase tensions in a society demanding more revenue redistribution, 
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companies instead choose to hide such information alongside the elite, who are informed but 
keep silent due to benefits that they get from mineral rents.  
With the repression effect, mineral rents induce huge investment in security apparatuses 
(Ross, 2001, p.357), mostly targeting political elites who claim for more transparency in the 
mining sector or for economic reforms. Incumbent elites become very repressive and 
authoritarian against their own people. On an extreme level, state apparatuses turn violent 
towards the people at the national and local level, especially in the areas related to resource 
governance or mineral resource activities. For Ross, oil exporters have more of an effect on 
authoritarianism than mineral exporters and the latter suffer more from the rentier effect than 
the repression effect. However, this indicates a research gap, 18 years of time has elapsed 
since this research, but it also shows the repression of the opposition and of journalists who 
want to put clear the issues of mining in certain African states. Similar forms of repression 
linked with resource conflicts, as we shall see in the next parts, are happening in non-oil 
exporters in Africa, as in the case of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.  
With the modernisation effect, Ross (2001, p. 357) argues that mineral revenues induce the 
country to focus on mining than developing human capital, as earlier discussed in the paradox 
of plenty. Consequently, a lack of education and human capital further delays the economic 
and human development necessary for democratic take off. Ferguson (2006, p. 197) 
highlights that states depend on maintaining its political base in mine areas, such as with the 
powerful mine worker in Zambia – the Mineworkers Union of Zambia, composed of 100,000 
workers, it has been a centripetal force of copper mining in the 1960s. However, the problem 
that occurs in current forms of extractive industry is that mining no longer creates cities, or 
strong forces of working elites that can tangibly contribute to social and political activities as 
miners now not only get meagre salaries but there are less of them and they are bound by 
unstable contracts. The international standards encourage the development of workers, and 
labour rights, the local content and corporate social responsibility but with low effect on the 
ground. There is still a knowledge gap on whether such standards mobilize tangible local 
livelihoods and transform the mining vicinities into thriving urban areas necessary for social 
and political development.   
However, in the context of mining sector, the flow of global capital negatively affects 
existing weak institutions in Africa (see Ross, 2001). Ferguson (2006) and Ross (2012) argue 
that the flow of global capital investment increases the effect of corruption, conflict and 
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violence between elites. This might be the reason why investment in mining does not 
necessarily bring stable institutions, whether this is the case of the EAC. For this reason, we 
refer to the political ecology approach because this at least focuses on the interplay of actors 
in mines, their imbalance in power and benefits, and how these affect the mining activities. 
Institutions result from global and local factors and both global and local mining acts affect 
the way actors work. The major task of this work is to look at whether this interplay is 
facilitating mining regulation or making it worse and, for what reasons.  
As mentioned above, the approach focuses on the effect of increases in interests and values of 
mineral resources in both local and global actors in triggering conflict or violence among 
actors. It is a fact that the EAC is increasingly getting more mining opportunities in strategic 
and important minerals for IT industries, construction for car, military and aerospace 
materials such as cobalt, copper, tin, lithium, and iron, in addition to gold and tantalum 
(coltan) and oil. Therefore, we assume that governance and regulation of mining in the EAC 
is becoming harder and therefore assess whether global and local standards and institutions 
established to regulate mining in central and eastern Africa are effective enough to 
counterbalance the negative effect that result from increases in interest among actors.  
The political aspect of the resource curse helps us to understand the role of regulation of the 
mining sector. The regulation helps to overcome violence and poverty by ensuring better 
distribution and allocation of mineral revenues. It also helps to understand the role of 
government elites in resource government and how their leaning towards MNCs and leaving 
out of the people’s interests have accrued more socio-political difficulties in sub-Saharan 
Africa, including resource conflicts and wars. Therefore, socio-political conditions within 
states are necessary tools to assess the resource governance and regulation of the mining 
sector in the context of globalisation of mining standards and acts. The comparative case 
study in the EAC for the countries of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda enables us to understand 
the relevance in social political conditions for states to accommodate and enforce global and 
local mining standards. 
The EAC has been identified as a conflict mineral zone. Therefore, this research relies on 
political aspects resource curse/conflict to assess the ways established global and regional 
mechanism such as traceability and value chain rules from ICGLR, Dodd-Frank Acts and 
OECD due Diligence Guidance (see details in Chapter three) prevent the occurrence of 
resource-based violence and wars in the whole region.    
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2.2.3. Discussions and controversies surrounding the resource curse hypothesis 
 
The main argument in this sub-chapter is to deepen the understanding that socio-economic 
and political conditions matter in resource governance and regulation and, not to loosely 
assess the resource governance issues as a mere result of resource endowments. Basedau 
(2005) argues that natural resources are not a curse per se, other conditions matter to trigger a 
resource curse. These conditions are, for instance, the resource-specific conditions, and socio-
economic and political conditions. The political condition hinges on the distribution of 
political power in the country, as well as the link between the resource use and the power use. 
Therefore, the worse the governance in the country the more resource management and 
regulation in general become counterproductive.  
In a more practical sense, Basedau (2005, p. 12) highlights that historical legacies in 
connection with resource extraction may have an impact on the quality of institutions. He 
argues that extractive industry in sub-Saharan Africa causes harm to MNC host countries 
especially those that lack property rights, civil rights, and have an extreme level of illegal and 
unfair expropriation. Most mining regulations at the local level give more power to states in 
controlling and managing resource rich territories, but in most cases, they lack other 
regulations for property rights including land rights, labour rights including minimum but 
balanced wages, and compensation mechanisms once expropriated. Based on this controversy 
of Basedau (2005) over the resource curse, we highlight that functional institutions at the 
local level are prerequisites for the regulation of mining and that global mining standards 
work once sustained by local institutions, not only working for mines but also other areas of 
property rights including land, human and labour rights. Such local institutions are, for 
instance, laws that govern land tenure and the rule of law. 
In terms of resource conditions, the type of resource matters. The literature shows that oil, 
diamond, tin cobalt, and copper have been sources of a curse. Angola and Nigeria faced the 
case oil curse; Sierra Leone faced the curse of diamond, and DRC a complex resource curse 
ranging from oil and metals (gold, cobalt, tin, and tantalum or coltan), land and timber.  The 
needs and the global dependence over certain types of minerals like oil and coltan triggered 
the need to compete over resources. In general, the increased metal endowment in terms of 
cobalt, uranium, coltan, copper and tin put the region of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, West 
Tanzania at risk of a resource curse. Indeed, the new extraction of oil in South Sudan, 
Uganda, Kenya, and the tanzanite in Tanzania exacerbates a regional resource curse risk. 
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In short, pre-resource conditions matter. While, for instance, diamond triggered development 
in Botswana, it stimulated a curse in Sierra Leone. Therefore, looking at EAC preconditions 
leads to a deeper analysis of how the member state deals with resource curse phenomena and 
how these preconditions, especially in terms of institutions, back up regulation of the mining 
sector.  
 
2.3. The effect of globalisation on state sovereignty 
  
State sovereignty over resource control have been advocated by the UN resolution 1803 of 
1962 as a basis to enable newly independent resource rich states of Africa to have full control 
of mineral rich territories as a mechanism of resource governance and regulation. However, 
the approach or use of such a resolution was contrary to the nature of the state and global 
political economy, which ended up failing. The nature of states regarding sovereignty is that 
they have never had total control of their territories and so states share its territorial hegemon 
with several other actors from the global to the national level (see Agnew, 2009), such 
exclusive sovereignty or national sovereignty over resource governance was not only 
dysfunctional but also was misleading since it induced the nationalisation of mines and the 
total collapse of the mining sector in sub-Saharan Africa in 1970s until 1990s.  It was simply 
termed as a poisoned gift given to these new independent states of Africa (see Emel et al, 
2011). For them, sovereignty “must be understood in relational terms to consider the global 
geography of non-state actors that shape access to and control over natural resources” (Emel 
et al, 2011, p. 1).   
Contrary to nationalisation, the liberalisation of mines that started in the end of 1990s enabled 
sub-Saharan African states to accumulate more foreign direct investment in the mining sector 
but, with minimum revenues since companies could invest with minimum tax and royalties 
(see Campbell, 2004, Ferguson, 2006). Still, with this lack of revenue accumulation, state 
sovereignty over resource control is not complete since the state has the capacity to 
accumulate FDIs but without the capacity to collect tax. However, it represents progress in 
comparison to the nationalisation that preceded the liberalisation of mines. In order to retain 
this sovereignty of revenue collection, global and national mining acts provide increases in 
royalties, and improvements in tax collection mechanisms (see following three chapters). 
However, even if such a mechanism is set, sovereignty of the sub-Saharan African state over 
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natural resources is challenged by the collection of tax from MNCs and the distribution of 
these tax/revenues to the people, as the case of Tanzania shows (see, Emel et al, 2011, pp76-
77). For them, people are often neither represented by or submissive to the territorial state 
(Emel et al, 2011, p. 77). In this research we intend to highlight the types of sovereign 
regimes that emerge in the EAC members states in relation to the current global and local 
trends of resource governance and whether they are positive (sovereignty) in effecting mining 
regulation.     
In this sub-chapter we discuss the emerging academic discussion on the effect of 
globalisation to national sovereignty in the domain of resource governance. The first effect is 
the increase of pluralism in the control of state territories brought in by globalisation (see 
Agnew, 2009, p.136). The second is the creation of enclave economies due to global capital 
flow of investment in mining sector (see Ferguson, 2006) and its raising concern at the local 
level, where stakeholders increasingly put pressure on governments and MNCs to have a 
portion in mining benefit through different ways of negotiation, demonstration and violence 
(See Werthmann and Ayeh, 2017, p.17). 
  
2.3.1. The effect of globalisation over national sovereignties and territorial control 
 
Globalisation is defined here as a process based on the flow of global capital investment to 
different global territories regardless of state boundaries. Globalisation allows MNCs to 
invest in different corners of the world without limitations. This process can therefore induce 
a loss of sovereignty of developing nations due to relative power of MNCs in both finance 
and politics. Financially, multinationals have a budget that most developing nations do not 
have, this allows MNCs to shape policies and indirectly control the governance of resource 
rich territories (see Hönke, 2009, Agnew, 2009, Ferguson, 2006).  
Agnew (2009) asserts that states have been losing sovereignty in the neoliberal order more 
than ever before. The economic globalisation and global capital flow especially in mining 
sector reduced the capacity of states to control their territories. Sovereignty is one of the 
important components of a state as it enables states to control their own territory and to 
prevent domination and coercion of people within this territory from internal and external 
forces. Therefore, global forces and networks influence state governance and regulatory 
capacities over their territories (Agnew, 2009, vii) but sometimes, global forces, especially in 
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extractive industry, infringe on the labour and human rights of the local nationals (see 
Schubert, Engel and Macamo, 2018). Loss of sovereignty then exists in the trend of 
globalisation once global flows of capital affect territorial control, divert decision making 
processes and infringe on human and labour rights of local citizens.    
However, Agnew (2009, p.2) asserts that states have never monopolised either total political 
or economic regulation over their territories. For him, globalisation has complicated the 
relationship between sovereignty and territory, mainly because it brings in forms of pluralism 
in the exercise of territorial control (sees Agnew, 2009, p. 136). The flow of global capital 
investment without borders increases this pluralistic effect even in the developing nations of 
Africa. However, this aspect of pluralism caused by globalisation does not work for all 
countries (Agnew, 2009, p.136). Since the liberalisation of mining in Africa and the EAC at 
the end of 1990s, MNCs, traders, ASMs and other stakeholders increased their mining 
activities, and this has had the effect on the use of mineral rich territories. However, there is 
limited knowledge on how EAC member states or society in general cope with such pluralism 
in a way that enables benefits from the sector for the local society.  
MNCs maintain influence over resource rich territories and so limit the ability of competing 
forces to enter the zone. This happens particularly in the case of strategic minerals in 
developing nations, such as oil and metals. Even though diamond is expensive, it is not a 
strategic mineral like oil, gold and metals.. Oil is not only a necessity for transport but also a 
source of military power and a vital element in the functioning of the state economy. Metals 
are used in the industry of construction, IT and for military equipment. Keenan (2012) 
studied the Tuareg struggle and resistance in Niger and Mali and indicated that due to the 
international role of uranium, the grievances around land and the marginalisation of Tuareg 
communities were mixed with other global concerns such as the war against terrorism. He 
argues that across the Sahel, as elsewhere in Africa, struggles over resources go beyond the 
economic interests of companies and local issues, but are mixed with the global geostrategic 
interest of superpowers in Western and Eastern World competing to control sub-Saharan 
resource rich territories such as Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia and DRC (see Keenan, 2012). Such 
strategic uses of minerals increase the struggle over resource rich territories and induces the 
problem of territorial control in weak states.  
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2.3.2. Enclave economies in the mining sector   
 
The other important characteristic of mineral investments in Africa nowadays is enclaving. 
Mineral extraction creates enclave economies leaving behind no social footprint or social 
development effects (Ferguson 2006, p. 201). Ferguson observes that the mineral extraction 
in Africa is currently socially ‘thin’ meaning that the enclave character of mining activity 
does not allow the society to benefit from mines and thus, MNCs invest less in social projects 
such as schools, playgrounds and socially oriented activities. Consequently, there is little in 
the way of provision for locals through social activities and the livelihoods of poor people in 
mining vicinities.  
Enclave economies in mining is triggered by new modes of mineral extraction which have 
been highlighted as mostly dominated by forms of offshore extraction. Ferguson (2006) 
differentiates the offshore and onshore extraction. The former characterises extraction in a 
space which is geographically distinct from others, for instance, offshore is on sea levels 
(case of Angola, or most oil sites in West Africa) while the latter is extraction on land (case 
of Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda). The former looks “clean” since it is totally independent from 
other territories and therefore independent from its environmental and social effects as it 
looks like an insular region, the latter looks unclean, unjust and unequal because it is situated 
in rich zones but with a poor local vicinity (see Ferguson, 2006, p 201). Ferguson points out 
that the extractive industry increasingly looks like an offshore model, as even in the onshore 
model, companies protect their mining zone from the rest of the environment through the use 
wired fences and private and public security. This is called ‘spatial enclaving of production’ 
in which foreign crews of skilled workers and security forces are used to control mines for 
the company and separate it from the rest of the local community and national society 
(Ferguson, 2006, p. 203). 
For example, oil production in the case of Angola is a thin offshore model of extraction. The 
country is one of the world’s leading oil exporters, producing about 1 million barrels per day 
in early 2000s and receiving $8 billion of oil revenue each year. Production occurs in very 
deep water while very little of the oil revenues enters wider society, moreover Angolans are 
among the poorest people in the world with low human development indicators (Ferguson, 
2006, p198). The oil industry imports all equipment and materials, including food and water. 
The entire industry, including the parastatal corporation SONANGOL, employs less than 
10,000 nationals, with local contractors (Ferguson, 2006, p. 198). Skilled labour comes from 
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abroad, hired on short-term contracts, they live in protected zones and go from the airport to 
their compound in helicopters, bypassing the surrounding towns (Ferguson, 2006, pp.198-
199).  
Consequently, extractive enclave economies have been generating a need for change at the 
local level, this sometimes causes conflicts that engage local people, MNCs and state agents. 
Such conflicts demand reforms in mining activities in a way that include the local actors in 
mining activities or related activities. In other words, this increases pressure of different 
actors involved in mining, such as for states and MNCs to share space, roles and benefits 
from mining activity – an aspect which has triggered the concept of regulative pluralism (see 
Megret, 2011, Cote and Korf, 2016). Regulative pluralism is understood as “complex forms 
of regulation where non-state and illegal mining entrepreneurs compete in governing mining 
extraction” (Cote and Korf, 2016, p.1). Based on research on Burkina Faso gold mining, Cote 
and Korf argue that “plurification” of mining regulation results from effect of competition of 
entrepreneurs in shaping mining rules and brokering regulatory authorities in mining 
concessions. In this process, local politics and social relations play an important role.  
This type of resource governance began in the 1990s and exists with nodes of governance 
made of global and local stakeholders especially the MNCs, states and local people (see 
Werthmann and Ayeh, 2017). Nodes of governance result from “encounters of various 
interest groups in context of extractive activities” and include regional organisation, nation 
states and local governments, MNCs, NGOs and local population (Werthmann and Ayeh, 
2017, p. 18). Using the triad stakeholder approach, the relationship between the MNC, state 
and local people, and in the case of Karma in Burkina Faso gold mine, Katja Werthmann and 
Diana Ayeh, concluded that there is an increase of pressure from local population groups in 
shaping their place in mining activities that were the domain of state and MNCs.  
Regulation aims at reducing enclave mining and at counterbalancing resource conflict and 
violence through enhancing mechanisms of redistribution of resource revenues, inducing the 
CSR and local content and creating a more functioning and pluralist environment caused by 
globalisation. There are several global and national mining standards now in place to do so 
but little is known about how they work and whether they are effective. Some focus on 
increasing accountability and transparency (see EITI), others on CSR and local content as 
well as the integration of ASM (see different national and international mining acts) and other 
on preventing resource conflicts and violence (see for instance ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-
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Frank Acts) highlighted in the following chapters. Therefore, based on two approaches such 
as the political ecology approach and regulation approach, we try to answer the research 
question on how the regulation of mining works in the EAC and whether these global and 
national mining acts are effective in preventing a resource curse, enclave economies and their 
consequences on EAC member states.   
   
2.4. Summary  
 
The previous studies highlighted the issues related to resource governance and regulation in 
developing nations especially in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the predominant theory on 
resource curse hypothesis and the effect of globalisation to the sovereignty of weak states. 
Except Botswana, most of sub-Saharan Africa resource rich countries such as Angola, DRC, 
Nigeria had fallen into a resource curse. There were few benefits from the mining sector for 
local and national level, which continues to posit a major problem in the mining sector in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
Political ecology explains the issue of resource conflicts in developing nations which have 
more strategic and globally important minerals than others (see Le Billon, 2013). These 
minerals are for instance oil, gold, and metals. As EAC member states have these minerals 
especially in the 3TGs (tin, tantalum, Tungsten and gold) the region is very prone to resource 
conflict. This makes regulation of the sector more difficult, as well as regionally and globally 
sensitive. 
The chapter also highlighted the literature that explains the effect of globalisation to the 
sovereignty of developing nations that eventually affects the regulation of mining sector. It 
highlights how current global capital flows in the mining sector in developing nations are 
characterised by spatial enclaving which means controlling and exploiting mines in the sense 
that all investment, profit and benefits in general do not flow into the rest of society. There 
are organised structures of the mining industry that use subsidiary mechanisms, and other 
forms of efficient and protected extraction which not only prevent the entrance of other actors 
but also limit local benefit. Ferguson (2006) considers most of extraction in Africa as an 
offshore model, kept at a distance from the rest of the economy and society. In some cases, 
companies use wired fences and private security guards to protect the extractive zones. 
MNCs also use few employees with meagre salaries, this weakens the local effect of 
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development and so prevents further social and political modernisation (see Ross, 2001). In a 
worst-case scenario, companies may recur to violence, forced resettlement of the population 
and infringe on human and labour rights of the local population.  
Recent studies in mining regulation provided useful material to understand the issue of the 
sector in Africa. Mostly using a stakeholder approach especially, the relationship between 
MNCs, states and the local population (see Werthmann and Ayeh, 2017), regulative pluralism 
(see Megret, 2011, Cote and Korf, 2016) highlights the increasing pressure of other actors 
apart from MNCs and states in mining activities. In this process, local people are pressing for 
more roles and more benefits from mining. Moreover, there is an increasing global and 
national mining standard which pressures MNCs and states to correct mining malpractices 
and distribute mineral rents to the rest of the society in a way to prevent a resource curse and 
poverty, especially in mining vicinities and at a national level. Policies including ASMs have 
been put in place, especially since early 2000. This research uses political ecology to assess 
whether regulation is working in the EAC member states.  The reason is that the approach fits 
well with the case of EAC which is increasingly home to more expensive and strategic 
minerals that the global IT, military and aerospace industries need – an environmental fact 
which induces hardships in managing and regulating the mining sector in the region.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF MINING RELEVANT FOR EAC 
 
This chapter highlights different regulations governing the extractive industry and mining 
sector in Africa and more specifically in the EAC member states. It explores international 
standards with relevance to EAC member states. The chapter consists of global or 
international rules and standards over mineral exploitation such as the UN resolutions, the 
EITI principles; ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Frank Legislation. 
 
3.1. The UN resolutions 
 
The beginning of international regulations on natural resources in Africa started in the 1958 
and more specifically in the 1960s. Within that, periods among other resolution, two are 
important in matters related to governance of resources. The first is the resolution 1515 (XV) 
of 1960s which was more concerned with levels of poverty and the economy of subsistence 
of new states. The objective as clearly stated in this resolution was to act for economic 
development of newly independent countries emphasizing how to increase the value of their 
exported natural resources. The second is resolution 1803 of December 1962 that ascertains 
“permanent sovereignty over natural resources” and therefore limiting any kind of unfair 
exploitation of resources by foreign actors without consent and agreements with those weak 
and new states. The third is the resolution 62/274 of 2008, this provides more transparency 
and accountability in international and national trade including the deals between 
multinational companies and nation states. 
The resolution 1515 (XV) is entitled “concerted action for economic development of less 
economically developed countries” and reveals the need of the UN to upgrade the economies 
of newly independent African members in the 1960s. The framework of the resolution was to 
use UN institutions to promote the economic and social development of  all people 
worldwide including those that were poor (UN, 1960, p.9). The resolution refers to the 
principle objective of the UN which stipulates the promotion for higher standards of living, 
and therefore asked member states to take joint and separate action in line with achieving that 
 39 
 
goal (UN, 1960). There are six strategies indicated below, that would allow newly 
independent countries to make such an international goal.  
The first is to accelerate the economic and social advancement of the less developed countries 
of the world, thus contributing to safeguarding their independence and helping to close the 
gap in standards of living between the more developed and less developed countries. Second 
is to recognize that social and economic advancement requires the development and 
diversification of economic activity, allowing good condition of the market, food production 
and industrialisation. Third, is to promote the fact that less developed countries would; (a) get 
opportunities of selling in the international market with stable and remunerative price so as to 
facilitate them improving their own economy and acquiring profit in foreign exchanges; (b) 
acquire public and private capital on acceptable term from developed states, through 
international organizations (IOs) and multilateral or bilateral cooperation (c) receive technical 
cooperation and knowledge transfer, and acquisition of modern techniques of production 
from developed nations; (d) get opportunities in scientific and cultural exchanges and 
cooperation; and (e) acquire help and facilitates to implementation of socio-economic and 
human development (UN, 1960). 
The fourth measure provides that: (a) member states and the international organs concerned 
should continue urgently in halting excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade  and 
restrictive practices or measures which have unfavourable repercussions on the trade of basic 
and primary commodities, (b) there should be compensatory mechanism whereby large 
fluctuation in the market exist in favour of developing nations (c) there should be technical 
training, education and pre-investment assistance, (d) member states would provide 
development capital to developing nations (e) member states should design regional 
economic communities in order to expand markets to all nations with consideration of third 
parties (UN, 1960). The fifth measure recommends “the sovereign right of every state to 
dispose of its wealth and its natural resources” and then calls for its respect in conformity 
with the rights and duties of states under international law principles (UN, 1960). The sixth 
article requests the economic and social council, the secretary-general, the specialized 
agencies andthe international atomic energy agency. The government of state members of 
these organizations consider the implementation and effectiveness of all the measures and 
principles of this resolution for the common benefit of humans (UN, 1960).  
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The resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 gives “Permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources”. It stipulates that the permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources is 
the basic constituent of the right to self-determination and therefore recommends the 
strengthening and a full survey of the status of the permanent sovereignty of peoples and 
nations over their natural wealth and resources (UN, 1962). The resolution stipulates that 
respect of sovereignty of developing nations over their resources is the basics of international 
cooperation and development of developing nations. 
There are four basic points in this resolution. First, the right of people and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interests of 
national development and well-being of people. Second, the exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources, as well as the flow of foreign capital in the recipient country should be 
judged necessary by the host county and be in conformity with local regulations and 
authorisations (UN, 1962). Third, the flow of that international investment and its earning 
shall be governed by national legislation but also in conformity of respect of international 
law; the profit must be shared in the proportions agreed upon between investors and the 
recipient state, due care being taken to ensure that there is no impairment, for any reason of 
that state’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources (UN, 1962). Fourth, 
nationalization, expropriation, or requisitioning shall be based on reasons of public utility, 
security or the national interest but not individual or private interests. Once nationalisation or 
similar cases happen, the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation based on national and 
international law (UN, 1962).  
The resolution stipulates that in case there is controversy in compensation, the national 
jurisdiction must be exhausted (UN, 1962). However, it also gives room to international 
adjudication: “upon agreement by sovereign states and other parties concerned settlement of 
the disputes should be made through international adjudication” (UN, 1962). This article also 
gives more power to states than MNCs in the face of controversy and less likeliness of 
international adjudication.  
Fifth, the resolution reiterates the principle of equality between nations that exist in 
international relations and put it in the context of natural resource management. This 
principle generally talks about mutual respect of nations and therefore provides that 
sovereignty over people’s resource management should go hand in hand with mutual respect 
of nations and states’ equality (UN, 1962).  
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Sixth, international co-operation for economic development of developing countries should 
be based on the independence of developing countries. This independence is linked with 
respect to self-determination in resource management.  Seventh, violation of the rights of 
peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth thwarts international cooperation 
and threatens global peace. Eighth, foreign investment agreements must be observed in good 
faith with strict respect to the sovereignty and rights of citizens (UN, 1962). 
As mentioned earlier, this resolution was a base of nationalization of mining companies in 
Africa in 1970s and 1980s. This nationalisation was followed by a decline in mineral 
production and the collapse of most of mining sector. With Structural Adjustment Programs 
that happened in 1990s, the opening-up mines as well as promotion of the private sector 
required countries to surrender mines to private companies acquiring foreign investment.  
Since the natural resources were confused with sovereignty of people and nations, elites have 
also gained powers to politicize resource distribution. The resource revenues are shared 
within the boundaries of those who have power by the hand or the majority ethnic group at 
the detriment of the minorities, depending on the weakness of sub-Saharan states and the 
level of efficiency and transparency in the public administration (see case of Nigeria by 
Anugwom, 2005). Therefore, the ideal of UN resolutions of 1960s did not efficiently achieve 
their objectives as the principle of sovereignty over developing countries’ mineral resources 
was followed by closure of mines, nationalisation, and depreciation of the mineral price in the 
international market.   
Although the resolution would counterbalance the colonial and neo-colonial forms of 
exploitation of resources in Africa it has created a form of uncertainty over resources and 
sovereignty in Africa which has had a negative impact on flow of investment in the mining 
sector, and development in general. Moreover, it did not prevent invasions over resources 
especially where it was needed by powerful regional and global powers. Indeed, the fact that 
mineral resources were interpreted as sovereign property of nations gave peace to states with 
involvement in the mining sector or to those with a deeper role in the management of private 
mining companies which resulted in deeper corruption and embezzlement.   
The UN and Bretton Woods Institutions injected the initiatives and policies in Africa, through 
SAP, that would improve conditions of increased flow of investment especially in the mining 
sector. These are for instance the Structural Adjustment Programs, and the recent New Public 
Management policies that would expand more involvement of the private sector, decreasing 
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the role of the government in the economy, improving transparency in extraction and giving 
companies more corporate social, infrastructural and developmental responsibilities.  
However, these opening-up policies of mines were followed by increasing in corruption, 
money laundering and repatriation of revenues in a way that made neither nationalisation nor 
liberalisation of the mines profitable to most of resource rich nations in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In pursuit of a solution, the UN adopted resolution 62/274 in 2008 which fostered 
transparency in extractive industries. Both states and companies are asked to be accountable 
to people for what they produce in mines and to be responsible in transferring income to other 
economic and social lives of people. As joint action, UN calls upon both NGOs and INGOs 
to promote such transparency and accountability in extractive industry especially in sub-
Saharan states. This resolution of 2008 is entitled “Strengthening transparency in industries”. 
The UN resolution 62/274 reaffirms the conference on trade and development held in Accra, 
Ghana, from 20 to 25 April 2008 and recalls the UN convention against corruption (UN, 
2008). It asserts that corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon 
that affects all societies and economies (UN, 2008). The resolution calls for international 
cooperation to prevent and support voluntary initiatives including the association of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). EITI is an international non-
governmental organisation created in 2003 and based in Oslo, Norway. The organisation 
engages with countries and companies to promote the transparency in the extractive industry.  
The UN resolution 62/274 provides that rule-based and predictable trade foster peace, curb 
mineral conflict, wars and terrorism in general (UN, 2008). It helps in clearing financial 
transactions in all countries, it emphasises the following points: (1) transparency   and   
accountability should respected, embraced, and promoted by all  member  states regardless 
the size and type of mineral resource endowment; (2) the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, anti-corruption measures in domestic law, in public administration, and in 
decision making process must be respected; (3) involvement of the international community 
is necessary in this process and should intervene upon request to support resource rich nations 
and especially those transiting from conflict to negotiate mutually satisfactory, transparent  
and  equitable  contracts with multinationals in the use and extraction of natural resources; (4) 
participation of countries in EITI and a high level of transparency and accountability should 
continuously be encouraged and there should be share of experience with others states. (UN, 
2008) 
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The resolution encourages the commitment to governance, equity and transparency in the 
financial, monetary and trading systems, and to open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems (UN, 2008). It encourages 
business and industry, transnational corporations, to establish worldwide corporate policies 
on sustainable development, to arrange for environmentally sound technologies from parent 
companies to their affiliates or subsidiaries without extra charges, and without compromising 
the local conditions and ecological situations (UN, 2008).  
This resolution of 2008 is in line with the reform to call for multinational companies engaged 
in resources extraction to be part of macro-economic stability in the recipient nations by 
injecting a share of their revenues into national economies. Besides, it aimed to fight against 
the repatriation of revenues as it has been claimed by many of sub-Saharan countries that 
were claiming that mining revenues always go back to foreign states at the detriment of 
national treasuries and local stock exchanges. 
The resolution calls upon the private sector and more specifically the corporations to be more 
active in transparency and on people centred sustainable development. Article 7 urges: 
“corporations engaged in the extractive industries (…) should ensure transparency and 
verifiable processes, while adhering to and promoting the principles of honesty, transparency 
and accountability to maximize the contribution of the private sector to the realization of 
social and people-centred sustainable development” (UN, 2008). The international 
community increasingly compels the companies to have corporate social responsibility and 
the more active role in implementing a developmental practice starting from the local vicinity 
to national wide economic inputs.  
 
3.2. The EITI standards 
 
EITI was created in June 17, 2003 and aims at increasing standards of transparency and 
accountability in extractive industry (oil, gas, metals, and other minerals). Its history shows 
that it started as a set of rules on revenue collection which latter transformed itself into set of 
international standards governing extraction industry. It does so through major principles 
which are beneficial ownership disclosure, transparency in contract between MNCs and 
recipient states, inclusion of EITI into government systems, and transparency in the trading of 
resource commodities. However, these principles faced challenges including the provision of 
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accurate and reliable information, integrating activities of EITI in the government processes 
through tax collection, budget arrangements and policies, and going beyond compliance to 
tangible and effective action. Most of the governments are reluctant to disclose the 
information on these aforementioned areas. For instance, the government of Angola was at 
the beginning unhappy with the oil company disclosure of information on money given to 
government in the process of licencing. In other cases, MNCs are sometime hiding important 
information to either government, media or EITI. 
In Africa EITI association members are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, DR 
Congo, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome et Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Togo and Zambia (EITI, 2007). The Central African Republic and Ethiopia were suspended; 
the former due to insecurity reasons the later due failure to meet the deadlines related to 
assessment. Tanzania is the only member of the EITI among the six EAC member states 
(EITI, 2007). 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global standard to promote the 
open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources (EITI, 2017). It believes 
that a country’s natural resources, such as oil, gas, metals and minerals, belong to its citizens 
and that extraction of these resources can lead to economic growth and social development 
(EITI 2016, p.1). Therefore, it seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform 
public debate and promote mutual understanding in 49 implementing countries, the EITI 
supports a coalition of government, companies, and civil society.  
The EITI processes evolved through the pursuit of benefit of natural resources to the public. 
Therefore, it monitors the ways (1) contracts and licences, (2) production, (3) revenue 
collection, (4) revenue allocation, (5) and social and economic contribution are done in 
extractive industry. The contracting parties are requested to follow the evaluation at each 
stage in the process of mineral extraction.   
The processes focus on three major stages of activities including (1) national multi-
stakeholder group (government, industry and civil society) which decides on how their EITI 
process should work; (2) collection of key information about the governance of the mining 
sector, and associated recommendation for improvement; (3) spreading of information to the 
public and insuring that they are followed by stakeholders especially states and companies 
(EITI 2016a, p.5). Besides, there are two parts of an EITI standard report of 2016: the former 
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is the implementation of the EITI standard the latter is governance and management. The 
former is composed of (1) EITI principles, agreed by all stakeholders in 2003, (2) the EITI 
requirements, (3) overview validation, (4) the protocol “participation of civil society”, and 
open data policy.   
The principle of EITI are adopted in the Lancaster House Conference in London in 2003. The 
conference gathered diverse groups of countries, companies and civil society organizations. 
These principles are stated as follow: 
“(1) We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts. (2) We affirm that management of natural resource 
wealth for the benefit of a country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign 
governments to be exercised in the interest of their national development. (3) We 
recognize that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over many 
years and can be highly price dependent (EITI, 2016a, p. 10). 
The EITI established steps in which countries apply for membership. These are (1) 
government engagement, (2) company engagement, (3) civil society engagement, (4) the 
establishment of a multi-stakeholder group, and (5) agreement on EITI work plan (EITI, 
2016). It also establishes a legal framework. This is for instance the requirement to disclose 
information related to mining acts and the rules that exist in the extractive sector and how 
they are managed. States have been obligated to disclose a description of the legal framework 
and fiscal regime governing extractive industries and “where the government is undertaking 
reforms, the multi-stakeholder group is encouraged to ensure that these are documented” 
(EITI, 2016a, p.17). On license allocation, countries are required to disclosure information 
about (1) a description of the process for transferring or awarding the license, (2) technical 
and financial criteria used, (3) information about the recipient of the license, and (4) any non-
trivial deviations from the applicable legal and regulatory framework governing licence 
transfers and awards (EITI, 2016a, p.17).  
During registration of mining licence, states are obliged to provide information on cadastre 
system under which the licences were given and to which companies and this information 
should be reported in EITI (EITI 2016, p. 18). The EITI standards stipulates that it is a 
requirement that the EITI Report documents the government’s policy on disclosure of 
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contracts and licences that govern the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and minerals. 
These are the full text of contracts and licences including types of agreements such as 
concession, production-sharing, or other kind of agreements.  
On beneficial ownership it is recommended that implementing countries maintain a publicly 
available register of the beneficial owners of the corporate entity that bid for, operate or 
invest in extractive assets, including the identity of their beneficial owner, the level of 
ownership and details about how ownership or control is exerted (EITI, 2016, p.20). The aim 
is to see who benefits from what and how to avoid corruption, evasion of tax and the like. 
Beneficial ownership information incorporates filings of the companies to corporate 
regulator, stock exchange that MNCs belong to, or licensing agencies that regulate extractive 
industry (EITI, 2016, p. 20). 
The EITI requires the disclosure of information of exploration and production of minerals to 
highlight the productivity and profitability of the sector. The data on production and 
exportation include the quantity and price of commodity and the country of destination.  
The EITI requires the disclosure of information on revenue collection such as (1) taxes and 
revenues; (2) sale of state’s share of production or other revenues collected, (3) infrastructure 
provisions and barter arrangements where it exists, (4) transportation revenues, (5) SOE 
(State Owned Enterprises) transactions; (6) subnational payments, (7) level of disaggregation, 
(8) data timeliness, and (9) data quality (EITI, 2016, p.22). Besides, states should also 
disclose information on how resource revenues are allocated. 
The EITI requirements related to revenue allocations include: (1) distribution of revenues, (2) 
subnational transfers, (3) revenue management and expenditure (EITI, 2016). Member states 
under EITI mining standards should indicate extractive industry revenues, whether cash or in 
kind, are to be recorded in the national budget: 
 “the allocation of these revenue must be explained, with links provided to relevant 
financial reports as applicable. In this perspective, multi-stakeholder groups are 
encouraged to reference national revenue classification systems, and international 
standards such as the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (EITI, 2016, 26-
27).  
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EITI recommends a formula through which oil gas and mineral revenues are locally 
transferred. This transfer should be disclosed andpublic debate should be open on these 
transfers and allocations. 
The association makes sure that civil society representatives speak freely in public about the 
EITI process including for example during MSG meetings, EITI events include the 
promulgation of EITI reports, public events, and in the media (EITI, 2016, p. 42).  
The major stakeholders of EITI are: Implementing and supporting countries, companies and 
investors, and the civil society organization. The major administrative body is the EITI 
conference including the EITI members’ meeting that occurs once every three years, EIT 
Board, that meets about three times a year and the international secretariat based in Oslo. The 
EITI board is composed of 21 persons:  a chair, 9 board members from the constituency, 3 
from supporting countries, and others from implementing countries.  
The EITI funding comes from bilateral and multilateral donors, international financial 
institutions and the other agencies, organization and entities, it is a non-profit association and 
may work through voluntary contributions (see art 17, EITI, 2016a, p. 55). However, 
professionalism and anti-internal corruption is a key of the functioning principles of EITI. 
This is due to the financial importance of mining sector and its global sensitivity.  
“Any offering or receiving of gifts, free tips or other compensation over value of USD 
100 directly or indirectly related to the discharge of EITI responsibilities should be 
declared to the EIT Board or the respective EITI multi-stakeholder group (though the 
international or national secretariats). Any offering or receiving of gifts considered 
excessive should be refused. In case of doubt whether a gift is excessive, the EITI 
Secretariat or multi-stakeholder group should be consulted. Should it be inappropriate 
to refuse an offering, notably because such refusal could prove embarrassing to the 
donor, the gift is to be surrendered to the EITI Secretariat or the multi-stakeholder 
group” (EITI, 2016 a, p. 61). 
The emphasis on the internal transparency and accountability is related to the highly lucrative 
environment of the mining sector in which the EITI works. A lot of information of a sensitive 
nature is required to be disclosed, in particular in oil, gas and mineral extraction.  
The international community increasingly compel the companies to have corporate social 
responsibility plans and to play a more active role in implementing developmental projects 
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and doing mineral extraction in an accountable and transparent way. Apart from EITI, EAC 
member states follow other directives from the EU, AU, ICGLR and US Dodd-Frank 
Legislation. AU policy focuses on the profitability of mining and especially mechanism of 
enhancing local developmental impact in recipient states. There is also the new EU Conflict 
Mineral regulation, which will come into force as of January 2021, and which focuses on 
mining traceability of 3TGs (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) to curb mineral conflict 
especially in Africa. For matter of limitation of research, I put emphasis on the ICGLR 
traceability mechanism, OECD due diligence guidance, and the US Dodd-Frank Legislation, 
since these regulations are already in place in the EAC member states. 
 
3.3. The Dodd-Frank Legislation 
 
The US Dodd-Frank Legislation for GLR (Great Lakes Region of Africa) including EAC 
member states started in August 2012. The section 1502 of the US law known as the “Dodd-
Frank Act” includes a requirement for companies that extract and buy 3TGs (tin, tungsten, 
tantalum and gold follow). The law determines whether or not those minerals coming from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or an adjoining country (mostly EAC neighbours 
such as Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda) are conflict free minerals. Therefore, it carries out a 
“due diligence” review of their supply chain to determine whether mineral purchases benefit 
armed groups in Eastern DRC. It is undertaken by USA government based on the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
The security exchange act of 1934 known as the 34 Act also governs the bonds and stocks in 
the USA and was enacted in June 6, 1934. It regulates security exchanges and sanctions the 
counter market exchanges within states to avoid inequitable and unfair market practices. It 
was enacted by 73 US Congress. Therefore, the said Exchange Act was renovated and 
contextualised in mining trade issues in Central East African states during the Obama regime. 
In D.R. Congo (especially in Eastern region that borders EAC community territory), the 
Dodd-Frank Legislation is known as the Obama law.  
President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
on July 21, 2010. This act was established to promote financial stability of the USA in terms 
of accountability, transparency and protecting consumers from abusive financial service 
practices, as well as for “other purpose” related to the financial transaction and the extractive 
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industry in general. The Dodd-Frank Act was established by the 111th USA Congress, 
following the global financial crisis of 2008. The act amended financial laws including the 
said Securities exchange Acts of 1934. The idea behind interpretation of Dodd-Frank 
Legislation was the conflict minerals that was spoiling peace in the GLR in general and the 
eastern DRC and the illegal flows of money and weapons associated with mineral exchange 
especially those pursued by the industrial world especially in IT such as coltan (Colombo 
tantalite). 
The general objective was to thwart security threats posed by these mineral deals. Eastern 
DRC had rebel groups from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda that find havens in mineral rich 
zone and therefore can finance themselves through mineral trading. The Mineral Statutory 
Provision defines the term “conflict mineral” as cassiterites, columbite-tantalite (coltan), 
gold, wolframite, or their derivatives, or any other minerals or their derivatives determined by 
Secretary of State to be financing conflict (US Security Exchange Commission, 2012, p. 6). It 
bans the illegal trade of minerals in the zones of conflict covered by law including member of 
EAC such as Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Burundi, and the others such as 
Malawi, Central African Republic, Angola, Congo and Zambia (see Ayogu and Lewis, 3 
October 2011).  
As noted by Ayogu and Lewis (2011) Dodd-Frank Act is a good start at the international 
level, but it has several challenges. These are for instance (1) lack of a binding global due 
diligence regime which leaves a gap in fighting multidimensional crisis in the region – which 
is not necessarily mineral driven; (2) MNCs do not meet domestic constraints of supply chain 
regulation (Ayobu and Lewis, 3 October 2011).  
 
3.4. OECD Due Diligence Guidance Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas  
 
The OECD due diligence Guidance Chains of Mineral from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas in mining was published in April 2016. It recommends multinational companies to not 
contribute to the violation of human rights by buying from conflict zones without scrutinising 
whether these minerals or metals are conflict prone and mined with illegalities. It covers the 
global scope of mineral supply chains.  
 50 
 
The minerals that are more sensitive to conflict and are in jurisdiction of OECD mining 
guidance are tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold and other mineral resources that viewed as 
conflict fuelling (OECD, 2018). The OECD standards directly apply to Rwanda mining 
sector since the country mineral production concentrates on 3Ts (Tantalum, Tin and 
Tungsten) but are less covered in other EAC member states even though all such minerals 
exist in the region. The process of value chain analysis starts from miners, local exporters and 
mineral processors to the manufacturing and brand-name companies that use minerals in their 
products (OECD, 2018).  
There is no sub-Saharan country especially where those 3TGs are mined which is yet a 
member of OECD or adhere to its guidelines for multinational enterprises. They only follow 
these guidelines as a necessary requirement for the marketing of minerals. Rwanda is the only 
country that recently showed interest in joining the OECD (Mugisha, 9 September 2018). 
This interest come as the organisational leadership under Secretary General, Ángel Gurría, 
who wanted to expand the organisation to developing nations, and Chile joined in 2010 and 
Colombia in May 2018, but there is no sub-Saharan African state that joined so far (Mugisha, 
9 September 2018). 
 
3.5. Regional regulations 
 
 At the regional level, there is no established mining law of EAC per se as a regional body 
related to mining regulations as it the case in other African RECs (regional economic 
communities) such as ECOWAS or SADC. Countries follow their own mining acts. 
However, the EAC charter have recommended the harmonization and joint exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources (EAC, 1999) and the initiative to further harmonize the 
mining act started in EALA and improving agriculture and mining. MP Valerie 
Nyirahabineza, who chairs the committee of agriculture, tourism and natural resources in 
EALA pointed out that there is a need to transform lives of East Africans through reforming 
agriculture and mining sector governance (Karuhanga, 5 March 2017). Some of the problems 
raised in drafting the EAC mining are licensing and permitting, access to information and 
transparency, mineral resource development, land access, employment and training 
(Karuhanga, 5 March 2017).  
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Since there is nothing as regional mining acts in EAC, countries follow ICGLR legislation on 
mining traceability mechanism in the region to avoid conflict minerals. This is facilitated by 
the fact that almost all EAC member states are already members of ICGLR.  
 
3.5.1. ICGLR Mineral Tracking and Certification Scheme 
 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region is a regional intergovernmental 
organisation composed of states of the Great Lakes Region of Africa including Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. All EAC 
member states are also member of this inter-governmental body (ICGLR, 2019). The 
objective of creating the ICLGR was to form a regional body in which cross-border conflict 
can be solved, after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the Congo War I and 
II all of which involved regional states and conflicting cross-border ethnic groups factions 
and different human atrocities.   
Since 2000, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1291 and 1304 were the basis of founding 
ICGLR. The resolutions called for international organisation in which issues of peace, 
security and democracy, in the region of African Great Lakes Region would be discussed 
(ICGLR, 2019). In 2004, there was a conference in Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, with a joint 
declaration on the necessity of tackling the regional conflict based on root causes and existing 
challenges. This was followed by signing the pact of security, stability and development in 
the region, in Nairobi, Kenya in 2006. The secretariat is based in Bujumbura, Burundi and 
aims at enforcing the implementation of peace, security and development pact signed by 
member states.  
The ICGLR is based on strong ownership of members states in the process of peace, stability 
and development but also on partnership with Group of Friends and Special Envoys chaired 
by Canada and the Netherlands (ICGLR, 2019). The Group of Friends of ICGLR are Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany 
and Greece. Other countries involved are the Vatican City, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (ICGLR, 
2019).   
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The ICGLR mining standards help to control the trading of tungsten, tin, tantalum and gold – 
minerals that are considered as serious regional and international concern in fuelling armed 
conflict and serious human right abuses. ICGLR assesses the influence of rebels, and 
government security personnel in mining activities that fuel violence in the GLR.  
ICGLR secretariat put in place a regional mine site database, an ICGLR database of exporters 
and an ICGLR mineral tracking database (ICGLR, 2019). The region also has a Mineral 
Chain auditor, and the ICGLR committee which provides independent oversight of the third-
party auditing system. The audit committee is composed of representatives of member state 
governments, local and international industry, and local and international civil society. 
According to the law, there is no company that should be allowed to export minerals without 
ICGLR certification (ICGLR, 2019). 
The first certificates were offered in 2011 in both DRC and Rwanda and the other countries 
in the region followed. Before the certificate is granted three steps occur including mining 
site inspection, chain custody tracking and then auditing. The system of mineral tracking 
consists of chain custody tracking from mine, regional tracking of mineral flows through set 
database and auditing. Auditors are independent though they work in ICGLR.  
The inspection decides whether to give a certificate to a mining site or halt its activity. When 
the inspection does not find any problem or criteria gap of mining good practices, such as 
conflict free mining and respect of human rights and security in general, the site receives a 
green card label and is therefore certified. However, when the mine receives a yellow or red 
card label, the certification is not granted, and the mine cite is not allowed. The yellow label 
means that the cite is not fully complying to requirements and the red one means that there is 
serious concern of non-compliance.  
Same labels apply to the export certification. Green means that the exporter is allowed and 
complies with the requirements. Therefore, ICGR provides a certificate for export for 12 
months. When there are some issues to correct, the yellow label is given to the exporter and a 
certificate for 6 months. That period allows the exporter to adjust and comply with 
regulations. The ICGLR may also ban export of a non-complying exporter.     
ICGLR works in framework of the OECD due diligence guidance and the Dodd-Franck 
Legislation. It evaluates the full mineral chain, controls unforeseen cases and checks whether 
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the sourcing of mineral is safe and free from conflict – or in other word not financing armed 
groups. 
 
3.5.2. Toward setting EAC mining acts 
 
The EAC Mining Bill 2017 has been drafted under the diligence of Hon Chris Opoka-Okumu 
from Uganda and aims at providing a legal framework for the regulation of mining operations 
in the Community, implementing the EAC Vision 2050, and operationalizing Article 114(2) 
(c) (iv) of the EAC Treaty (see EAC, 1999, p. 98). Article 114, 2, c, provides for (1) joint 
exploration and management of natural resources within EAC member states:  
“(i) to promote joint exploration, efficient exploitation and sustainable utilization of 
shared mineral resources; (ii) to pursue the creation of enabling environment for 
investment in the mining sector; (iii) to promote the establishment of databases, 
information exchange networks and sharing of experiences in the management and 
development of the mineral sector using electronic mail, internet and other means for 
the interactive dissemination of mineral information, (iv) to harmonize mining 
regulations to ensure environmentally friendly and sound mining practices; (v) to 
adopt common policies to ensure joint fossil exploration and exploitation along the 
coast and rift valley; and (vi) to establish a regional seismological network” (EAC, 
1999, p. 98). 
The draft of the EAC Mining Bill is in that framework of an EAC Treaty and provides for a 
transparent and accountable mechanism for the reporting of mining and mineral related 
activities in the Community. The goal of the Community is to ultimately reduce the 
differences in the operating environment for the mining sector (EALA, 2017). Besides, it is 
the same reasoning behind the African Development Commission and the AU mining policy 
for intraregional transformation in mining sector.  
EAC member states also are implementing programs that facilitate them to increase the value 
of exported raw materials and to develop mining industry. “The EAC is focusing on the 
Development and Promotion of Extractive Industries and Mineral Value Addition” (EALA, 
2017). The EAC recognizes that the EAC Partner States are endowed with rich mineral 
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resources, potentially ranging from gemstones, precious metals, base metals, and industrial & 
construction minerals amongst others (EALA, 2017).  
The EAC established a program improving the regulation and development of the extractive 
and mineral processing industries, with a view to ensure more economically integrated and 
evenly spread industrialization in the region (EALA, 2017). The process of development of 
the extractive industry in EAC consists of the following objectives: (1) to develop and 
harmonise regulatory and institutional framework for promoting investment in the extractive 
industry; (2) to establish regional and national capabilities in the field of industrial mineral 
management, extraction, prospecting, and processing and marketing; (3) to improve 
knowledge and information on the availability and utilization options of industrial mineral 
resources through appropriate information collection, dissemination and exchange 
mechanisms among EAC Partner States; and (4) to provide an assessment of the necessary 
complementary infrastructure supports required as pre-conditions for investments into the 
extractive and mineral processing (EALA, 2017). 
Following activities have been selected to achieve the mentioned goal. These activities are for 
instance examination of intervention levels from national to regional levels, the role of states 
and the role of the region itself; assessment of mineral potentials at regional level; identifying 
legal, regulatory, and institutional strengths and weaknesses of utilisation of natural 
resources, setting up promotion campaign and infrastructural development to facilitate the 
production of mineral resources, developing promotional materials i.e. an inventory and 
project profiles of mineral resource base and their potential industrial utilization/ application 
and a regional framework including technical information on the industrial minerals and 
incentives available (EAC, 2017).  
However, as mentioned, the project of EAC mining regulation acts show that the community 
now is aware on mining potential it has and seek to take this opportunity to harmonize and 
improve governance of resource extraction. Despite that effort, the regional enforcement 
capacity is very low due to the nature of international organization per se, the binding 
sovereignty concepts of member states over their resources, and the lack of institutional 
approaches that link the region with the local actors including MNCs, local miners and local 
population. There is no single national code that quotes regional level mechanisms in mineral 
resource governance. The existing national mining codes, as explained in the chapters that 
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follow below, are isolated from regional aspects and totally independent despite earlier 
provisions in the EAC Charter (article 114 as mentioned above).    
 
3.6. Summary 
 
The international mining standards for African mining started in 1958 when the UN showed 
the need to support weak and new nations in exercising their sovereignty, and economic 
development through raising their capacity and their position in the global trade system. By 
doing so, the resolution argued for a kind of affirmative action in mineral resource wealth, 
economic diversification and help to empower weak African economies. This did not actually 
work. In 1962, the UN resolution was passed to legitimate the use of national sovereignties of 
weak and newly independent states over their resources. However, this did not work too as 
countries, such as those within East Africa, got the opportunity to nationalize mine and 
eventually failed to develop mining and materialize natural resources into economicc 
development. Nationalization gave pace to a developing nation to exercise sovereignties over 
their natural resources, but that sovereignty was neither profitable to the state nor to their 
citizens. The nationalization indeed allowed the collapse of the existing mining projects. 
Laws also did not adequately address the issue of price fluctuation of natural resources in the 
international market and the position of Africa in global trading arena. Consequently, the 
mine sites were closed for a long time.  
The new international mining standards hinges upon accountability and transparency, as we 
saw in UN resolution 2008 and in the EITI principle. However, this is also difficult to 
materialise given the territorial coverage of laws, the problem of enforcement of international 
standards, and the local corruption levels that thwart governance. . Besides, the 
implementation of accountability and transparency it is also challenging given the nature of 
MNC as profit maximisers. 
The other regional mining standards such as ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Frank Act advocate 
for controlling the trading and value chains for mineral conflict such as 3TGs (tin, tungsten, 
tantalum and gold). This was due to the regional turmoil associated with mineral looting and 
theft from Eastern Congo and the increasing ungovernable resource rich territories covered 
by GLR member states with similar Kibalan belt geology that are currently marketable 
worldwide for IT industries (for instance coltan/tantalum). The target was to thwart the 
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occurrence of conflict mineral in EAC and in Central East Africa in general. As mentioned 
above the issue has been to see whether mineral conflict can be stopped simply by acts, given 
the porous border of the mining territories, the nature of minerals, multidimensional aspect of 
conflict which goes beyond mining, and the increasing network of formal and informal 
business in a globalizing world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. MINING IN EASTERN AFRICA 
 
Eastern Africa is a sub-region composed by many countries ranging from the horn of Africa 
to the southeast Africa and some islands in the Indian see. These states are Burundi, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte 
(France), Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. This research focuses only on the six countries that compose the EAC including 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.  This chapter provides the 
three major parts that help to understand mining in Eastern Africa. The first is the history of 
mining in eastern African countries since the colonial period, with a focus on the EAC. The 
second is the history of the EAC. The third is the current situation of the EAC, with a 
statistical view of its economic situation within member states, and the role of regulation for 
individual member states.  
 
4.1. History of mining in East Africa since colonial period 
 
The history of mining in Africa, since colonial period, consists of three historical mining 
periods. The first period starts with global competition over resources and appropriation of 
mining territories in Africa by European powers, from 1880s to 1950s. The second period is 
the nationalization and regaining of territorial sovereignties that starts from 1960 to 1980s. 
The third period is liberalization of mining activities that starts from the end of 1990s to 
nowadays and characterized by an increase in industrial and large-scale mining as well as 
small-scale mining. The focus is on mining range from oil, metals and gemstones.  In the 
EAC specifically, the research focuses on industrial and small-scale mining of metals 
including coltan, nickel, gold; gemstones including diamond, tanzanite and amethysts, gas 
such as methane gas and oil.   
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4.1.1. The scramble for Africa and appropriation of mining territories by European 
powers 
 
Because of industrial revolution, there was an increase in the global need for mineral 
resources in Europe that resulted in the scramble for Africa in 1760 to 1840. The European 
powers, through German leadership decided to broaden their territories to Africa for the 
pursuit of minerals and other natural resource opportunities. Moreover, from 1870 to 1929, in 
the period of the Great Depression, the precolonial patterns of production and consumption of 
minerals turned into forms of mining enclaves in local economies of Africa (UNECA, 2011, 
p. 12).  They were rich territories in Africa distinct from local economies and controlled by 
foreign companies under colonial command. Their contribution to the host society was 
negligible and they continuously accrued the foreign countries’ economies since the cost for 
resource extraction was relatively low (UNECA, 2011). Great Britain became a global 
leading economy through her mining opportunities in gold, diamond and metals in southern 
Africa and eastern Africa and the resource extraction at that time was highly productive 
(UNECA, 2012). Not only Great Britain, but also Belgium and Portugal benefited greatly 
from resource exploitation in Africa. Belgium for instance benefited much in terms of metal 
extraction in Congo and in central east Africa including Rwanda and Burundi. Well known 
mines and mining regions of the time include Katanga copper and cobalt mines in eastern 
Congo and the Rutongo tin mines in Rwanda.  
Germany started mining exploration in her colonial territories in EAC in Tanganyika, a 
colonial region that was composed of three EAC countries, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. 
Germany was decidedly active in mining before her defeat in World War I and most of her 
exploration activities in the EAC are documented in the mining library of the Tanzanian 
ministry of energy and minerals in Dodoma. A geological survey and mineralogy studies are 
one of the activities that marked the pace of Germany in mining in East Africa. In 1907, the 
Duke of Mecklenburg sent a group of scientists comprising of a mineralogist and geologists 
to Rwanda to do more exploration on mineral endowment potentials for the country (BRGM, 
1987, p.23).  
The other major feature of this period is that most of the workers came from Europe and were 
highly expensive. Africans worked were mostly in low-skilled, low-wage and most of the 
time in dangerous work in mining (UNECA, 2011, p. 12). The Africans, however, were 
gradually trained in Europe; for instance, Rwandans, Burundians and Congolese studied in 
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Belgium the courses of mining during and after colonial periods. However, still the more 
expert workers were predominantly Europeans until 1960s.  
While initially mining in Africa was based on diamond and gold, the development of 
industrial technology in 1870 to 1939 induced the search for new types of minerals and that is 
how copper, cobalt, and tin extractive industries started in Eastern Africa. Due to the wealth 
of minerals in the region, tin, copper and cobalt marked the history of the first industrial 
mines in eastern Africa. The exploitation in copper belt colonies in Northern Rhodesia 
(current Zambia), Belgian Congo, and in Uganda started in the form of mining industries 
(UNECA, 2011).  
These historical mining industries have had both political, social and economic impact on the 
mines at that time and at least until the period of nationalization in the 1970s. The company 
development created cities where thousands of workers lived and their families. They built 
schools, churches and playground, urban villages with electricity, telephones, hospitals, roads 
and houses. That is how towns like Kilembe in Uganda, Ndola, Kitwe, Chingola, Luanshya, 
and Mufulira in Zambia, Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, and Likasi in Congo, Rutongo in Rwanda 
developed (see also UNECA, 2011)  
The effect of these mining economies in eastern Africa was that states become predominantly 
reliant on mineral exports from the 1950s and to the1960s, for instance in the case of Zambia 
and Uganda. The contribution of mineral exports went beyond 50%, as manufacturing was at 
a very low level, Africa and east Africa continued to be commodity export economies selling 
raw materials. The price of minerals was relatively good and most of the states prioritized 
mining sector institutions and fused them with trading institutions. For instance, Tanzania 
geographical survey and department of mines fused with the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry in 1960 (UNECA, 2011).  
As mentioned above mining regulations and control of territory was conducted by colonial 
states. In the case of German East Africa (Deutsche Ost Africa), mining territory and 
regulation was under the German foreign office (Kolonial-Abteilung) established in 1890. 
There was also a German non-governmental colonial agency that had a say in mining 
regulations and information. This private agency played a role in media communication on 
the progress and new findings in mining in the colonial territories and the best-known media 
and report tools regarding resource situation in Tanganyika were Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 
(1884-1922) and Zeitschrift fur Kolonial politik, colonialrecht und Kolonialwirtschaft (1899-
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1914) (see Nilsen, 1980). Besides, the role of religious and missionary agencies is also 
important in mining development activities in the colonies and in east Africa mainly, and 
especially the priests from the Catholic Church. 
 
4.1.2. The period of nationalization of mines in East Africa  
 
Regaining territorial control after colonialism resulted into changes in resource governance 
and in setting economic policies that have a direct effect on the capital investment needed to 
develop mines. In the case of Tanzania for instance, the arrival in power of Nyerere in the 
early 1960s, brought new political and economic ideologies: Uhuru na Ujamaa (freedom and 
socialism). The economic effect of socialism was like that of Chinese Mao in the same period 
of 1950s and the1960s. The political economy was based on socialism and communism with 
collective ownership of land and state running the means and institutions of economic 
production. In such context, mining was affected by nationalization and collectivization of 
land property rights.  
The economic implication of the uhuru na ujamaa policies was that no investors were ready 
to invest in the market that states policies and command dominates. The market was already 
distorted by the relocation of over 10 million Tanzanians into communes, an idea which was 
socially important for building national identity. Though the policy reduced the chance of 
having inequality in the country, impoverishment become so high since the people were 
reluctant to collectively produce and institutions weakened the individual accumulation of 
wealth.  
The other effect was the difficulty for Tanzania to integrate into the global market economy. 
The system of the economy since 1945 was especially dominated by American and British 
global capitalism. Though some other European leaders pleased Nyerere by having an 
African style of familyhood governance, there were no incentives for multinationals to come 
to Tanzania. At the early stage of the 1960s, Nyerere’s policy of Kujitegemeya (self-reliance) 
meant that the state was skeptical of foreign investment for fear of foreign domination. In 
1967, Nyerere speech about foreign capital investment was as follows: “… A capitalistic 
economy means a foreign dominated economy.  These are the facts of the Africa’s situation.  
The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the 
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economic institutions of socialism”. Nyerere viewed capitalism as a way of seeking to build a 
happy society but through means of exploitation of man by man (Muhanga, 2016, p. 32). 
However, what was unique for Nyerere was his flexibility on policies, and that lead the 
country to reform as he accepted a peaceful transition to democracy and capitalism. Muhanga 
argues that Nyerere did not want an extreme socialism for he embraced the need to accept 
foreign investment in 1970s. Nyerere said:  
“We have no alternative. The world supply of disinterested altruists and unconditional 
aid is very small indeed, regardless of how self-reliant we try to be in our economies 
and our development, we are up against the fact that progress out of poverty has 
everywhere throughout history required some injection of capital or expertise. Even 
the largest states of the world have used outside resources; small ones have to use 
more. It becomes a question of how far we will go and what kind of compromises we 
will make. We cannot refuse to make any” (cited in Muhanga, 2016, p.32). 
The flexibility of Nyerere derives from both local and global pressure. In the 1980s, IMF and 
World Banks conditioned Tanzania to make a structural adjustment program (SAPs) and in 
1993, privatization started in Tanzania and a market driven economy that accept foreign and 
local private investors (Muhanga, 2016, p. 27). That is how big companies started to invest in 
Tanzania including Barrick Gold Corporation from Canada, Anglo Gold Ashanti from South 
Africa, and Richland Resources that owns the Tanzanite One (Muhanga, 2016, 33).  
In Ugandan, nationalization was negotiated between the Falconbridge of Africa and the 
government and the mines were sold to government after 25 years of operation from 1950 to 
1975.  The same case applied to Rwanda where the government acquired Rutongo tin mines 
owned by the Belgian companies of SOMUKI (from 1928 to 1982) and SOMIRWA (from 
1982 to 1986). The consequence in both countries was that governments failed to maintain 
the development of the said mines after nationalization. The access to the foreign market was 
a big problem for newly owned public enterprises. For Uganda in 1982, the Kilembe mines 
ceased to function. In Rwanda, the government tried to keep the pace of production through 
its company REDEMI until civil war broke into genocide against Tutsi in 1994. After 
genocide the company were occupied by local cooperatives from 1995 to 2008.  
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4.1.3. The period of neoliberal world order in the EAC mining 
 
Since 1990s, African countries were still restructuring according to IMF and World Bank 
policies. One of the conditions was to privatize and adopt a market driven economy. Mining 
sectors were privatized. However, few investments were flowing into Africa until the year 
2000.  
As said above east African countries gradually privatized mining companies and received 
new foreign investment in both exploration and the exploitation of resources. Through these 
explorations, new mineral and energy products, such as nickel and coltan, started to increase 
in the region especially due to global demand in the IT industry. Both investment from all 
around the world, eastern and northern economies arrived in EAC members states and the 
whole of Africa. Rutongo mines were privatized to TINCO in 2008, and the state withheld 
25% of the shares. Kilembe privatized the Kilembe mines as well to Tibet-Hima Mining 
Company Ltd, though the government stopped the mining license after only 4 years.   
The tangibility of economic capacity of resource endowment in the EAC member states is 
clear. EAC states have big reservoirs of gold, oil and metals highly needed in global market. 
Gold is still a symbol of real and exchangeable economic reserves and power in global 
politics. For instance, the USA gold reserve amounts to 8133.46 metric tonnes (Trade Online, 
2018) while other countries and organisation globally follow with Germany, 3373.641, 
France, 2435.94, China, 1842.56, Russia, 1828.56, South Africa, 125.28, and Ghana, 8.74. 
USA almost triples Germany in gold reserve tonnes in 2008, the other important gold reserve 
holder which is not a state is the IMF. However, no EAC member states have tangible gold 
reserves. Tanzania however demonstrated the will, through legal mechanisms, to establish a 
domestic gold reserve since the presidentship of Magufuli in 2015.  
There are important gold mines in EAC. In Tanzania there are Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi, Geita, 
Golden Pride, Kirondatal, New Luika, North Mara, Sekenke, and Tulawaka. In Burundi, 
Kenya and Rwanda gold extraction is not intensive. It has been on a small-scale basis and 
mostly controlled by the governments or in some cases by ASM. In Rwanda for instance, 
there is Miyove Mines with reserve of 5.55 million metric tonnes at a grade of 1.48 grams per 
metric tonne gold. In Burundi there is eastern Muyinga mine and Chibitoke-Mabayi. Uganda 
gold mining exists in artisan and small-scale mining but with intensive labour amounts to 
                                                          
1 With a high level of decrease since 2015 
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60,000 people in Kitumbi sub-country, in Lujinji village (Tusiime, 26 July 2017). This small-
scale mining has a direct impact on the lives of people who use it as an alternative source of 
money apart from the agriculture and business sector. However, in Kitumbi for instance, it is 
something new and has brought in unintended actors including people from Chinese, 
Congolese, Rwandese, Burundians, and Tanzanians, a fact that compelled the Ugandan 
government to temporary close the mine (Nunis 9 August 2017). Besides, South Sudanese 
gold mining is intensively increasing and with a high risk of conflict.  
EAC not only have gold but also copper, cobalt, tin and nickel, which are useful in industries, 
construction and defence sectors. Copper is mostly used for car industries, electricity and 
construction as it is an electrical and heat conductor. Tin does not easily corrode and that’s 
why it is used mostly for food containers, in industries, and in construction when mixed with 
other materials. Cobalt is found in mining nickel, silver, lead, copper and iron. It was 
discovered by Georg Brandt in 1739. Due to its resistance to heat, cobalt is used in engines 
especially in civil or military airplanes and gas turbines. Cobalt is also used as alternative 
energy since it increases the performance of batteries. It is useful in electric vehicles. Nickel 
is used for food preparation equipment, mobile phones, CD plates, medical equipment, 
transport, building, power generation and because of its use, international companies are 
massively investing in nickel (Nickel Member Companies, 2019). Similar industrial 
discovery of nickel also recently occurred in China (nickel pig ore). In EAC, apart from 
copper and tin, nickel production started in the early beginning of the 21st Century and mainly 
in Kabanga, Dutwa and Ntaka hills in Tanzania and in Musongati in Burundi. Tin has been 
mined since the 1930s in the Rutongo mine, in Rwanda while copper started in the Kilembe 
mine in the 1950s. Another important tin mine in EAC is the Karagwe mine in Tanzania. 
Since 2000 there has been a rapid increase in metal investment in both number and size to 
renew the extraction in old and new EAC mines. New mining codes have been established to 
regulate such abundance of cassiterites, cobalt, copper, gold, nickel, platinum, and tantalum. 
The table below indicates the important EAC metal mines. 
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Table 1. EAC Metals and selected mines 
States Types of metals Ownership Important mines (for 
research purpose) 
Burundi Cobalt, copper, 
Nickel, tantalum and 
Platinum Iron and 
Steel,  
Private, ASM, little 
share of 
government 
Musongati, Nickel, 
Cobalt and copper 
deposits) by Burundi 
Mining Metallurgy 
International Ltd (a 
subsidiary of Kermas 
Group of the United 
Kingdom, originating 
from Russia) 
Kenya Gold, iron, steel, 
nobium and rare 
earths, titanium and 
zirconium, ilmenite 
and rutile 
Private, ASM Mrima Hill, niobium 
in Kwale, PAW, 
licence revoked 2013, 
Canada,  
Rwanda Cassiterite, 
Columbite-tantalite, 
gemstones, gold, 
peat, and wolframite 
Private sector, 
cooperatives, 
artisanal miners 
Rutongo Tin mines in 
Rulindo District, 
owned by Tinco 
Investment Limited, 
UK) 
South Sudan Gold, with possibility 
of other metal mines 
yet to be found in 
these EAC new 
member state. 
Private Luri gold project, 
CMERIC and Equator 
Gold Ltd, United 
Kingdom) 
Tanzania Cobalt, Nickel, gold, 
nickel, copper, 
platinum, niobium, 
Private Kabanga deposit, 
North West Tanzania, 
Barrick Gold Corp. of 
Canada (50%) and 
Glencore Xtrata plc of 
Switzerland (50%) 
Uganda Cobalt, copper, tin, 
steel, and Iron 
Private, ASM Kilembe copper and 
cobalt mines, Tibet 
Hima Industry 
Company Ltd, China 
Source: Constructed by author using Yager (2016), and Taib (2016)  
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The Musongati nickel, cobalt and copper mines are owned 85% by the Kermas Group and 
15% by the government, they are managed by BMM (Burundi Musongati Mining) since 
2014. The deposit is rich in nickel, then in cobalt and copper; the Burundi share of nickel 
worldwide is 6%. The company originates from Russia but was bought by BHP Billion and 
Anglo-American, two companies which have other mining activities in Africa and especially 
in the Great Lakes Region and in southern Africa. Burundi is a poor country with a GDP per 
capita of USD 312, which puts the country among the poorest in the region and vulnerable to 
the resource curse. Musongati district (commune) is in Rutana province. With Mukanda and 
Buhoro, Musongati belongs to Kibaran Belt. Nickel mining potentials were discovered in 
Burundi by the government in 1972. In the contract signed with government, BMM have a 
25-year license and 10 years for each renewal. It was agreed that at the beginning BMM 
would use expatriate employees on the condition that it would gradually train the Burundians, 
BMM also agreed to develop local infrastructure. The Musongati district would get USD 50 
million each year in the first 3 years of operation and there was a programme to improve 
electricity connections to facilitate the company’s energy need (Nimubona, 2014). 
The Rutongo Mines were run by Belgian companies from 1930 to 1985. In 1986, the 
government of Rwanda nationalised it and then the company production fell due to lack of 
investment and inefficient management. In 1994, it was closed due to genocide and war that 
occurred in the country. In 1995 to 2007, cooperatives occupied the mines. In 2008, the 
government privatized it to TINCO which owns 75% of the equity shares while the 
government owns the rest. It employs 4,000 miners among which 550 are administrative, 
technical, and security staff. TINCO abides with conflict mining policy and the business code 
of conduct. The local community have got experience in digging cassiterites and Rutongo is a 
quite a small city in the Rulindo District. The district leadership have also tried many times to 
raise the financial skills of the local community in saving and investing in other activities, 
including the education of their children.  Licence, security of mines, health impact of 
underground diggers, its boundaries vis à vis the companies land and the people’s land as 
well as environment policies, are issues that TINCO and local government have been dealing 
with. Many illegal miners have been arrested through TINCO security apparatus and the 
government. Currently, the integration of ASM and illegal miners into company activities has 
been included through local district and company policies. 
The Kilembe mines is situated in the Kasese district in Uganda, it is one of the old copper and 
cobalt mines in EAC. It was first opened during colonialism but shut down in the 1980s 
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during the regions’s move to nationalisation in EAC and in the GLR in general. People in 
Kilembe remember the productive past of the mines. “This place used to be full of life. It was 
like a beehive. In this room, we used to charge batteries of the head lamps and radio 
equipment for the workers who worked underground. Everyone was respected and earned 
some good money,” said Mzee Okello (Rehema, 2013). It was established by two Canadian 
mining companies Frobisher Limited and Ventures Limited, on a joint venture basis. KML 
built and operated a copper smelter in Jinja and Maintained offices in Kampala. They have 
also established electricity power plants in Mubuku in Rwenzori Mountains. In 1962, KML 
was acquired by Falkonbridge of Africa, also a Canadian company, who sold it to the 
government of Uganda, in 1975. “In a joint partnership with the London-controlled Colonial 
Development Corporation, the Toronto Company’s highly profitable mine produced more 
than $250 million ($1 billion today) worth of copper yet paid no income tax until its capital 
was fully recovered in 1965. In 1968, post-independence leader Milton Obote increased the 
country's copper export tax and then moved to gain majority control of the mine. 
Falconbridge quickly stripped out $6 million in special dividend payments and threatened to 
withdraw its management from the country” (Engler, 2015) 
Falconbridge forced nationalisation has had negative implication for the Kilembe mines. The 
company withdrew the mining investment. "Although Kilembe Copper was both profitable 
and socially important in the Ugandan economy, this did not prevent the Falconbridge group 
from withdrawing capital as rapidly as possible just before President Obote forced it to sell 
Uganda a controlling interest in 1970” (op cit). These issues of the Kilembe resources 
contributed much to war and to the coup carried out by Idi Amin against Obote and the 
further diplomatic legitimisation of Amin. Finally, the company sold Kilembe mine assets to 
the government in 1975. 
The Kilembe mines are owned by the Chinese company Tibet Hima in 2013. However, the 
latter did not comply to the government requirement and received a notice of termination of 
the contract on 5 May 2017. One of the failures alleged to the company are (1) failure to 
deposit a 15% performance guarantee on commencement of the concession, (2) failure to pay 
annual concession fees over after a six months grace period by the government, and (3) the 
exploitation of the Kilembe Mines conceded assets from which the concessionaire is 
receiving revenue from electricity, housing estates and a foundry. Other allegations are: 
vandalising the mines in addition to ferrying away several assets belonging to the 
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government, depleting the mines including tampering with the river Nyamwamba which may 
cause a flood and corruption with government ministers. 
Kabanga is in the Ngara district, Kagera region, Tanzania. The Kabanga mines have nickel, 
cobalt and platinum. Since 2007 the production of nickel has surged. Kabanga deposits have 
been exploited by, Barrick Gold Corp. of Canada (50%) and Glencore Xtrata plc of 
Switzerland (50%). The new company, called Northwestern Basemetals, showed an interest 
in the Kabanga mines and was estimated to have 75% owned subsidiary of Tanzanian 
Royalty, with 15% ownership by Tanzania’s state miner and 10% ownership by Beijing 
Songshanheli Mining Investment (Seattle, WA, 2013). Kabanga Nickel, in turn, owns the 
Kabanga nickel deposit that is widely regarded as one of the world’s leading undeveloped 
nickel deposits, hosting some 58 million tonnes of nickel at 2.6% (op cit). Geological 
description of EAC metals, at least in northwest Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and part of 
Uganda, are in the same belt – the Kibaran and the Karagwe Ankoran belts. This region is 
more linked with Katanga in the South and other parts of north eastern DR Congo mineral 
rich in metals. The region of GRL and especially the East African Community will continue 
to be important in both geopolitics and geostrategy of mineral resources worldwide. The 
reason is that in the region we find a big reservoir of minerals such as cobalt, tin and nickel. 
The other reason is that since 2005, the region is increasingly emerging in the new resource 
deposit finding. Currently, the EAC member state considered to be a mineral economy is 
Rwanda, with export shares of 45% in 2016. The table below shows the contribution of 
mining in the EAC economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
Table 2. The Contribution of Metal and coal in GDP: EAC member states 
Country Mineral 
Contribu
tion 
Index 
score 
2016  
MCI 
rank 
2016 
Miner
al 
Expor
t 
Contri
bution 
% 
Change
s 2009-
14, 
percent 
point  
Produ
ction 
value 
% 
GDP 
Mineral 
rents 
Producti
on value, 
US $ 
Billion 
GDP 
2014 
Burundi 63 51 14 3 0.1 0.35 0,00 286 
Kenya 62 54 4.6 1.3 2.5 0.19 1,51 1368 
Rwanda 79 19 45 7.6 3 0.17 0.24 697 
South 
Sudan 
- - - - - - - 1115 
Tanzania 67 43 33 -1.8 3.8 2.64 1.84 926 
Uganda 28 138 2 -3 0.0 0.04 0.00 714 
Source: Author based on data from International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) 
(2016)  
The table above shows that Rwanda is a mineral economy in EAC followed by Tanzania and 
Burundi in 2016 (see mineral export contribution in the table). Tanzania is close to being a 
mineral economy due to her export in gold, another emerging mineral economy is Burundi.  
This was one of the reasons why I chose to focus this study on regulation of mining in the 
context of globalisation with focus on the cases of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda (see 
chapter six, seven and eight). Rwanda and Tanzania exports dominates other sector and it was 
crucial to see more their relevance to the rest of economies and the specific problems 
encountered in the regulation of the sector. Uganda was a special case as a growing oil 
industry in the region and with huge metal endowments that are not exploited. It was also 
special case as it is the only country of EAC which have 90% of mining activities run by 
ASMs but with large informalities and mineral smuggling roots from Eastern DRC. All these 
specific characters of 3 EAC member states help us to assess the resource governance and 
regulation of mining sector in the region.  
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4.2. The history of EAC 
 
The history of EAC community help us to understand the process of politics and governance 
in general of the region and the main characteristics of agents and decision-making process 
that affect the whole regional political economy. It starts in 1917 when the former British 
colonies, Uganda and Kenya entered the customs union. In 1909, Kenya started to collect 
duties on behalf of Uganda and then share the revenues from this common tariff. The 
formalisation of the joint custom was implemented (Livingstone, 1993). In Tanganyika, the 
common market existed as well, however, it was mixed with a lot of smuggling on borders 
because the control of frontiers was hard, and the regulation and control of territories were 
too difficult.  
In 1920, East African states had a banking system and free movement of capital investment. 
Foreign and local enterprise developed in Jinja, Kampala and in Nairobi. In that time, the 
cities already have a working stock exchange market. In 1948, the East Africa high 
commission was formed, and Tanzania joined the integration.  
Burundi and Rwanda by that time were grouped into single state called Rwanda-Urundi and 
were separated from Tanganyika (former German East Africa). This was aresult of Belgium 
military occupation during WWI from 1916 to 1922. The territory was controlled by Belgium 
under class B Mandate of the League of Nations from 1922 until 1945 when the WWII 
ended. The territory became a Trust of UN which replaced the League of Nation but still 
controlled by Belgium until it got independence and split into two countries Burundi and 
Rwanda on 1st July 1962. . In 1967, the East African Community was officially launched, 
comprising of three states highlighted above, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya which were under 
British protectorate.  
On the other side, the legacy of Belgium and France in the late 1970s enabled the creation of 
central African French speaking countries through CEPGL. The latter comprises Congo, 
Rwanda and Burundi and was created in 1976. As highlighted below, these countries: 
Rwanda and Burundi, integrated into the EAC in 1 July 2007. CEPGL was quite inactive by 
that time as there was regional war, Congo War I and Congo War II that the country accused 
Burundi and Rwanda of invading its territory. During these wars, South Sudan was still in 
conflict for secession from Sudan and the later took that advantage to oppose Rwanda and 
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Burundi in the Congo wars (Mushimiyimana, 2011). After independence, South Sudan also 
joined EAC on the 5th of September 2016.  
In 1977, the EAC collapsed due to economic and political issues; Nyerere, who was leading 
Tanzania, did not agree with the former Ugandan President Idi Amin’s policies. Such policies 
were the killing of the opposition and arbitrary decision making. The more bitter 
disagreement caused by the invasion of northwest Tanzania (Kagera Region) by the troops of 
Uganda. Nyerere used his strategic position in OAU and in Rhodesia to form a geostrategic 
support and retaliate against the Ugandan invasion. He organised a Ugandan exile and 
managed to uproot the Amin government.  
The political disagreement between Nyerere and Amin caused geopolitical change in EAC, 
such as the collapse of EAC in 1977, after only 5 years of rule of Idi Amin. The regional 
influence of Nyerere enabled the stabilisation of the region and the integration of Rwanda, 
Burundi and South Sudan into the community. Most of the peace agreements of disputes 
were tackled in Arusha, Tanzania especially in matter of Burundi, Rwanda related peace 
deals. The geopolitical configuration of Uganda and South Sudan, and the support of the 
former to the independence of the latter enabled a political trust to fast track the recent 
inclusion of this newly EAC member state.  
However, the political problem remains in the region even though it looks more stable 
compared to some more other parts of Africa. These problems are associated with regional 
tensions over regional governance policies, and the continuous accusation of interferences in 
domestic matters by individual states. There has been political tension between Rwanda and 
Tanzania during President Kikwete’s government and Tanzania in particular was accused of 
harshly treating and expelling Rwandan refugees. President Kikwete had generally accused of 
trying to find a regional and Rwandan solution through talking and supporting opposition 
parties of Rwanda abroad.  
Also, the fact that Tanzania is in both SADC and in the EAC, it sometimes brings divergent 
foreign policy issues that compromise other members of the EAC. For instance, the Tanzania 
withdrew in COMESA, and did military intervention along with Malawi, and South Africa 
special brigade in eastern DRC, a region that has different rebel movements that are accused 
of destabilising Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Rwanda and Uganda and, Rwanda and 
Burundi recently were mired in conflict and accused the other of interfering in domestic 
matters, through spying, supporting the opposition and attempting coups. Kenya still has 
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internal political issues of stabilisation and ethnic conflicts, similar to the unstable South 
Sudanese peace processes.   
The economic issues that explain the collapse of the EAC is the imbalance of internal trade 
within the EAC, revenue distribution, and colonial global economic politics. The imbalance 
of internal east African trade was due to the lack of manufacturing between Tanzania and 
Uganda. Countries did not have enough mutual business that would have accrued the trade 
relations. On the contrary, Kenya had manufacturing industry and almost dominated the 
regional market.  
Trade was weakened again by imbalance of trade policies that had a negative impact on 
internal market structure. Kenya had a capitalist market approach, Tanzania a socialist 
approach and Uganda a mixed approach. For instance, the nationalist tendencies of Amin 
caused the forced expulsion of Indians in 1972, except some professionals, and this had a 
negative consequence in trade of Uganda and of the EAC. The controversial political 
economy of trade had a negative effect on property rights, investment and free movement of 
capital within the region. 
Revenue distribution was always a problem, Kenya refused to redistribute revenues to other 
countries collected from single customs as agreed in the protocol. The EAC Development 
Bank which would help the community with compensation policies was weakened by the Idi 
Amin and Nyerere disagreements. Tanzania and Uganda refused to recognise the appointed 
leaders that would serve the community. Amin dismissed Idi Simba as the governor of EAC 
Bank and later Uganda pulled out in 1976. Kenya on other side, needed more institutional 
influence and own interests by fostering dominion in community representation.  
Despite the hard times of the EAC, the regional economic community revived and thrived. In 
1991, during the Common Wealth Heads of States, member states decided to rebuild the EAC 
community. In 1993 they set up tripartite commission and in 1996, the secretariat. The idea 
was to fast track integration and become a common market and a political federation in 2010. 
Institutions have been created including EALA and EAC Charter and Anthem, and in each 
state, there is a Ministry of EAC affairs. 
However, problems still exist including the imbalance of trade, some patterns of divergent 
political and economic ideologies. Though not as the same level as the past, it still occurs in 
Tanzania that aspects of nationalism and socialism are mixed in with the transition to 
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capitalism. Uganda adopted a liberal economy but share its systemic paralysis of corruption 
with Kenya. Though intraregional war is less likely, the internal stabilities is low in almost all 
EAC members.  
Economically, the EAC is promising and the adoption of asymmetric exchange with Kenya 
during the initial stage of integration was successful. New member states especially Rwanda, 
managed to develop her trade with the EAC, though at the beginning, Burundi and Rwanda 
did not have almost anything to trade with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The local market of 
Rwanda for instance was dominated heavily by Kenya and Ugandan products, but Rwanda 
managed to progress especially in the development of house construction materials and food 
processing, a new comparative advantage in the face of Kenyan manufacturing and Ugandan 
and Tanzanian food industries. The geographical proximity of the region to the eastern DRC 
market allowed countries of the EAC to boost trade and increase the mutual benefit from 
integration rather than disintegration (Mushimiyimana, 2016).  
Although tariff of some countries decreased due to the EAC Common External Tariff, the 
countries still have incentives to integrate. For instance, Rwanda have lost 25% of its 
revenues due to EAC CET (EAC Common External Tarif), but still local production 
increased, and the country is continuously willing to regionally and internationally integrate. 
Tanzania and Uganda are also still focussing on EAC trade and to some leaders like 
Museveni, EAC is a matter of survival, prosperity and security in Global competition with 
giants like China, and India (Ihucha, 2016).  
The other problems also are building blocks in the EAC as already the recent common market 
protocol in 2013 induced EAC to split into two blocks (North Corridor and the rest). The 
northern corridor that consist of Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya accepted the free movement of 
goods and services while Tanzania and Burundi did not, however, Tanzania and Rwanda 
have specifically agreed on the free movement of people before the protocol. The primacy of 
national interest still exists in the functioning of the institution through location and voice in 
the EAC, and they reflect the new threat to the regional institution and more specifically on 
harmonisation of policies and rules governing mineral resource as it happened in many other 
regional blocks (see Ihucha, 2016).  
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4.4. The current economic situation of EAC member states and the role of member 
state in its regulatory system 
 
Mining sector management performs within the economic, human and political environment 
of the states and the region. Economically, the poorer the country, the more separate the 
mining industry is from the national economy as it does not provide enough revenue to create 
an economic link between mining and other sectors. Second, the price of labour in mining is 
low since the market of labour provides a surplus from agriculture, as well as other informal 
and formal sectors of the economy.  
Besides, human development embraces the ideas of freedom, consideration and capability 
building of the people into the whole economy. The more people are free and capable, the 
more their bargaining power increases especially in the resource governance which involves 
stakeholders’ inputs. Amartya Sen in “Development as Freedom” and capacity approach 
theory, highlights that building the literacy level and access to facilities including hospitals, 
schools, clothes, and food is paramount to building the basis of human rights. A mining 
environment that has such a system of capacity building for the people becomes easier for 
both the company and the state to generally promote the good environment of mining. 
Besides, the political context of mining as well as the level of state capacity, create a peaceful 
environment and security within the mines. In more resource curse states, as we saw in the 
literature, the more the level of the state weakens, the more mining becomes chaotic and 
ungovernable. The state level as well as the regional level of state capacity and decision 
making matters a lot in the resource governance, especially in mining. In these following 
paragraphs I elaborate these three aspects in the EAC both at states levels and regional levels.  
First, the economic situation in the EAC is low compared to other states and regions globally. 
The GDP PPP of the EAC member states are the lowest. This implies that economic activities 
in the region are too low to create a required linkage between economic sectors, including 
mining.  It also triggers the countries especially those with more mineral economies such as 
Tanzania and Rwanda to focus much on mining sector which delays manufacturing and 
economic development at large. Moreover, the more mining sector is nationally relevant, the 
more its politicisation, rent seeking and negative effects that triggers to resource conflict 
occur and render resource governance more problematic.  
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Furthermore, the research shows that the situation of development of population of EAC as 
well as their scientific and technological capacity is too low globally. This is indicated by the 
HDI report from the UNDP in 2016. The indicators highlight both fertility and dependence 
levels, the numbers of those who are living in urban place and the schooling levels at least in 
secondary school. The UNDP (2016) data compared the EAC and the rest of the world and 
show that EAC is the least in HDIs. The more the population who are in the labour market 
have a lower scientific and technological capacity, the more the labour market supply has a 
surplus to the demand. Those within the surplus then have little choice but to enter into work 
which requires cheap and hard labour. Most of the private companies hire such labour 
cheaply and bequeath them limited rights, as the demand and supply provide a bigger surplus 
of people who need jobs unconditionally, some such jobs can be found in mining.  
While the new technology requires the industrial mining with few miners, one of the 
expectations of local people as well as governments is the provision of jobs to people. 
Companies choose to use both artisanal mining and industrial mining to accommodate such 
social structure and get an advantage of increase of these labours. Workers most of the time 
do not have a bargaining power in matter of salary and rights due to these living conditions 
and also market conditions.  
The other problem is that most of the EAC population live in rural areas and this brings in the 
problem of mining and farming as both activities which require a larger land space. There is 
an issue of population placement. Most of the people who live in rural areas and still depend 
on traditional farming rather than use larger land especially for those countries which are 
small but densely populated like Rwanda and Burundi. Even the countries with enough space, 
like Tanzania, the situation shows that they have conflicted with companies to move from 
mines and the mining induced displacement (MID) was inefficiently done with violence. The 
Burundi population is the most rural in the EAC with only 12% living in urban places. 
Uganda follow with just 16% living in urban places. Only Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya are 
encouraging urbanisation, still no country has reached 50%. Even though urbanisation 
enables people access to infrastructure it eases macro projects through the opening up of large 
spaces for agriculture and mining.  
However, the EAC has the lowest worldwide education population, this is even lower than 
the sub-Saharan region. The UNDP indicators show that Burundi is the lowest with only 8% 
of the population of 25 years old and above with a secondary school education. Secondary 
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school is six years in most after primary school it is important for human capacity, profession 
and civilisation in general. Rwanda and Tanzania follow Burundi in the least educated society 
in the world with just 13% and 12 % of the population of 25 years old and above able having 
completed secondary school respectively. Kenya and Uganda have between 32 to 30 percent 
of educated people, Rwanda has put an effort in the recent years to have 12 years basic 
education but the level of drop out from primary school has also increased. Some of the 
mechanism have been put in place to diminish school dropouts but pupils choose to leave 
school for other small opportunities provided in informal markets including mining, tea 
plantations and household activities. 
Manufacturing in the EAC is generally low and has been stagnant and decreasing for 
countries like Kenya that has had a comparative advantage in manufacturing in the region, 
though there is a positive high pace increase in manufacturing for Rwanda since integration 
(Were, 2016). This posits a problem as mentioned above, as mining has no linkage with other 
sectors. We have seen in the literature review that manufacturing in most of the developing 
nations is very low and this creates an imbalance in economies that rely on agriculture, 
mining and other export commodity economy. In the case of the EAC, most countries still 
depend on agriculture, then service and industries especially for minerals. Tanzania’s 
manufacturing contributed only 126 billion of TZS in 1998 while agriculture has contributed 
to the GDP the amount equivalent to 739 billion of TZS (Mbelle, 2000). Nowadays the 
country that has a high pace in manufacturing in the EAC is Rwanda with 35% average 
annual growth. Tanzania follows with 25% annual growth, Uganda 22%, and Kenya 7%.  
EAC leadership is committed to developing industries which boost manufacturing. There 
exists policies of industrial development especially in Tanzania and Rwanda. Under the 
leadership of President Dr. Pombe Magufuli, Tanzania is expecting to benefit from his policy 
of Tanzania ya Viwanda (Industrialisation of Tanzania). Through that process, investment in 
this area gets more facilities and support and the government have already started plans for 
electricity plants and roads that will facilitate the energy and transportation facilities of 
investors in Tanzania. Rwanda introduced and enlarged industrial park in Kigali.  
On major problem of the EAC is cooperation between countries for joint development 
project. For instance, the refusal of Uganda to allow an electricity line to cross the country 
which would come from Ethiopia to arrive in Rwanda through international support project. 
The deals over pipe lines of petroleum between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania and the road 
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and railway master plans. As far as mining is concerned the railway plan from Isaka to 
Musongati and Isaka to Kigali are important to disenclave the metal region. 
Intraregional trade is still dominated by Kenya and Uganda while Tanzania follows. Kenya is 
the most economically liberalised compared to other EAC states due to outreach companies 
of business, education and services orientation. Their extra regional trade is more linked with 
East Asia countries and Europe and America. However, most mineral exports go to East Asia 
especially India, Malaysia and China for processing and not directly to European and 
American markets. This induces companies to sell cheap and thus the state cannot access the 
market price for the goods. This is also due to lack of mineral processing plants in the EAC. 
EAC have cooperation an agreement through TIFA, EPA, EBA, and AGOA with asymmetric 
exchange but little is done to benefit such Western market benefits.  
The other issues are that the EAC which adopted a political federation pact, is still far behind 
common integration policies and harmonisation of rules including the mining acts. EAC is 
still more like an economic integration where politics and the self-interest of nations matter 
more than common regional interests especially through competition and the stabilisation of 
states. The region is also committed to receiving investments in both manufacturing, 
agricultural processing, education, and more importantly in mining exploitation and 
processing as mentioned on EAC investment plan.  
For investment in mining, EAC member states could invest in mining stone for construction, 
phosphate for agriculture development, salt for domestic and chemicals, iron ore and steel 
development for construction industry, kaolin for leather tanning, and for pharmaceutical use. 
The region also have silica sand that can be used for manufacturing of glass and home 
utensils. These are in addition to other larger mining industry which still have gaps in 
exploration and processing of mineral deposits, oil, gold, cobalt, copper, sulphide, lithium, 
hematite iron etc (EAC 2018, a).  
In short, the problem of EAC member states is that they focus on one sector economy or one 
orientation rather than combining all sector opportunity to increase development in general 
and livelihood condition of the people in particular. This render mining sector more isolated 
as it lacks linkages of economy. The country that focussed on mining such Rwanda and 
Tanzania delayed in industrialisation, and the country that did focus on manufacturing such 
as Kenya and Uganda did not also develop mines while it is one of their economic potentials. 
Moreover, there is no joint effort, projects or interests in mining activities that gather all 
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member of EAC. The political and historical aspect of EAC put the region into danger of lack 
of harmony not only in resource governance and regulation but also in commonly improving 
mining as a centre of development at regional level. This puts the region into difficulties of 
regulation of the sector and differently excising and implementing both global and local 
mining standards despite the similarities of problems related to mining sector governance, 
and socio-economy situation in general.       
 
4.5. Summary 
 
The East Africa region is a larger sub-region ranging from Djibouti to Madagascar, therefore, 
the EAC is part of that larger sub region composed of six countries Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The history of mining in this region during colonialism 
was characterised by the period of “Scramble for Africa, when territories and mines were 
owned and regulated by colonial states. In the case of Tanganyika mining development was 
under Deutsche Ost Africa and regulated by the Kolonial-Abteilung (colonial office) 
established in 1890.  
After the failure of Germany in the WWI, Great Britain occupied Tanzania, which was the 
larger part of Tanganyika and the remaining Rwanda-Urundi was grouped under Belgium 
protectorate in addition to the Belgium Congo. Therefore, the tin, copper and cobalt mining 
development that occurred in Belgium Eastern Congo also influenced the development of tin, 
wolframite and tantalum mines in Rwanda-Urundi, under the Belgium company SOMUKI 
and this is how the Rutongo mine started in 1931.  
The influence of Britain in Tanzania and Uganda also allowed EAC member states to enter 
into geopolitical ties with north Rhodesia (current Zambia) and south Rhodesia (current 
Zimbabwe) and the recent South Sudan in a matter related to liberation struggles. It also gave 
pace to Tanzania to join former British colony, Kenya and Uganda and to integrate into the 
common market established between the two countries in 1917, and that latter on brought in 
the establishment of the EAC since 1967.  
Independence allowed the African countries to regain sovereignty over their territories and by 
1970s to 1980s most of the mining companies were nationalised. The nationalisation in EAC 
member states were quite smooth and fair compared to the harsh and arbitrary nationalisation 
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of Mobutu in the neighbouring Congo in 1973, which nationalised without compensation. In 
Uganda for instance, government bought the copper mines and paid money for it. In Rwanda 
and Burundi there was smooth negotiation. After nationalisation, mining companies collapsed 
due to mismanagement of newly government owned mining companies. The flow of private 
capital in EAC mining weakened until 1990s.  
Not only did nationalisation weaken the mining sector in the EAC but also the socialist 
ideology of uhuru, ujamaa and kujitegemea. The first means the freedom and this included 
being free from any subjugation such as freedom of employee by private companies or 
individuals. Second ujamaa, allowed the state to own and control means of production like in 
Chinese Mao period. Moreover, kujitegemea means self-reliance or autarchic economy which 
depended less on foreign intervention and opening up to the world. Mining especially 
weakened since Nyerere did not believe in foreign investment – he believed rather in 
economic institutions based on socialism (Muhanga, 2016, p. 32).  
The neoliberal period allowed the countries to adopt privatisation policies including the 
mining sector from 1990s and early beginning of 2000. The promotion of foreign direct 
investment was encouraged. Rutongo tin mines were given to TINCO, from South Africa, a 
subsidiary of NOBLE, and Kilembe copper and cobalt mines were given to the Tibet Hima 
Company from China. In Rwanda the company still operates but in Uganda after only 4 years 
of operation, the government decided to close it again. In Tanzania, the privatisation of 
mining allowed Barrick Gold and Tanzanite One to enter into gold, nickel, and tanzanite 
mines in 1990s (I discuss this further in case studies in Chapter six, seven, and eight).  
The neoliberal period also brought in new mining opportunity in EAC members states which 
had not existed before. New types of minerals were introduced such as nickel in Tanzania and 
Burundi, and coltan and lithium in Rwanda. Methane gas, oil and gold deposits continue to 
increase their dimension levels of reserves in EAC. The EAC is still encouraging investment 
in mining as well as other key sectors including agriculture, education and manufacturing. 
Mining institutions were also established in terms of Ministries or Boards of Mining.  
However, EAC members states still have several social and human capacity problems to reap 
much from mining investment. The scientific and technological level is still low, and this 
weakens the bargaining power of EAC people to get more salaries and rights in mining 
activities. The labour market provides the surplus that is recruited for cheap, hard and risky 
labour in mines. Moreover, The EAC economic production is too poor to facilitate the 
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mineral trade through economic linkages. Except for clothing (Rwanda and Kenya) and 
blasting (Uganda), other materials used in mining are mostly exported outside the region. 
Moreover, the region still depends on commodity exports especially from agriculture and 
mining and manufacturing is too low. This compel EAC member states to improve economy 
and redistribute revenues to people but also to other sectors – including the mineral resource 
revenues.  
The EAC also lacks a harmonisation policy especially in mining. There is still gaps in 
policies and levels of adoption of global and national mining standards. Despite the common 
issues related to mining sector, the regional member states always foster their territorial 
interests in mining. This cause the region to fall into regional resource conflict and lack of 
bargaining power vis a vis multinational companies and other actors involved in regional 
mining.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. EAC MINING ACTS 
 
In this chapter I refer to national mining acts that have been set in EAC member states from 
2010 to highlight legal perspectives used in regulation of mining sector in EAC (East African 
Community) member states. This period marks the adjustment of neoliberal reforms in 
mining sector that hinges on the claim that though mining sector was liberalized nation-states 
did not gain anything as the existing national laws adopted in the end of 1990s was favoring 
MNCs rather than enabling states to collect tax and royalties (see Campbell, 2004). 
Therefore, this chapters show changes and legal reforms that aim at reawakening states in 
mining sector for that said purpose and so analyses increase in tax and mineral rents, and new 
conditions set for Corporate Social Responsibilities and Local content.  
The chapter focus indeed on three countries Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda mining Acts. It 
assesses the agencies and institutions that these acts provide in order regulate mining sector. 
In Rwanda, I refer to Law No 13/2014 of 20/05/2014. In Tanzania, I refer to Mining Act of 
2010, and the Special Bill Supplement of 28 June 2017, and in Uganda, I refer to The Mining 
Act of 2003.  
5.1. Agencies 
 
Setting up agencies was one of strategies to regulate mining in EAC member states. The 
World Bank recommends African states to create at least 5 institutions that would regulate 
and harmonize mining activities within member states. These institutions are: the ministry of 
mines, a department of mines, (a sub-unit of the ministry), a geological survey, a mineral 
promotion agency, and an environmental office (Campbell, 2004, p.19). The department of 
mines would also recognize and formalize the ASMs (Artisan Miners) and deal with other 
issues of poor working conditions, health and safety concerns, environmental impacts, and 
government revenues (Campbell, 2004). 
In Rwanda, the mineral resource governing body is RMB (Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and 
Gas Board), which is coordinating the exploration and mining-related activities. The Mining 
Act of Rwanda in art. 2, 18 determines the role of Police Judiciaire (criminal investigation) 
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in ordering and enforcing mining laws. In Uganda, the law provides the minister in charge of 
mineral development, commissioner for geographical survey and mines department, 
appointed under section 13. The law also determines the inspector of mines, including the 
principle inspector of mines and other persons authorized by the commissioner.  
In the case of Tanzania, the Mining Act, 2010 and its amendment in 2017, show changes of 
structure and functioning of mining agencies in the country. The Principle Mining Act of 
2010 provides the geological survey of Tanzania, established under the Executive Agency 
Act, and the Chief Inspector, Tanzania Mining Audit, and Agency. The agency works under 
the Ministry of Energy and Minerals.  
In Tanzania, there are also different authorities including the Commissioner for Minerals and 
Zonal Mines Officers.  There are also another seven assistant commissioners in 7 mining 
zones: eastern zone based in Dar es Salaam; northern Zone based in Arusha; southern Zone 
based in Mtwara, central zone based in Singida, northwestern zone, based in Shinyanga; Lake 
Victoria Zone based in Mwanza; western zone based in Mpanda; and the southwestern Zone 
based in Mbeya (see also Kafumu, 7. August 2017). Depending on scales of power, each of 
these agencies have different functions such as licensing, controlling and checking mining 
activities. The role of these zone agencies is wide and includes providing mining dealer 
licenses, a right to trade minerals that Tanzania put in place through the ministerial 
announcement on the 12th of September 2013, and to fight against illegal dealers for easily 
transportable minerals such as gold and diamond. 
The amendment provides new roles for the minister and the Commission of Minerals in 
Tanzania. The minister prepares and implement mining policies, promote mineral resource 
activities, monitor the issues of licenses by the commission and provide support for the 
creation of favorable mining investment. The commissioner for minerals is appointed by the 
president. The members of the commission are the chairman, the permanent secretary for the 
Treasury, the permanent secretary from the Ministry for Land, the permanent secretary from 
the Ministry of Defense, the permanent secretary from the ministry responsible for local 
government, the secretary to the Chambers of Minerals and Energy, the deputy Attorney 
General, and two eminent persons who possess proven knowledge and experience in the 
mining sector. The president nominates the Commissioner. Besides, the amendment of 2017 
changed the structure of the mineral resource agencies in Tanzania, the “zonal mines office” 
and “zonal mines officer” were replaced by the “commission”.  
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The amendment also gave power to the president and government in the control of mineral 
exploitation. The Article 5 (1) of the 2017 amendment stipulates:  
“The entire property in and control of minerals in, and under or upon any land, rivers, 
streams, water courses throughout Tanzania area covered by territorial sea, continental 
shelf or the exclusive economic zone is the property of the United Republic and shall 
be vested in the President in trust for the People of Tanzania” (The Republic of 
Tanzania, 2017, p 11).  
The Article 5 A stipulates that the President of Tanzania may after consultation with the 
relevant local authorities through the minister responsible for local government and by order 
in the Gazette declare any area of Tanzania, which is subject to mining operations, to be a 
controlled area. 
The function of the commission is set as follow: (a) To supervise and regulate the proper 
provision of the act. (b) To regulate and monitor the mining industry and operations, (c) to 
ensure orderly exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, (d) to resolve disputes 
arising out of mining operations or activities, (e) to carry out inspections or investigations on 
health and safety issues related to mining operations or activities, (f) to advise the 
government, (g) to monitor and audit environmental management, budget for rehabilitation 
and mine closure, (h) to counteract minerals smuggling and mineral royalty evasion, (i) to 
advise government on matters related to administration of the mineral sector with main focus 
on monitoring and auditing of mining operations, (…) to maximize government revenues. (j) 
to promote and conduct research, (k) to examine feasibility reports, (l) to collect data, (m) to 
suspend and revoke exploration and exploitation licenses, (n) to ensure compliance with 
standards, monitor and audit quality and quantity of minerals, audit capital investment and 
operating investment of miners for taxable information for Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(TRA).  The commission also have function to sort and assess values of minerals produced by 
miners to facilitate collection of payable royalty and produce indicative prices of mineral for 
local and international market and for assessment of royalty (The United Republic of 
Tanzania, 23rd April, 2010).  
Other agencies suggested in the amendment are: establishment of gemstones and mineral 
houses; the mineral auction center; the mineral exchange and the mineral clearance house. 
The law also allows for the establishment of the National Gold and Gemstone Reserve. The 
latter should hold and maintain all royalties required to be paid in refined minerals, all 
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minerals impounded or confiscated, dividend mineral paid under arrangement or agreement; 
any minerals otherwise acquired by the government. The law provides that the National Gold 
and Gemstone Reserve established under this section shall be under the control of the Bank 
of Tanzania. Besides, in terms of resource management, the Tanzania Mineral Audit Agency 
(TMAA) was established. 
The Government Mineral Warehouse shall be the custodian of all metallic minerals and 
gemstones won by mineral right holders in Tanzania (Art 27 D 1) (see The United Republic 
of Tanzania 23rd April, 2010). The purpose of this warehouse is to facilitate the calculation 
of the value of the minerals for royalty or tax payment. The law provides that once the value 
given by the companies is too low, it shall have the option to buy the minerals at the low 
value ascertained. Therefore, one-third of the royalty payable shall be paid to the government 
by depositing refined minerals equivalent to the ascertained royalty into the National Gold 
and Gemstone Reserve (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). 
The Mining Acts in its special amendment in 2017 provides for mining storage. Article 100 
commends (1) every mineral right holder shall construct a secure storage facility for storing 
of raw minerals. The access to these stores is strictly limited and subject to the joint 
authorization of the mining company authority and the mine’s resident officer. The time limit 
for storing minerals in the mine is not more than five days before they are taken to the 
government mineral warehouse to await disposal for home refining, authorized mineral 
dealers or, where so permitted, for export (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April, 
2010). 
The minister publishes in the Gazette the procedures and standards for storage of minerals. 
The act stipulates that the storage of mineral occur with sorting and valuation of those 
minerals and in presence of the mine’s resident officer, an officer from the Tanzania revenue 
authority, and the relevant state organ before being entered for storage at the mine storage 
facility. The law stipulates that minerals won from the mines shall be beneficiated within the 
United Republic before they can be dealt with in any way. Reports on the sorting and 
valuation is made and verified by both an authorized official of the mineral right holder and 
the mines resident officer and submitted to the commission. The said report is also used to 
calculate royalties that is paid to government.  
According to the Tanzanian Mining Acts, raw minerals are only removed from the mines 
under the supervision of the government and are kept secured in the government mineral 
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warehouse established in accordance with the regulations. Therefore, it is an offence to 
remove minerals stored at the mine without government authorization and by means of 
transportation not approved by the government (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 
2010).  
The exportation of raw minerals is prohibited. “…no licence or permit shall be issued under 
this act or any other written law for exportation of raw minerals and mineral concentrates” 
(Art 100 C, 3) (see The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). The law provides that 
where government authorization is given for the exportation of raw minerals, any benefits 
given under any law for the promotion of Tanzanian products in external markets shall not be 
extended to the exportation of raw minerals. This was a mechanism of increasing the benefit 
of mining for the country. The acts provided that all minerals shall be processed within the 
United Republic of Tanzania.  
As mentioned above, the idea was to see how the country especially Tanzania can control the 
mining activities which were turning to be the monopoly of MNCs. The latter used to give 
underestimated data to government of mineral export and to evade from paying mineral 
royalties.  Therefore, the establishment of mineral house was to enable the control of 
quantity, quality and value of minerals exported. Agency in Tanzania mines was important to 
reestablish the role of government in mines that it has lost since the liberalization of the 
sector in the end of 1990s. The actual implantation of these acts and difficulties and 
challenges of regulation that these agency and institutions have will be discussed in detail in 
the following chapters.  
 
5.2. License and Mining Right 
 
A Mining License and mining rights are important aspect of regulation of mining since they 
give the holder to access and control mineral zone for a certain period. In this part, we discuss 
how national acts provide for these licenses and recognize short time mining right to 
accommodate both large scale mining and small-scale mining as provided by global and 
national standards. The focus again is on three countries Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.  
Generally, the mining licenses are: (1) prospecting license, (2) exploration licence, (3) 
retention licence and (4) mining leases (see US Legal, 2017). Countries have similarities and 
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differences in providing these licences in the EAC. A prospecting licence allows miners to 
undertake exploration or mining activities, the holder of a prospecting licence may apply for 
a mining licence or retention licence over the area of the prospecting licence (US Legal, 
2017). The retention licence is an intermediate licence and exist between an exploration 
licence and a mining licence. It includes activities such as intensive exploration, research and 
other development activities required to demonstrate the economic viability of mining. An 
exploration licence provides exclusive rights to explore for petroleum or specific minerals 
within a designated area, but it does not permit mining, nor does it guarantee a mining or 
production lease will be granted (US Legal, 2017). A mining lease is a contract to work in a 
mine or for related activity of mining. All these licenses and permits are compensated in the 
form of either fixed rent or royalties based on the amount of ore mined (US Legal, 2017). 
IN EAC, the mining acts of member states provides different aspects of mining licenses and 
permits and use different ways to provide the scope of large- and small-scale mining. In the 
following paragraphs we discuss the difference and the implication of these differences in 
regulation of mines for individual countries. The term “mining permits” are often used for 
small scale mining and came out after global and regional policies to integrate ASM into 
formal mining activities in Africa as the sub-sector provide employment and opportunities for 
local population.  
 
5.2.1. Mining licences and permits in Tanzania 
 
There are five major mining licences in Tanzania: (1) prospecting licences, (2) retention 
licences, (3) special mining licence, (4) mining leases, and (5) primary mining licence. The 
prospecting licences is addressed to the commissioner and after paying prescribed fees. The 
holder gets exclusive rights to carry on prospecting operations in the areas of minerals 
applied for. The applicant once given rights, he or she must start the activities within three 
months. Its duration is a four years period (art. 32, a). The other obligation is to give notice to 
the licensing authority after the discovery of any mineral deposit and to adhere to the 
prospecting program. Failure to do so is an offence sanctioned by paying 20 million shillings 
in the case of default.  
A retention licence is stipulated in Article 37 and provides that the holder of prospecting 
licence may apply for retention licence after submitting a study on: (1) the extent prospect for 
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recovery, and the commercial significance of the mineral deposit and the relevant market 
conditions, trends, technical and economic factors, (2) the impact of mining operations to the 
environment and ways to minimize effect. It has a duration of 5 years renewable and the 
holder may apply for Special Mining Licence (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 
2010). 
The special mining conditions that the investment capital may be not less than US$ 
100.000.000 or its equivalent in TZS (Tanzanian Shillings). Its duration depends on the 
completion of exploited explored ore which is provided by the minister after consultation 
with the commission. After the application of these license, the minister checks whether the 
applicants fulfil the conditions summarized as follow. (1) Whether there is sufficient deposits 
or reserves of minerals proposed to be mined in order to justify their commercial exploitation, 
(2) whether land over which licence is given is reasonable for proposed operations, (3) 
whether the mining is in conformity with international standards of good mining practices, 
(4) size and nature of the proposed mining operations, proposal for employment and training 
of Tanzanians and succession plan on expatriate employees and plan for procurement of 
goods and services available in the United Republic are adequate, (5) whether the applicant is 
not in default in respect of any of the obligations under his prospecting licence or as the case 
may be his retention licence (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). The clause 
on employment and training of local people is in line with the enforcement of the local 
content. 
On mining leases, the law provides quite the same as the special mining licence except on 
duration and on the required capital investment. The time given for mining lease is 10 years, 
renewable. The obligation of the holder of mining lease is stipulated in Article 52. He or she 
shall: (a) develop the mining area and carry on mining operations in substantial compliance 
with his program of mining operations with due diligence, (b) demarcate and keep 
demarcated in the prescribed manner the mining area; (c) take all appropriate measures for 
the protection of the environment in accordance with the environment management act; (d) 
implement the proposed plan for relocation, resettlement, and payment of compensation to 
people within the mining areas in accordance with the land act, (e) employ and train citizens 
of Tanzania and implement the succession plan on expatriate employees in accordance with 
the employment and labor relations act, (f) implement plan for procurement of goods and 
services available in the United Republic (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2017: Article 
52). 
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For inclusion of ASMs the Tanzanian mining act provides for the primary mining licence. 
This is a licence for small scale mining operations, whose capital investment is less than 
US$100,000 or its equivalent in Tanzania shillings. This licence is exclusively granted to 
Tanzanians. Article 8 (2) stipulates: A primary mining licence for any minerals shall not be 
granted to an individual, partnership or body corporate unless (a) in the case of individual, the 
individual is a citizen of Tanzania, (b) in the case of a partnership, it is composed exclusively 
of citizens of Tanzania, (c) in the case of a body corporate, it is a company (i) its membership 
is composed exclusively of citizens of Tanzania, (ii) its directors are all citizens of Tanzania, 
(iii) control over the company both direct and indirect is exercised from within Tanzania by 
persons all of whom are citizens of Tanzania. Article 8 (3) provides that licences for mining 
gemstones shall only be granted to persons who are Tanzanians – however this is not 
practically the case given the importance of large-scale mining in gemstones which include 
both nationals and foreigners as indicated the following chapter (The United Republic of 
Tanzania, 23rd April 2010).  
The amendment of Tanzanian mining act brought about some changes, especially on the 
share of government in the mining activities and on establishment of additional conditions for 
getting a mining licence.  Article 10 (1) stipulates: “In any mining operations under a mining 
licence or a special mining licence the government shall have not less than sixteen non-
dilatable fees which carry interest shares in the capital of a mining company” (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). The amendment also provides that the government 
must compensate its tax expenditure into the shares in the capital invested in the company. 
Article 10 (2) argues: “in addition to the free carried interest shares, the government shall be 
entitled to acquire, in total, up to fifty percent of the shares of the mining company 
commensurate with the total tax expenditures incurred by the government in favor of the 
mining companies” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). Article 10 (3) 
emphasizes that the acquisition by government of shares in the company shall be determined 
by the total value of the tax expenditure enjoyed by the mining company (The United 
Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). 
Moreover, all contracts that should be signed between the government and the mining 
company in Tanzania are subject to the provisions of the Natural Wealth and Resource 
Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of unconscionable Terms) (Amendment of Mining Act 
2017, Article 11). The Natural Wealth and Resource Contract, Act 2017, Part III stipulates 
that the government shall, within thirty days of the resolution of the National Assembly made 
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in terms of section 5, serve the other party to the arrangement or agreement a notice of 
intention to re-negotiate the terms which the National Assembly found to be unconscionable. 
The said article paragraph (2) explains what clauses or arrangement that are unconscionable:  
“Terms of the arrangement or agreement shall be deemed to be unconscionable and 
treated as such if they contain any provision or requirement that: (a) aim at restricting 
the right of the state to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth, natural 
resources and economic activity; (b) are restricting the right of the State to exercise 
authority over foreign investment within the country and in accordance with the laws 
of Tanzania; (c) are inequitable and onerous to the state; (d) restricts periodic review 
of arrangement or agreement which purports to last for life time the mining; (e) 
securing preferential treatment designed to create a separate legal regime to be applied 
discriminatorily for the benefit of a particular investor; (f) are restricting the right of 
the State to regulate activities of transnational corporations within the country and to 
take measures to ensure that such activities comply with the laws of the land; (g) are 
depriving the people of Tanzania of the economic benefits derived from subjecting 
natural wealth and resources to benefit in the country; (h) are by nature empowering 
transnational corporations to intervene in the internal affairs of Tanzania; (i) are 
subjecting the State to the jurisdiction of foreign laws and forum; (j) expressly or 
implicitly are undermining the effectiveness of State measures to protect the 
environment or the use of environment friendly technology; or (k) aim  at  doing  any  
other  act  the  effect  of  which undermines  or  is  injurious  to  welfare of  the People 
or economic prosperity of the Nation (3)” (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2017).   
This law provides that the government shall state the nature of the unconscionable terms and 
the intention to remove the terms from the arrangement or agreement if the re-negotiation is 
not concluded within a specified period (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). 
(4) Unless the period for the renegotiation is extended by parties on agreement, the period for 
renegotiation of unconscionable terms shall not exceed ninety days from date of service of 
notice to the other party (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010). It gives rights 
to the minister as well to make regulations for the better carrying out of the provision of this 
Act (see article 10: 8) (The United Republic of Tanzania, 23rd April 2010).   
According to the law, this Natural Wealth and Resource Contract Act of 2017 refers to the 
UN resolution 1803 (XVIII) of 1962 that guarantees the “permanent sovereignty over natural 
 89 
 
resources. As discussed in the chapter three this resolution provides the exclusive sovereignty 
of states to their mining territories. It has been used for nationalizing mines in Africa in the 
period of the 1960s and 1970s. The mining acts refers to it to reiterate this sovereignty 
principle in mines and to explain any activity that can refer to closure or nationalization of the 
mine. In the current context this law is used not in a former way of nationalization but 
reawaking the state in liberalization process of mines which give new form of regulation of 
the sector and new form of sovereignty state over mining territories (we highlight this in the 
discussion provided in chapter nine).   
 
5.2.2. Mining Licences and Permits in Rwanda 
 
There are four types of mining licences in Rwanda: exploration, small scale, large scale, and 
artisanal mining licences. The mineral licence area shall consist of contiguous blocks, each of 
which is of such shape, dimension and orientation as follows. For an exploration and large-
scale mining licence, the areas cover 400 ha. For small-scale mining licence, the area covers 
100 ha, and for artisanal mining, the area covers 49 ha.  
The Rwanda Official Gazette (20/05/2014) stipulates that an exploration licence is valid for 
four years renewable once after relinquishing of fifty percent of the unexplored area. The 
holder of exploration licence may: (1) explore for all mineral ores in respect of which he/she 
is granted the licence, (2) drill boreholes and make such excavations as may be necessary, (3) 
collect from the exploration licence areas mineral ore specimens and samples for the purpose 
of having them analyzed and valued, without exceeding such limits as specified by a 
ministerial order for exploration purposes, (4) sell, with prior authorization of the minister, 
ore specimens and samples obtained from exploration operations and pay taxes associated 
with the sale of such mineral ore, (5) erect camps and temporary buildings; and, unless the 
minister decides otherwise, remove before or upon the termination of the exploration 
operations, any such comps, temporary buildings  or other facilities erected by the holder of 
the licence (Rwanda Official Gazette, 20/05/2014 p.40). 
 A small-scale mining licence in Rwanda is valid for 15 years or the estimated life of the ore 
body proposed to be mined, or whichever is shorter. It shall be renewed for further periods 
each not exceeding ten years. Besides, a large-scale mining licence shall be valid for an initial 
period not exceeding twenty-five years or the estimated life of the mineral ore body proposed 
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to be mined, whichever is shorter (Rwanda Official Gazette, 20/05/2014). Such a licence may 
be renewed for further periods each not exceeding fifteen years. An artisanal mining is five 
years renewable. The application of mining licences is addressed to the minister. 
 
5.2.3. Mining Licences and Permits in Uganda 
 
The mining act of Uganda (2016) provides five types of mining licence: a prospecting 
licence, exploration licence, retention licence, mining lease, and location licence. The 
location licence is quite unique. It means a licence for prospecting and mining operations by 
methods which do not involve substantial expenditure and the use of specialized technology. 
The law explains that substantial expenditure exceeded five hundred currency points 
necessary to bring the mine into production or such other amount as may be prescribed (The 
Mining Act of Uganda 2016, p. 34). Article 55 (2) stipulates: “A location licence shall be 
granted, in the case of an individual, only to a citizen of Uganda, and in the case of body 
corporate, only where citizens of Uganda hold at least fifty one percent of the beneficial 
ownership of such a body” (The Mining Act of Uganda, 2016). The duration of the location 
licence is 2 years renewable. 
Prospecting licence authorizes the holder to prospect over an area or explore such an area 
through flying or doing any other related activities, it has a period of one year and the sample 
received are for the government of Uganda, and therefore cannot be sold. It can only be taken 
away upon a written request to the commissioner. Exploration licence is much more 
restrictive in Uganda. Article 26 (d) says that an application for an exploration licence shall 
give (1) in respect of the person or, if there is more than one person, the name and nationality 
of each person, making the application, in the case of a body corporate, its name and place  of 
incorporation, the name and nationality of directors, managers and other officers of a similar 
rank, and if the body corporate has a share capital, the name of any persons who is the 
beneficial owner of more than five percent of the issued share capital (The Mining Act of 
Uganda , 2016). The same article paragraph (h) stipulate that the applicant of exploration 
licence should also submit a statement regarding the employment and training of Uganda 
citizens (The Mining Act of Uganda, 2016). The duration of exploration licence, like the 
retention licence, is three years (see art. 29, p 21) but for a retention licence, the Article 
provides a renewal for once for a period of 2 years. A retention licence is given when an 
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applicant, normally a holder of prospecting or exploration licence have found a valuable 
mineral worthy of exploitation in the mines (The Mining Act of Uganda, 2016).  
A mining lease in Uganda focuses on conditions such as employing Ugandan citizens, goods 
and services, efficient land use, and a positive cash flow. Article 41 (h) provides that an 
application on the mining lease should be accompanied by a report on the goods and services 
required for the mining operations, which can be obtained within Uganda and the applicant’s 
proposals with respect to the procurement and training of Ugandan citizens. The paragraph (j) 
stipulates that it should be accompanied by a business plan giving a detailed forecast of 
capital investment, operating costs and revenues, and the anticipated type and source 
financing including the year for the positive cash flow and financial plan and capital structure 
(The Mining Act of Uganda, 2016). The duration of the mining lease is twenty-one years 
renewable.  
Mining licences in EAC give more opportunities to small-scale miners as well as large-scale 
miners. These enable the integration of artisan mining into extractive industry while 
maintaining the pace of more intensive capital investment. In some countries this small-scale 
mining opportunities are given to nationals or jointly nationals and foreigners but with equal 
partnership or majority venture to national. 
Except Tanzania, where the mining lease is given for 10 years and in Uganda for 21 years, 
other EAC members have a 25 years duration. The companies have possibilities to renew 
their laws, as prescribed by laws. This difference in years is important as the country can 
refuse to renew the contract once it is over due to different reasons that the government may 
have including dissatisfaction with the company. Mining License have direct implication in 
resource governance or mining regulations in general. While the government use that power 
to control MNCs within its territory, companies also use the same opportunity to manage 
efficiently the extraction of mining and due to the advanced technology, depletion of mine 
may be in short time than the period allocated in the mining license. This sometime brings in 
problem with negotiation and allocation of time and benefit between parties and more 
specifically between government and MNCs. We discuss further on these case in the 
following chapters.  
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5.3. Royalty and taxes  
 
Royalty and tax collection is an important aspect of regulation of mining. As discussed 
before, Campbell (2004) argues that states have been losing mineral tax and royalties since 
liberalization of mining sector in the end of 1990s because MNCs were given opportunities to 
pay less tax and royalties, mostly below 2 % in order to attract investors. This policy was 
successful to bring in MNCs, but hard for collection of tax and royalty for host countries until 
the reforms that is still going on but started early 2010 for most of EAC member states. 
Henceforth states reformed the tax and royalty that MNC and miners in general pay to 
government which is levied at least to 5 % for royalties and 30% for corporate income tax 
even though the practice is something else as we shall see in the next chapters. Therefore, this 
part shows the legal provisions regarding royalty and tax in mining sector of EAC members 
states with focus to Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.      
For Tanzania, the royalty fee is four percent for metal extraction and five for precious metals. 
For Rwanda, the metal royalty fee is four percent and precious metals six percent. Uganda 
have the same royalty fees on both metals of five percent each.  
 
5.4. Local content, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and integrity pledge, 
safety and environment 
 
Corporate social responsibility, integrity or mining good practice are very important in the 
current global and national regulations due to the former mining malpractices that occurred 
with the extractive industry as earlier mentioned. In this part, we discus on how national 
mining acts provides for these aspects. Besides, in the following chapters the research will 
assess the implementation of these provisions.  
In the case of Tanzania, the law provides for the “local content” signed by mining companies. 
According to the law, this is a quantum of composite value added to, or created in, the 
economy of Tanzania through deliberate utilization of a Tanzanian and material resources 
and services in the mining operations. Its aim is to stimulate the development of capabilities 
of indigenous of Tanzania and to encourage local investment and participation. This should 
also be accompanied with integrity pledge. The latter means a formal and concrete expression 
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of commitment by mineral rights holders to abide by ethical business practices and support a 
national campaign against corruption and prepared by the commission.  
For Tanzania, a mineral rights holder shall give preference to goods which are produced or 
available in Tanzania and services which are rendered by Tanzanian citizens and or local 
companies. Goods and services required by the mineral rights holder which are not available 
in the local market are imported from a foreign company, but which has a joint venture with a 
local company. The local company must own share of at least twenty five percent in the joint 
venture or otherwise provided for in the regulations (The United Republic of Tanzania, 2017, 
part VIII).  
Subsection (1) and (2) stipulate that mineral right holder shall prepare and submit to the 
commission a procurement plan for a duration of at least five years indicating among others, 
the use of local services in insurances, financial, legal, accounts, security services, cooking 
and catering services and health matters and goods produced or available in Tanzania. Article 
103 (1) asserts that mineral right holder shall, within twelve months after the grants of a 
licence, and on each subsequent anniversary of that grant, submit to the commission for 
approval, a detailed program for the recruitment and training of Tanzanians in accordance 
with an approved local content plan. The program provides training and recruitment of 
Tanzanians and (should) considers gender equity, persons with disabilities host communities 
and succession plan in accordance with the non-citizens in accordance with the Employment 
Regulation Act.  
For Rwanda, the holder of a mineral licence shall comply with environmental laws and 
regulations. A mineral licence includes conditions relating to the rehabilitation, reinstatement, 
leveling, reforesting and contouring of any part of the exploration, artisanal mining, small-
scale mining or large-scale mining licence areas that may be damaged by exploration or 
mining operations.  Companies must pay a financial guarantee for environmental protection. 
According to the law, health and safety of workers are taken into consideration. Article 33 
provides that every holder of any type of mineral licence shall (1) ensure the mine is 
commissioned, operated, maintained and decommissioned in such a way that workers shall 
perform their work without endangering the health and safety of themselves or of other 
persons, (2) ensure that persons who are not employees, but who may be directly affected by 
the activities at the mines are not exposed to any hazards to their health and safety; (3) ensure 
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that all persons working at the mine have the necessary skills, competence and resources to 
undertake their work safely and ensure the safety of others. 
The law guarantees land owners’ right. Therefore, fair fees and compensation shall be paid 
through negotiations and through laws (see chap V of the law, 2014, article. 28, and 29). 
Contrary to most of other EAC mining laws, there is no written obligation to replace foreign 
workers in the mines by nationals in Rwanda, or any obligation of the company to submit 
such labor plan. However, there are provisions that allow the government to negotiate with 
the company before the licence is issued.  
For the case of Uganda, some of the conditions that must be fulfilled by a mining lease holder 
are as follow: (1) to guarantee to the commissioner that the area of land over which the lease 
is sought is not in excess of the area reasonably required for carrying out proposed  mining 
operations; (2) to provide environmental impact assessment, environmental impact research, 
environmental statement and safety factors must be provided. The law requires the applicant 
to submit the proposal to employ Ugandan citizens and the planned mechanism to buy goods 
and services produced in Uganda.  The miners are asked to respect the land use and they 
allowed to graze or farm in mining land as far as it does not compromise other activities. 
Companies are requested to respect the community land, religious sites and subsequently pay 
loyalty shares to the owners or to the community. 
 
5.5. Summary  
 
The national mining acts in EAC and more particularly in Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda 
shows the important reform in mining sector which is in line with reawakening the role of 
state in mining sector after total liberalization of the sector in the end of 1990s (see Campbell, 
2004, p. 82). States set up legal mechanism to put more control on MNCs and provide 
intervention mechanism of government in mines. For instance, article 5 of the Tanzanian 
mining acts 2017 allows the president to take decision on mining cite or declare that a mining 
zone is “state” controlled area. This came as a response to the problem of sovreignity 
highlighted in the second chapter that MNCs after liberalization of mines had monopolized 
the control of mining territory which occurred in most of the case to the disadvantage of 
governments. Governments also restricted the MNCs intervention in domestic matters (see 
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for instance Natural Wealth and Resource Contract in Tanzania Mining Act 2017), as a 
response to the claim that MNCs were involved in shaping policies and indirectly exercise 
control of local governance as earlier discussed in Chapter two (see Hönke, 2009).  
States embraced the idea of global and regional initiatives to include ASMs in mining sector 
and so have put in place mining permits that allow these small mining projects to legally 
function. This follows UN agencies on formalising ASMs as they employ many people.   
EAC member states also initiated binding rules to put pressure on MNCs in respecting, the 
royalty and tax payments, CSR, local content, integrity or mining good practices, and respect 
of environment. These are mechanisms to solve the problems that extractive industry was 
causing on ground including enclaving in mining which thwarts local and national profit in 
mining industry, and triggers mining malpractices including infringement on human and 
labour rights, violence, tax evasion, and repatriation of mineral income (see Chapter two).    
Even though there are legal provisions to reform again and restructure the sector, there is still 
little knowledge on the outcome of these reforms in practices. Therefore, in order to know the 
real outcome on ground we use assessment of cases of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6. CASE OF TANZANIA 
 
This chapter consists of three main parts: (1) the assessment of probability of resource curse 
in Tanzania, (2) the assessment on applicability and enforcement of regulation and standards 
of mining in Tanzania and (3) the summary. The main objective is to assess the extent to 
which mining sector is regulated in Tanzania and the extent to which the country deal with 
probability of resource curse.  
 
6.1. The probability of resource curse in Tanzania 
 
Basedau (2005) highlights that resources are not a curse per se and that other conditions 
should be taken into account such as the resource conditions, the political and socio-
economic conditions. For instance, oil differs from metals and gemstones in both mechanism 
of extraction techniques, price, needs and dependability. Looting for gold and diamonds is 
different to that of oil.  Moreover, oil and gold are extremely crucial resources globally and, 
influence more political and economic institutions than many other resources and thus could 
easily create a resource curse (Ross, 2009).  
Though Tanzania has a different resource endowment, gold, tanzanite and diamond are the 
principal Tanzanian resources, all of these minerals can be specifically found within the north 
of Tanzania. Even though minerals do not contribute much to Tanzanian revenues per se 
compared to other countries such as Botswana, the mineral export is almost half of the total 
export, if one considers the financial year 2014-2015 for example. The gold itself was almost 
40% of the total export. The Tanzania economy relies heavily on the external market of 
mineral LSM (Large Scale Mining), and ASM (Artisan and Small-Scale Mining), they have 
been extracting considerable quantities of gold since the mining sector liberalisation of 1997.   
Despite rapid economic growth, especially since 2010, Tanzania is still among the poorest 
region of Africa with an agrarian economy. The wage and working conditions are poor in the 
country. The wage for workers over 18 years of age is 80,000 TZS per month, or 37.5 Euros 
per month (almost 1.3 USD per day) as of January 2012 (Lee, 2012, p. 7). The Integrated 
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Labour Force Survey highlighted that in fact 35.6% of labourers were working under the 
poverty line level set in 2006 (Lee, 2012). Moreover, at the beginning of extractive industry 
liberalisation, 82.1% of the population were working in agriculture, while only 2.6% were in 
extraction industries and 15.3% in the service sector (Lee, 2012, p. 2). 62.9% of employees 
were getting the salary equivalent to $1USD or below per day, and 94.8% were receiving a 
salary below $2USD per day in financial year of 2001 (Lee, 2012, p. 2.). This highlight the 
poor economic conditions of the country which exacerbate the tenacity of lack of resource 
distribution and economic inclusiveness in the country.   
Political conditions matter when we talk about democracy, competition between elites, 
institutions, corruption levels and the degree in which the state respects the human rights of 
citizens. The more a country falls short in the aforementioned areas, the more it becomes 
vulnerable to the resource curse. Tanzania entered into the phase of democratisation at the 
same time as it entered into the liberalisation of mining sectors in 1990s. Combining all these 
processes was initially hard for the country and thus it continues to be in the process of 
democratisation.  
Nevertheless, the country still has one dominant party system, this brings about clashes 
between elites related to political competition between two most prominent parties: CCM and 
CHADEMA. The competition is not peaceful and both political elites use mineral resource 
politics for election gains. This triggers the country into more politicisation of the sector and 
distort the functioning of mining regulatory institutions which have to conform to political 
agendas of elites.  
Besides, the aforementioned parties currently receive almost equal support in Tanzanian 
politics, this creates bipolarity in the Tanzanian politics. In the recent electoral competition in 
2015, Magufuli from CCM won with 8,882,935 votes (58.46%) while Lowassa, from 
CHADEMA, received 6,072,848 votes (39.97%). In fact, this generated countless threats to 
CCM, who have been ruling the country since independence, demanding the exchanging of 
power to CHADEMA elites without violence. Moreover, CHADEMA claims that CCM uses 
force and state institutions to hold onto power. This political bipolarity and the specific nature 
of its mineral endowment could make it a resource curse and further cause difficulties in the 
regulation of the mining sector as will be detailed in the following section. 
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6.1.1. The resource specific conditions in Tanzania 
 
6.1.1.1. Type of resource 
Tanzania is immensely endowed with mineral resource, such as gold, tanzanite, diamond, 
sapphire, emerald, oil, coal, uranium, and metals including silver, tin, nickel, and copper, 
nevertheless the country depends predominantly on the production of gold and tanzanite more 
than any other minerals. Furthermore, the country is highly endowed in gold mines especially 
in northwest of Tanzania, around Lake Victoria greenstone belt. Whilst tanzanite is the only 
worldwide produce of Tanzania and is found in the northeast, in Merelani mines. Finally, 
Tanzania follows Botswana in terms of level of diamond exports in Africa, diamond can also 
be found primarily in the northwest. 
  
6.1.1.2. Dependable resources 
 
The gold reserve is about 45 million ounces (oz) and largely concentrated in northwest of 
Tanzania, around the Lake Victoria, on a green stone belt (Tanzania Invest, 2018) and both 
ASM and LSM have been mining the minerals intensively since 1990s. In addition, the 
government committee chaired by Judge Mark Bomani highlighted that Tanzania has 2,222 
metric tonnes of gold (The East African, 2018). Therefore, the country’s economy and 
livelihood has depended much on the production of gold even though the organisation of 
resource production and distribution have been questionable as we discuss below.  
The country started mining on a larger scale in 2000 and by 2010, the export of gold was 
$655 million USD. The major destination of gold export was United Arab Emirates (38.6%), 
Switzerland (31.9%), South Africa (26.9%), Saint Helena (1.3%), Netherlands, (1.0%), 
Thailand (0.2%), and others (0.1%) (Tanzania Invest, 2018). In 2015, the major export 
destination of gold of Tanzania were South Africa, India and Switzerland (Tanzania Invest, 
2018). Gold export contributed 32.9% of the total exports in 2015, and the gold export value 
from July 1st 2005 to June 30, 2016 was $1,646,213,198.53 on the side of LSM and 
$33,049,485.47 for ASM (EITI Tanzania, March 2018, p.31). Compared to other mineral 
exports in Tanzania, gold acquires a price far higher than any other mineral. The diamond 
export value from July 2005 to June 2016 was $79,016,898.28 for LSM and $4,212,847.93 
for ASM (EITI Tanzania, March, 2018, p. 31). The report also mentioned that the silver 
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export value was $8,616,200.87, while copper was $34,841,285.35, the tanzanite export value 
was $8,620,647.25 for LSM and $17,135,783.86 for ASM, the coal export value was 
$1,597,125, tin was $1,116,741.11, and gas export value was $53,166,496.83 (EITI Tanzania, 
March 2018, p.31). However, this EITI report showed neither how much tax was recovered 
by the state or the benefit of the mineral export.  
Tanzania is among the four giant gold exporters in Africa in addition to South Africa, Ghana, 
and Mali and the pace of gold production in Tanzania is at 700% since the opening of the 
mining sector in 1995. Gold production increased to 45 tonnes per year in 2010. Even though 
it is still lower than South Africa, which produced 140 tonnes in 2015, the pace of Tanzania 
gold production in East and Southern Africa is more promising given the shrinking role of 
South Africa and its own existing mining deposits. The Tanzanian economy depends very 
much on the gold export. Gold was and continue to be more relevant than any other metal in 
Tanzania. In 2010, gold export reached the value of 1.3 billion USD. It made up 22 % of the 
total exports in 2010 and 90% of the total mineral exports (Tanzania Invest, 2018).  
Even though copper and silver are not mentioned as specific conditions of resource along 
with gold, tanzanite and diamond, the geologic component of ore in the case of greenstone 
belt around Lake Victoria allows the simultaneous extraction of gold-copper concentrate. 
Companies, especially Acacia, a Barrick Gold subsidiary, export them together in the same 
containers. These mixed containers of gold-copper products complicated the measurement of 
taxable quantity of gold and of copper as the products are different in terms of prices.  
In 2014, Tanzania exported gold, silver and copper, which value $1,661,230,406 USD 
equivalent to 3.8 trillion TZS, for the quantity of gold of 1,274,289 tonne oz.; of silver, 
469,027 tonne oz.; and of copper, 13,775,018 Ib (Tanzania Minerals Audit Authority Annual 
Report 2014). The export of gold, silver and copper in 2013 totalled USD $1,780,495,461. 
For Tanzanite, the export in 2014 is $9,658,706 USD, equivalent to 22,218,734,328.63 TZS 
for quantity of grade AI tanzanite 3,798,403 carat and of 5,306101 rough grams and of 
76,245 carats of cut tanzanite (Tanzania Mineral Audit Authority Annual Report, 2014).  
The value of gold, silver, copper and tanzanite export in 2014 is about 4 trillion TZS. The 
total budget of the financial year 2014-2015 was 19.8 trillion TZS and mineral export value 
were equal to an estimated 5%. If we compare this value of export to the total Tanzanian 
budget after the Magufuli reform in 2016 and take into consideration the financial year 
2017/2018 which is 31.7 trillion TZs (Tanzania Invest, 2018), we find that the value of these 
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mineral exports, as mentioned above, is almost 8% of the post reform total budget. This 
highlights the magnitude of mineral export in the national economy. 
Moreover, the exports of the four minerals mentioned above were more than Tanzania’s 
foreign loans, equivalent to 2 trillion combined with general budget support (GBS) of 922.2 
billion. The total domestic revenue in the annual budget of 2014-2015 was 12.1 trillion, with 
tax revenue of 11.3 trillion. Mineral export in the same financial year is almost equivalent to 
1/3 of the domestic revenues. The estimate of 4 trillion of gold, silver, copper, and tanzanite 
was more than the sum of both domestic market borrowing (2 trillion TZS) and external 
market non-concessional borrowing (1.3 trillion) (see United Republic of Tanzania – 
Ministry of Finance, 2015, p. 7). This shows how big the mineral economy in Tanzania is 
and, the reason why the government focuses on mineral sector reform. 
The Tanzanian economy depends heavily on minerals, despite the mineral sector generating a 
relatively low percentage of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The MCI (Mineral 
Contribution Index) show that only metals contribute to 33% of total exports and that the 
country ranks 30 in metal contribution index (MCI) in 2012, along with DRC 10 and 
Botswana 59. Thus, despite the rise in gold export, 2% between 1997 and 1999, and 27% in 
the period between 2007 and 2007, the contribution of mining to the entire GDP is too low 
(Magai and Marquez-Velazquez, 2011, p. 9.). In 2012, the mineral value into the GDP was 
only 3.8%. In fact, little has changed since the beginning of extractive industry in 1999, 
where the contribution of mining in 2002 was 21 billion TZS in the total GDP of 887 billion 
TZS, or 2.37 percent of the GDP (Magai and Marquez-Velazquez, 2011, p. 10).  
Because of loopholes in the mining sector’s taxation system, Tanzania did not collect much 
money from the mining sector. With reforms, the government wanted a win-win situation 
between the government and MNCs (Ng’wanakilala, 19 October 2011) and to regain its role 
in the sector. Apart from increasing the royalties, the government needed to increase its share 
in the gold project in new mining projects with MNCs. For instance, in Buckreef gold project, 
the government has contracted a share of 45 % with Tanzania Royalty Company 
(Ng’wanakilala, 19 October 2011).    
Second, the internal corruption and institutional loopholes facilitated tax evasion by the 
mining companies. Corruption and embezzlement in mines and lack of transparency and 
accountability during 20 years of mineral extraction disorganised mining sector regulations 
and their enforcement of tax recovery. During that period, the country GDP for mining did 
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not increase especially from the period of Kikwete regime (2005-2015). In the fourth quarter 
of 2008, the GDP from mines was 197,832 million TZS. In the fourth quarter of 2016, during 
the Magufuli regime, the GDP from mining increased to 509,033 million TZS (Trade 
Economics, 2019).     
 
6.1.1.3. Looted resources 
 
Looting of minerals is one of the major aspects of extractive industry that followed the 
liberalisation of mining in Tanzania. The government set up an inspecting committee on 
April 1st, 2017 to evaluate mining production and commercialisation in Tanzania, the 
accuracy of declarations of the companies on taxable quantity and quality of exported gold in 
2016 and generally, the level of looting. The committee chaired by prof. Abdul Kadil Mruma 
evaluated the containers of Acacia produces. The committee reported that each container of 
227 carried 28.1 kilogrammes of gold or 7.8 tonnes of gold. Acacia used to export 4000 
containers per year or 333 containers per month. Moreover, the committee confirmed that 
Tanzania might have been the first exporter of gold in Africa – 223 metric tonnes of gold per 
year, if companies declared the true quantity (The East African Reporter, Monday, June 5, 
2017). The report confirms that the quantity they found in Acacia containers were far more 
than what the company declared and that 1.4 trillion TSh had not been declared or recorded 
anywhere by Tanzania Mineral Audit Agency (Nellist, 1 September 2017). The economic 
impact, as the reports says, is that from 1998 to 2017, the country lost between 68.59 trillion 
TSh and 108.5 trillion TSh through the illegal export of gold and copper concentrates 
(Nellist, 1 September 2017). 
More looting happened especially during the last two decades, during Mkapa and Kikwete 
regimes. The aim of establishing the inspecting committee was to re-establish the reform 
agenda that started in 2010 during the Kikwete regime, but not enforced. One of the missions 
of the committee was to evaluate the mining sector from 2004 to 2016 and to boost the 
contribution of mining sector into the economy. The committee reported Acacia Company in 
looting case.  
Complications arose with the measuring of gold by Acacia as a result of the particular 
geological nature of Bulyanhulu’s and North Mara’s gold-copper concentrate as discussed 
above. This was further complicated by the behaviour of the company towards the local 
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people and with the help of state apparatuses. The Geita mine, owned by Anglo gold Ashanti, 
a South African brand, did not have such complications; on the contrary, the observation 
shows that the Geita mines contributed to the city development and good working conditions 
of labourers. Gold in Geita had no other proven metal concentrate, thus the measurement was 
straightforward, and tax, royalties and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) were well 
provided.   
Not only is Acacia on the looting side of Tanzania gold but so too were particular individuals 
both internally and externally. Even though informal miners are not necessarily looters, when 
they are not controlled, they favour the informal gold market. Internally, the increase of 
ASMs (300.000 associations) according to Bryceson (2010), increased the illegal flow and 
trading of gold, which did not fall into the national account. Most of the channels of people 
looting Tanzanian gold were in Kenya. For instance, the Kenyan Revenue Authority arrested 
a Tanzanian in Kenya for having gold worth 100 million KSh (APA news, 21 February 
2018). The Kenya Revenue Authority found him with 32,255,50 grams of gold at Jomo 
Kenyata Airport coming from Mwanza, through Kilimanjaro, using Precision airline, a local 
airline company in Tanzania. He was going to sell gold to Dubai and would use Kenya 
airways (APA news, 21 February 2018).  
Looting lead to resource curse as the country heavily loose its natural resource that would 
otherwise be used to help in development process. These resources especially gold mines are 
indeed depletable which increases the level of resource curse case once they are not taxed. In 
the following points we discuss how the mines have been depleting given the period of life of 
mine and the level of industrial extraction applied.   
  
6.1.1.4. Abundant but depletable 
 
Despite the abundant character on gold in Tanzania, gold does eventually deplete without 
having helped with the development of the country, including even having no more reserves 
in the national treasury.  Gold mines will possibly deplete in 10 to 50 years.   
The major important mines under extractive industry that may deplete soon are Bulyanhulu, 
Buzwagi, North Mara, Geita, The New Luika and the Golden Pride. The Bulyanhulu gold 
mine started in 2001 in Shinyanga Region of North West Tanzania. It has an estimate of gold 
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reserve of 6.1 million ounces (oz) and so far, companies extracted 3 million oz. Acacia 
Company have already 273,552 oz in 2015 according to Tanzania Invest (2018). However, 
the local region possesses 17.1 million oz, but with regards to the actual mine, half of the 
reserve has already been mined.  
The Buzwagi gold mine in the Shinyanga region, northwest Tanzania, is owned by Acacia. 
The reserve of Buzwagi in terms of gold is too small compared to other mines in the 
northwest region – only 0.6 m oz while the whole reserve in Buzwagi is only 2.7 m oz. The 
mine is estimated to be fully extracted after four years, as of 2015 Acacia extracted 171,172 
oz (Tanzania Invest 2018). The Importance of Buzwagi for Acacia was not so high compared 
to Bulyanhulu and North Mara. North Mara started in 2002 as an open pit mine whose life 
period was 9 years. Acacia have already extracted 287, 178 oz of gold (Tanzania Invest, 
2018).   
Geita gold mine, owned by Anglo Gold Ashanti, started in 2000, has an estimated life 
duration of 10 years. The mines produce 3 million oz. of Anglo Gold, Ashanti produced 
already 527,000 oz in 2015. The New Luika gold mine in the Mbeya Region, which Shanka 
Gold has owned since 2012, has a life expectancy of 6 years. The reserve is 2.9 m oz and the 
production so far is 81,873 oz. Golden pride gold mine is in the Tabora region, and was 
among the mines in Tanzania that rushed to open after the 1995 reforms It started in 1997 and 
an Australian company owned it and has extracted about 2.2 m oz., almost depleted and 
closed as other mines in Kirondatal, Sekenke and Tulawaku (Tanzania Invest, 2018).  
These cases indicate the depletion of Tanzanian gold reserves, many appear to be half way 
through. In fact, the life expectancy of the mines had been depleted by half by the time the 
extractive industry was liberalised in 1997. 
 
6.1.2. Political condition 
  
6.1.2.1. Domestic politics  
 
6.1.2.1.1. Shadowing the state and mining scandals during Mkapa and Kikwete regime 
 
The major problem related to politics of mining in Tanzania is the linkage of competition 
over political power and mineral policies between the incumbent political party CCM that 
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ruled the country for many years since 1964, and the lead opposition party CHADEMA. The 
CCM has taken minerals, protected the company leaders from their scandals, coerced the 
media as well as the opposition leaders. The party does not take government criticism easily, 
particularly relating to mining companies and state-MNC relations. For instance, in June 
2017, the government suspended the local tabloid Mawio for 2 years. Mawio has published a 
photo on its front-page highlighting CCM leaders from Mkapa, Kikwete and Magufuli in 
mineral scandals and asserted that the Tanzanian sovereignty and security was under threat. 
This happened after a dialogue between the Barrick Gold leader Professor John Thornton and 
Tanzanian President Dr. Magufuli. The media argued that both Mkapa and Kikwete had been 
involved with mining corruption scandals that weakened the regulation of Tanzania mining 
sectors since the Mkapa regime in 1995-2005.  
In his statement, president Magufuli said: “the media should stop tarnishing their reputation. 
They have done a great work in serving this country. We should let them rest” (The Citizen, 
15 June 2017). Consequently, the Minister of Information, Culture, Arts and Sports Dr. 
Harrison Mwakyembe banned the Mawio because of reports on former presidents. This 
banning was achieved through a press release on June 15, 2017 (The Citizen, 15 June 2017). 
Newspaper put Mkapa and Kikwete as their front page and highlighted in Kiswahili Acacia: 
Usalama wetu uko hatarini “Our security is under threat” (Allafrica, June 2018). And, in just 
the first lines they stated that the president Dr. John Pombe Magufuli had been using 
institutions of the state police (Jeshi la Police), the national security service (Idara ya 
Usalama wa Taifa), The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) (Taasisi 
ya Kupambana na Kuzuia Rushwa), and FIU (Tanzania Financial Intelligence Unit – Kitengo 
cha Kuchunguza Fedha) in this mining scandals. 
President Benjamin Mkapa and Daniel Yona, former Minister of Energy and Minerals, were 
involved in what the media called “an abuse of public office” and “conflict of interests” in 
Kiwira Mine Privatisation in 2005 (Rusekelo, 29, January 2009). They had undersold the coal 
project in Kiwira to TANPOWER Company for $7 million USD in 2004, although the 
project originally cost the government around $50 million USD in the 1980s (Rusekelo, 29, 
January 2009). However, the PCCB invoked their immunity as a former president and a 
cabinet senior officer. The constitution of Tanzania allows immunity to presidents though the 
crime was committed during the time of service. Despite this, many still claim that the PCCB 
remains impartial in handling cases of corruption of senior leaders in Tanzania.   
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However, there is difference in the Mkapa regime’s and Kikwete regime’s anti-corruption 
mechanisms. Even though both were not able to handle corruption cases, the institutions of 
Tanzania during Kikwete regime was very vibrant in triggering more public awareness of 
corruption scandals and a multi-cabinet reshuffle, and the resignation of some senior leaders 
in the government (The Citizens, 24 June 2015).  Institutions played a role in exposing 
corruption cases such as the National Coordinator of Tanzania Human Right Defenders 
Coalition (TDHRC) Onesmo Olengurumwa noted (The Citizens, 24 June 2015).  
The mostly vibrant institutions were the Tanzanian Parliament (opposition members), the 
media, donor agencies, and activists, the justice sector including courts, and the Controller 
and Auditor General (CAG). The latter launched an audit of the 133 billion TZS in the Bank 
of Tanzanian External Payment Arrears (EPA) account and through Ernst and Young Audit, 
the institution found that the money had been transferred illegally and wrongly to 22 local 
companies during the year 2005/2006 in which there was an election and government transfer 
from Mkapa to Kikwete. There was information also that the BoT (Bank of Tanzania) spent a 
lot of money in the building of twin tower headquarters where 222 billion TZS was spent. 
The implication is that the government fired the BoT governor Daudi Balali in 2007 as a 
result of this development (The Citizens, 24, June 2015).  
The other former institutions highlighted above played a role in pressing the government to 
refund the money and to hold accountable not only the low-profile employees but also senior 
ones, whom they claimed had not participated in the scandal. The donor penalised the 
government by cutting off aid and the courts were able to judge and punish on some 
corruption cases.  
Another element to consider in the Kikwete corruption scandal is the Richmond scandal; 
Richmond LLC is a US based company that won a bid to supply 100 megawatts. 
Consequently, the country fell short of power and lost 172 billion of TZS (Citizen, 24 June 
2015). MP Zitto Kabwe revealed the scandal in 2007.  Zitto Kabwe position in Kikwete 
regime is like the current Tundu Lissu in the Magufuli regime. The general public and the 
media pressed both government parliament officials to hold them accountable. 
Incidents of corruption by politician arose regarding Barrick Gold, when agreements began to 
be signed outside of the formal institutional mechanism and, in more covert and deceptive 
circumstances. For instance, the MP Zitto Kabwe launched a motion against the former 
Minister of Energy and Minerals Nazir Karamagi, in 2007, claiming that he signed a mining 
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contract with Barrick gold in secret in a hotel room in London, allowing access to the 
Buzwagi gold mine. MP Zitto Kabwe was thereby suspended from parliament (Citizen, 24 
June 2015).  
The facts demonstrate the malpractice of institutions and corruption behaviour of the senior 
leaders triggered the MNCs and local companies, not only in mining but also from other 
sectors, to loot money from Tanzania. Based on the data provided by different sources, the 
elites involved BoT in the illegal transfer of public funds of more than an estimated 500 
billion TZS in Kikwete regime alone (The Citizen, 24, June 2015). Both private and political 
elites were too powerful to suppress the public voice, and to take away public funds to their 
private accounts.  
 
6.1.2.1.2. Violence in Tanzania political competition 
 
The main characteristics of Tanzanian politics since liberalisation, privatisation and adoption 
of multiparty systems in 1992 is the competition between the two main parties CCM and 
CHADEMA. Other parties including Alliance for change and transparency, Alliance for 
democratic change Chama cha Ukombozi wa Umma, Tanzania labour party, National 
Reconstruction Alliances and the United People’s Democratic Party remain politically 
marginal. Therefore, the issues of political competition rely on the fact that CCM have held 
power since independence. The fierce competition of CCM and utilisation of state 
institutions, including electoral commission and the police, triggers violence and 
misunderstanding between political elites of the two strongest parties in the country. This 
competition fuels a case for arguing the existence of a resource curse case and lack of 
tolerance between political elites.  
Political and civil liberties in Tanzania are increasingly critical and, many associations and 
elites are demanding regime change (Tripp, 2000). These fights do not happen peacefully and 
sometimes induce violence in the process. In Tanzania, the democratisation process is 
increasing the need to change the status quo of the political configuration of the country 
mostly dominated by the CCM. Even though the party has held power since 1977, it is facing 
a lot of pressure from opposition parties.  
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Contrary to accepting a peaceful regime change, the government is tightening the political 
space. The CHADEMA party accuses the CCM of using forces in electoral processes, leading 
them to threaten an election boycott. Freeman Mbonye, leader of CHADEMA, declared: “At 
many ballot stations, our representatives were prevented from observing voting, others were 
arrested or beaten”. This happened in the recent election of 2 parliamentary seats and 40 local 
authorities in September 2018. There was massive presence of armed police and the election 
turnout was low (Agence France Presse, 19, September 2018). 
Moreover, Mr Humphrey Polepole, the party’s ideology and publicity secretary, argued: 
“there is no way that the opposition party would win an election”. He asserted that with the 
meaningful investment of the Magufuli government in the social economic development 
activities, the opposition party would have to wait their turn to gain political power 
(Mosenda, 2018). However, the opposition is no longer prepared to be patient and the 
increasing tensions between the parties have resulted in more violence related to political 
competition. The opposition party claim that the CCM continue to win through the 
manipulation of the electoral commission. Last year the opposition parties rallied in Dar es 
Salam against CCM, during which the police unintentionally shot a 22-year-old student, 
Akwinlina Akwiline, in a Dar es Salam bus. The bullets hit her while the police were 
shooting to halt a violent demonstration by the opposition on 16 February 2018.  
A politician of the CHADEMA party was found beaten to death and shoved into a car in 
February 2018. The opposition leader of Chadema Freeman Mbowe confirmed that 
CHADEMA campaigners were kidnapped, beaten and tortured (Daily Nation, 14 February 
2018). Mbowe said that the CCM was behind this violent attack and asserted that the ruling 
party needed to take everything by force. 
In September 2017, the Tanzanian lawmaker and activist Tundu Lisu survived several 
shootings in Dodoma and was taken to a Nairobi hospital and then to Brussels for treatment. 
Tundu Lisu, an activist, “vocal person” and MP, was at the time of the attacks investigating 
the human rights abuse in the mines by the police and mining company security guard in 
North Mara region and in Bulyanhulu.  
The followers of Nyerere, including president Kibaki, did not manage to contain the 
corruption in the country, thus the CCM has become increasingly unpopular. Instead of 
losing power in the favour of opposition parties, the party opted for rapid reform, policies that 
would attract the public’s attention, such as the famous policy of Tanzania ya Viwanda 
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(Industrialised Tanzania), which took place during Magufuli regime. In this framework, the 
government started to increase electricity power plants, paved roads and attracting local 
mineral processing industry. However, it is too early to analyse the effectiveness of the 
projects.  
Contrary to the police, the army of Tanzania is one of the more professional armies in Africa 
and, in East Africa they have been a vanguard of stability, such as in their stabilisation 
mission in Eastern Congo with the help of SADC-UN Special Forces and almost 1000 army 
personnel from Malawi and South Africa in DRC. Indeed, the army was able to monitor the 
peaceful transition of Nyerere regime to his followers. The police were involved not only in 
the containment of the opposition party, but also in leaning to the government side, and 
therefore to the ruling party.  
The failure of the Jeshi la Police to bring about order in society has triggered demonstrations 
within Tanzania. One hundred and eight civil society organisations co-signed an open letter 
protesting against the assault on the rule of law and security in the country. These include 
armed attacks, atrocities killings, injuries, enforced disappearance, brutality, arrests, 
malicious prosecutions targeting human rights defenders (HRDs), journalists, politicians and 
even civilians (see open letter in annex). 
The religious leaders in Mwanza protested the attacks and during the Tanzania Episcopal 
Conference of 36 Bishops in February 2018, religious leaders claimed the situation of the 
country could bring mistrust and divisionism among the population and called for unity and 
stability. During the event, a catholic priest reiterated the democratic principle of Vox populi 
vox Die (The voice of people is the voice God), summoning the ruling elites to listen and 
respect the voice of the people in the country.  
The Charge d´Affair of the EU in Tanzania also protested the violence and intimidation in 
Tanzania on 23 February 2018.  The communiqué released by the EU head of mission in 
Tanzania with the support of High Commissioners and Ambassadors of Canada, Norway and 
Switzerland stated:  
“We are worried by the rising number of reports of violence in the last months 
including: the attempt on the life of MP Tundu Lissu; the disappearance of people 
such as journalist Azory, Gwanda; the lethal assaults upon government 
representatives, the authorities and citizens which occurred in the Coast Region in the 
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past two years. We join Tanzania’s people in calling upon those responsible, to 
safeguard the peace and security of democratic process, the country, its citizens, and 
respect for the due process of law without impunity” (EEAS – European External 
Action Service, 23 February 2018). 
Most of the targeted people were in the opposition, people who had refused to convert from 
the opposition party to the ruling party or who were human right activists. Dr. Hellen Kiijo-
Bisimba, who is also a human rights activist, highlights that one of his local activists Lwema, 
was killed after refusing to convert (Ulimwengu, 27 February 2018). In February 2018, there 
were a number of political assassinations, such as the killing of Godfrey Luena by unknown 
people, Luena was a CHADEMA member in Morogoro centre. The party claimed that he had 
a dispute with the local leaders and CCM members, accusing them of land grabs. Moreover, 
the CHADEMA secretary general, John Mnyika, claims that state security institutions are 
failing. Mnyika asserted: “Following multiple incidents of torture, kidnapping and murder of 
our leaders, state organs should take this matter seriously. There is need for abrupt measures 
to be taken by the police force. The tendency of claiming to be following up on the matter is a 
sign of incompetence,” (see Materu, 24 February 2018).  
However, some of the opposition leaders participated in insulting incumbent leaders and 
publicly speculating that Magufuli is the cause of the situation. This demonstrate the lack of 
tolerance between Tanzanian political elites and undermines the democratic process, stability 
and development. Contrary to many other developmental states where elites show tolerance 
in managing public affairs and political struggles, Tanzanian elites from either party remain 
antagonistic and hostile to each other. In the recent case, the court convicted MP Joseph 
Mbilinyi and party local leader Emmanuel Masonga, they were jailed for 5 months for 
insulting the incumbent president (Ng’wanakilala, 26 February 2018).   
6.1.2.2. Foreign policy 
Harmonising effective mining reform and keeping the good foreign policy image of the 
country continue to be a challenge for the Magufuli regime, and this brings a sovereignty 
issue, abuses the image of the country, paralyses economy, and orients the country to a “look 
east policy”. This policy involves rechannelling diplomatic relation to the Eastern World, 
including China and Russia, instead of cooperating with the West on trade, loans and aid, as 
well as development projects. On sovereignty issues, the Acacia Company threatens to take 
the country to the international courts and engage the president in talks that threatens the 
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sovereignty of the Tanzanian people. The negotiation between the president and Barrick Gold 
leaders, as said above, are no different from the same negotiations that happened before 
between companies and either the president Mkapa or Kikwete, and the deal between 
ministers of energy and minerals.   
With reference to the image of the country internationally, the activity and involvement of the 
state in human atrocities in Bulyanhulu and North Mara mines undermine the level of human 
and civil rights in Tanzania at the national and international realm. As mentioned above, 
several international civil society organisations petitioned against the human right scandals in 
Tanzanian Acacia mines and the systematic shooting of government critics, including Tundu 
Lisu. All the scandals were associated with the states wishes to impose mineral policy reform.  
The recent pressure of the World Bank on the country after the Magufuli mining sector 
reform and other social reform policies, such as suspending pregnant girls from school, is 
triggering financial pressure on the country and causing a “look-east” policy. This means that 
leaders take the country into the eastern cooperation and turn their backs on the West – which 
diplomatically has a deteriorating effect on national economy and politics.  
In terms of the national economy, whilst Tanzania was undergoing mining reform, aid was 
being cut as a response to social and human rights issues. The W.B withheld $300 million 
USD loan as a reaction to the handling of pregnant girls’ issues in schools by the government 
and questionable official statistics (Jacobsen and Obuluba, November 15, 2018). Denmark 
also withheld $10 million USD because of human right abuses and, according to Ulla 
Tornaes, the Danish Minister of Development Cooperation, “unacceptable homophobic 
comments” made by the president during a speech (see Kenya Chronicles, 24 June 2017). 
The mining reform come along with little tolerance between the elites and the sign of 
authoritarian decision making, where the government refused to engage companies before 
sanctions (Jacobsen and Obuluba, November 15, 2018).  
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6.1.3. The socio-economic conditions of Tanzania during resource production 
 
6.1.3.1. Little contribution of LSM in socio-economic development 
 
LSM has no direct or high socio-economic contribution in Tanzania except in some cases like 
in Geita. Here, the Anglo gold Ashanti contributed to its development and considerably to 
livelihood impact. Labour rights, including salaries, are relatively better and the company 
systematically contributed to CSR through the building of schools and promoting of a local 
healthcare system (see document in annex). Moreover, policy and management of Anglo gold 
Ashanti was totally different from that of Acacia and thus the human rights of the local 
populations were not violated in Geita, as happened in Bulyanhulu and North Mara. Anglo 
Gold Ashanti worked with cleric organisations and local authorities to implement these CSR 
projects.  
There are three reasons behind the low contribution of LSM to local development. First, 
despite the huge contribution of gold to Tanzanian exports, almost half of total exports has 
had little impact on the total GDP. Second, gold mines in both Bulyanhulu and North Mara, 
under the Acacia company, created a human rights crisis in the mining sector of East Africa, 
including the killing of local civilians and the raping of women, and so exacerbated the social 
stigma and psychological trauma in the country. Third, in the last 20 years, the extractive 
industry in Tanzania has been using a high-level technology that has quickly depleted the 
country’s natural resources, whilst doing very little to benefit people at a local level. These 
factors deteriorated the socio-economic expectation of LSM in Tanzania extractive industry. 
Apart from gold, other minerals of Tanzania, including tanzanite and diamond, benefited 
foreign countries, especially India, more than the county of origin. For instance, the Indian 
companies including Tanzanite One and Shop LC, which buys from Tanzanite One, 
participates in CSR in India rather than in Tanzania. Shop LC provides hot meals for hungry 
Indian schoolchildren as part of their CSR (Shop LC, 2019).  
Tanzania has a mineral “Dutch disease” on gold, in that it forgets to develop the trading of 
other minerals including diamond. While Tanzania is the second in African diamond exports, 
after Botswana, the focus on gold has hindered the country’s ability to promote other 
valuable minerals which could be of more benefit to national economic development. In 
2015, Tanzania only exported 216,909 carats of diamond and earned $58,768,313 USD, 
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while Botswana exported 20,778.000 carats and earned $6.399.624.000 USD. Tanzania has a 
38.1 million carats reserve just in Mwanza. The diamond project is a joint venture by the 
Government of Tanzania and the Petra Company. William Diamond Limited operates the 
diamond mine, the company comprises the Petra Company and the government of Tanzania 
who hold 75% and 25% respectively. Botswana has 130 million carats of gold reserve 
countrywide. Tanzania is the second in diamond exports in Africa, but still has the lowest 
GDP per capita. The focus on gold has thwarted the development of other mineral industries, 
and other economic sectors, including manufacturing. The country has also fallen short in 
developing sectors, including agriculture and education as mentioned in previous chapters.  
On the contrary, the government allocated a lot of money to the mining sector which has not 
yet been proved to be profitable for the state. This implies macro-economic loss and irrational 
budgeting with regards to the mining sector, which would otherwise finance itself and the 
money could then be allocated to other sectors that are falling behind, as is the case in 
Botswana. Currently, since the government separated the ministry of energy and the ministry 
of mining, it will become clearer how much money is being allocated to mining in Tanzania. 
For Botswana, the budget allocated to mineral resources and green technology is 0.41 Billion 
Pula while the sector brings in mineral revenues of 24.6 billion pula and mineral tax of 7.9 
billion pula (Republic of Botswana, 5 February 2018). 
Moreover, Tanzanian development budget is 40% of the total budget or 11,820.5 billion TSh 
in the annual budget 2016/2017 (Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
2017, pp 11-12). However, there is a sector, which is not clearly demarcated in the budget: 
the economic sector. If you look at the budget of Tanzania a lot of money is being pumped 
into the “the economic sector” without specification. In 2015-2016, it was the “other sector”, 
in the recent budgeting of government expenditures it has become “economic affairs” 
(Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2017, pp 11-12). It is separate from 
transport, agriculture, social, health, industry, and energy and mineral; and sometimes 
different from defence, public security, justice and governance. This is very different from 
Botswanan budgeting, which prioritizes basic education (7.97 Billion Pula), health and 
wellness (7.54 billion Pula), and local governance and rural development (6.2 billion Pula) 
and then defence security and justice, tertiary education and research, and transport.  
In the annual budget of Tanzania 2014/2015, this ambiguous sector comprised almost 47% of 
the total budget, and recently, 2016/2017, it was over 50%. The sector has a budget of 10 
 113 
 
trillion TZS, while the education sector had 5 trillion TZS and the social sector 387 billion 
TZS. This continues to undermine the rational budgeting and allocation of existing resources 
to clear socio-economic plans. Besides, the huge government expenditure in this so called 
“economic affairs” thwart other economic reform, privatisation and promotion of the private 
sector that would benefit the economy and government revenues more than competing with 
the government in the market or harvesting the national public budget. 
 
6.1.3.2. ASMs as an alternative livelihood strategy  
 
ASM have a direct socio-economic impact, at least at the microeconomic level. Although this 
does not extend to the macroeconomic level as the taxation and government control of the 
financial flows in the sector are weak (EITI Tanzania, 2017). ASM gives local people job 
opportunities, they create an alternative to an agrarian economy, and provide skills to miners 
through apprenticeships (Bryceson, 2010, Fisher et al, 20). ASM in Tanzania employs seven-
hundred thousand individuals and both ASM and traders declared a mineral wealth of 
128,334,475 USD in the financial year 2014 (EITI Tanzania, 2017, p. 5). 
While Tanzania remains among the poorest country in the world economy, its resource 
endowment did not boost other sectors, especially the agriculture sector. More than 80 
percent of the population are in the agriculture sector and they produce one quarter of the 
GDP. The rural population mainly resorts to income diversification through petty cash trade, 
selling non-processed and perishable agricultural goods or investing in charcoal burning and 
local beer brewing (Bryceson and Johnson, 2010, p. 380). The country lacks the 
manufacturing and agricultural processing potential to sustain the economy and thus, peoples’ 
livelihoods. Food is expensive in some areas where the land is less fertile, like Dodoma, 
whilst in highly fertile areas farmers do not receive much money for their produce. This in 
turn compels rural people to work in mines where minerals are more abundant and easier to 
access, such as in northwest Tanzania.  
Rural people do not need to have mining skills before entering the mines. They learn as they 
work, this enables them to earn money whilst doing an apprenticeship (Bryceson and 
Johnson, 2010). Diggers have esprit de corps, mutual trust and cooperation, and are 
hardworking (op cit). In addition to that, ASM has gradually increased emphasis on gender 
equality in mines and the company administration is working to contain the possibility of 
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violence at work (Bryceson and Johnson, 2010). The social character of mining in ASM in 
Tanzania is multi-ethnic, more inclusive to women, and was able to contribute in the de-
agrarianizing of the economy as the gold mines and diamond opportunities have increased.  
However, ASM faces challenges in Tanzania: first, there are socio-economic, health, and 
environmental damages; second, there is more government prioritisation towards LSM. 
Where gold mining increases, there is always excessive consumption of consumer goods, 
prostitution, alcohol and gambling. There are also environmental problems such as 
deforestation, mercury pollution and a lack of rehabilitation of mining environments 
(Bryceson and Hanson, 2010). In the gold mines, there is an increased risk of injuries, 
silicosis and sexually transmitted diseases (Fisher, 2007; Mwaipopo, and Mutagwaba, 
Nyanga and Fisher, 2004).  
 
6.1.3.3. Disintegrating ASMs 
 
While formalisation of ASM is increasing in Africa, as recommended by ILO, AU and 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the acquisition of mining licences for ASMs is still hard in 
Tanzania (Fisher, 2007); foreign companies are more favoured than local ASM and they 
receive better financial and information capacities. There is a lack of access to loans for ASM 
in Tanzania. Moreover, the discovery of mines by ASM have ended up becoming properties 
of LSM: 
 “In Tanzania, while precious minerals discovery are often made by small-scale 
miners, or local people, the restricted capacity of mining authorities to timely 
disseminate legislative information on how to acquire PMLs favours large-scale 
mining companies over small scale miners” (Fisher, 2007, p.6). 
Most of the land handed to LSM were property of ASM in the sense that there is no land 
tenure registration in Tanzania, land was supposedly the property of the state whereby local 
communities use it but do not legally own it (former socialist legacy). Therefore, land was 
handed to companies without considering the compensation of displaced people, especially 
the Kuria people in the North Mara case. Particularly in cases when they are not 
compensated, this transferal of land to companies made the livelihood of people more 
uncertain (Bryceson, 2010). The Tanzanian government leaned on the MNCs, with the help 
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of the police, to coerce people to leave their plot of land and to stop mining activities without 
some form of compensation or alternative livelihood strategy.  
In Tanzania, disintegrating ASM was associated with systematic killing of artisan miners in 
order to get them out the mine. For instance, in Bulyanhulu, in 1996, the company workers 
and police buried fifty artisan miners alive with bulldozers. The extract from the Canadian, 
European, and American activist says: 
“Eyewitness accounts, family testimony, photos and police videotape recently 
uncovered by the Lawyer's Environmental Action Team (LEAT) of Tanzania 
corroborate long-standing allegations that employees of the Canadian owned Kahama 
Mining Corporation, LTD (KMCL) in conjunction with the Tanzanian police, buried 
over fifty artisanal miners by bulldozing over the entrances to the shafts in which they 
worked. LEAT has also compiled significant evidence that tens of thousands of small-
scale miners and their families were forcibly evicted from the area without any 
compensation to enable the Canadian mining company to take over the property” 
(Mining and Community, 27 September 2001, p. 1) 
The CAM report says that this was an international level human scandal. The Council of 
Canadians, Mining Watch Canada and the NGO Working Group worked with MP Tundu 
Lisu to monitor this case. The report says, "The video, the photographs and the testimony of 
the family members and eye witnesses show incontrovertibly that there was a massacre. All 
this in its totality proves a scandal of international proportions," (Mining and Community, 27 
September 2001).  
The Ministry of Mining established a Commission of inquiries and reported that 65 people 
were killed and 270 injured (York, 22 September 2016). The people clashed with the 
company security guards and the 160 deployed state police when they were looking for low 
grade rock from which to extract gold. People used to mine gold in the region before the 
company arrived as part of their livelihoods. The case of clash was recorded by the 
commission in 2006 and the government was worried about the resulting level of fatalities, 
stating that it would not happen again. The government sent a letter to the vice-president of 
African Barrick Gold in November 2014 saying that the government could not allow that 
situation to continue (York, 22 September 2016).  
 116 
 
Besides, two independent activist groups: Mining Watch from Canada and RAID (Rights and 
Accountability in Development) from the UK visited the mine in August and September 2016 
and argued that the actual number of victims are greater than what the government 
commission reported and that they could have been more than 300 violent deaths at North 
Mara since 1999, including women and children who had nothing to do with mine invasion 
(York, 22 September 2016). They said that hospitals falsified post-mortem reports to decrease 
the extent of mine related death. Since 2014, the activist found 22 cases of unlawful killings 
by the police or mine security guards and they became concerned by the scale of human 
rights abuses in pursuit of profit, as Catherine Coumans from Mining Watch Canada stated 
(York, 22 September 2016). 
 
6.1.3.4. Integrating and supporting ASMs in Tanzania 
 
Given the number of people linked to ASM in Africa, integrating them in the formalisation 
and financial support is one of the strategies of enhancing sustainable and inclusive 
development. ILO, UN and regional institutions support these policies in Africa to accrue 
mining inclusiveness that changes lives. In the case of Tanzania, the mining policy of 2009 
and the mining act of 2016 provision for ASM facilities. Professor Mruma, the Chief 
Executive officer of geological survey of the United Republic of Tanzania, during the round 
table discussion on managing mining for sustainable development in New York, 12 May 
2010, highlighted that almost one million (that is an estimation of labour who were involved 
in ASM sector by 2010) Tanzanians are involved in ASM activities and in search of 
alternative livelihood strategies (UN-Sustainable Development, 2010, pp. 1-2).  
In his note, Mruma highlighted that Tanzania ASM policy is in line with the agenda of the 
Group of 77 and China (the Group of 77 was formed on 15 June in 1964 in UN to foster 
commercial and development interests and bargaining power of developing nations and is 
now composed of 134 states). The aim of these groups is to decrease people’s uncertainty and 
hardship in life caused by global inequalities and trade tensions. This was reiterated by the 
UN secretary general Antonio Guterres on 27 September 2018 who deems the groups to be a 
driving force for delivering multilateralism to the people (UN, 2018). Tanzania, as a 
participant, highlighted that the challenges of ASM are (1) poor technology that lead to poor 
recovery, environmental degradation, poor health and an unsafe working environment, (2) 
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lack of effective and efficient organisational systems (informal management system), (3) lack 
of financial and support schemes, and (4) absence of transparent and fare market 
arrangements (UN-Sustainable Development, 2010, pp. 1-2).  
Since the ASM sector remains in the informal realm, they tend not to be able to participate in 
the official mining business, however the government has promised to correct both this and 
the aforementioned issues. The government would designate mining areas to ASM and help 
them in determining resource content as well as environmental impact assessments through 
Geological survey offices. The government would provide training sites and demonstrations 
of good practice. As well as providing financial support and access to loans from a regional 
bank: the SACCOS (Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations). The government would 
also initiate trade fairs of gemstones (tanzanite and diamond) for a reliable and secure market 
for ASM and they would scale up values through gem cutting and jewellery, allowing 
indigenous populations greater ownership. The aim was to increase cooperation between 
foreign and local investors, and to facilitate transfer of technology and to the benefit of the 
local community (UN-Sustainable Development, 2010). This policy however proved futile as 
it became apparent that when ASM get loans, they invest the money in non-mining activities, 
as noted by former Minister of Energy and Minerals, professor Sospeter Muhongo in 2013 
(Corporate Digest, 2013). The government launched the call for a new proposal on ASM loan 
of 50,000 USD in 2013, a project under supervision by STAMICO (State Mining 
Corporation), this would assist in developing technical skills. However, the information made 
available to me was limited with respect to funding and operation since 2010. 
The government of Tanzania has also committed to increasing the participation of mining 
companies (LSM) to community development, including compensation for the consumption 
of local products and a re-settlement plan according to the statement of Professor Mruma. As 
Tanzania is still in the process of reform as of the 2010 mining amendment, which was put in 
place in 2016.  
ASM started in Tanzania in 1940s and in 1987, there were 150.000 ASM and in 2012, they 
increased to almost 700,000 associations (Masanja, 25 September 2013). Sixty percent of 
them are in gold mines, while 25% are in building materials, 10% in gemstone and 5% in 
copper ore, salt, and other industrial minerals (UN-Sustainable Development, 2010), to this 
day the numbers of ASM continues to grow.  
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Numbers of primary mining licence (PML)being issued increased from 2007 to 2010 from 
2000 PMLs to 4500 PMLs respectively. However, from 2001 to 2006 the government did not 
issue many PMLs (500 to 1500 PMLs only), whereas from 1999 to 2000 the government 
issued 2500 PMLs (presentation of Eng. Paul Masanja, Chief Executive Officer, Tanzania 
Mineral Audit Agency, 25th sept, 2013). Therefore, obtaining a PML proved most difficult 
during the years 2001 and 2007, which confirms the fact that the government has since 
weakened the ASM legalisation to enable the arrival of bigger MNCs in the country 
(Masanja, 27 September 2013). However, until 2013, the government issued 23,000 ASMs, 
within and without demarcated areas designed for ASM mining (Masanja, 27 September 
2013). Since one of the supports from government for ASMs was to identify and demarcate 
mineral rich areas. By the year 2013, the identified areas for ASM were 265,396 Ha 
(Masanja, 27 September 2013). According to the annual budget 2017-2018, these processes 
will continue to occur to support ASMs. 
The government established a loan scheme for ASM called The Small-Scale Mining 
Development Revolving Fund in 2010. The scheme aims to investigate geotechnical and 
milling activities. In 2010, the government granted 425 million TZS to indigenous local 
companies for purchasing equipment or to establish a hire purchase scheme centres through 
which miners access materials (Masanja, 27 September 2013). The year between 2012 and 
2013, the government provided 2.5 billion TZS for this purpose. The World Bank provides 
funds for this under Sustainable Management of Mineral Resource Projects (SMMRP) and 4 
million USD was already budgeted for this purpose. As mentioned above, the government 
assisted ASM in the creation of SACCOS and in writing up business plans (Masanja, 27 
September 2013).  
Challenges still exist within ASMs mining in Tanzania despite the effort to formalise them. 
Tanzania Mineral Resource Audit in early 2010s mentions some, such as a lack of security 
equipment, pollution through sluicing and panning, mercury pollution, deforestation, risky pit 
with cut trees supports, poor storage of cyanide, unprotected women with children in mines, 
etc. Despite these challenges, ASM are developing fast in both their technology, technology 
including sluicing facilities, automated and mechanised hoisting systems, and their capacity 
(Masanja, 27 September 2013).  
The socio-economic conditions of the country show that Tanzania is still far from benefiting 
from mines. There are still several issues such as looting, use of industrial mining without 
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tangible collection of tax and royalties and redistribution of these revenue to poor people in 
both local vicinity of mines and the rest of the national economy. This continue to be a 
serious problem of resource governance and regulation in Tanzania.  In the following 
paragraphs we see also whether political conditions induce difficulties in regulating the sector 
and exacerbating resource curse.  
 
6.2. Companies malpractices in Tanzanian extractive industry  
 
Most of the companies in gold, diamond and tanzanite mine have had an issue with the 
evasion of tax and a lack of tangible activities relating to CSR, including Acacia, Tanzanite 
One, and William Diamond Limited. As mentioned above, Acacia did not repair most of the 
damage caused by its workers, some of whom are in jail in Tanzania. Even though the Acacia 
mine continues to operate, this international company have not adequately compensated for 
the loss of land or given support to women who suffered from violent sexual abuse in the 
mines (RAID. 17 April 2018).  
Contrary to Acacia, Tanzanite One signed an agreement with the Tanzanian government to 
pay back the money lost by tax evasion in the last decade (The Citizen Reporter, 16 May 
2018). The company agreed to pay back the money, provided the government assists them 
financially and have begun to standardise and improve the working conditions of the mines. 
These new conditions include a minimum salary for the workers, uniforms and other 
administrative facilities including cards and registration- such policies have proved fruitful so 
far for Tanzanite One. As such, the Tanzanian revenue of Tanzanite rose from166 million 
(74,439 TSh) in January to 1.28 Billion TSh (460,987 USD) in September 2015 after the 
government tightened the control, formalisation of ASMs and building of a wall around 
Tanzanite mine in Merelani (Onyango, 6 November 2018).  
On the side of William Diamond Limited, the government accused the company of having 
evaded tax payment by falsifying the quantity of diamond exported. The company however 
reject the claim and asserts that the government officers working in the mine were 
responsible for the tax evasion (Malanga, 12 September 2017). The government has 25% 
shares and the rest are owned by Williamson Diamonds Limited (WDL), whose share is 
managed by Petra Company. However, the company accepts that there were incidences of tax 
evasion and falsification of data in terms of quantities of diamond exported in the last decade; 
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the company has said it is ready to cooperate with the government (Malanga, 12 September 
2017)   
On September 31st 2017, the Tanzanian government seized $15 million worth of diamonds at 
Dar es Salaam airport, which were set to be exported to Antwerp, Belgium by Williamson 
Diamonds Limited (Kazeem, 12 September 2017). The government claimed the declaration 
of the actual mineral value had been fabricated and launched a criminal investigation to 
Tanzanian authorities involved in handing out export permits as, the actual value of tax for 
71,654.45 carats was 29.5 million USD (65.7 billion TSh), almost double what was declared 
(Malanga, 12 September 2017). According to the Minister of Finance, the country lost 46 
million annually due to under-declaration of diamond exports, based on the parliamentary 
report time of 2017 (Kazeem, 12 September 2017). The Petra Company accused the 
government officers working in the mines of falsifying the declarations to profit from the 
shares they own in the company, these officers make up part of the administrative staff. 
According to the Bloomberg report, the Petra shares fell by 28% in just one day (Kazeem, 12 
September 2017). 
Moreover, the government demanded the suspension of ministers during the diamond and 
tanzanite corruption cases, those affected were the Minister of State in the President’s Office 
(Regional Administration and Local Government), George Simbachawene, and the Deputy 
Minister for Works, Transports and Communication Edwin Ngonyani (Malanga, 12 
September 2017). 
 
6.3. Challenges of Tanzania to reform and regulate the mining sector 
 
6.3.1. Holding MNCs accountable and Transparency 
 
The politicization of the mining sector is one of the challenges that Tanzania must address in 
the mining sector. Reform was needed, especially if we consider the amount of money that 
has been lost to mineral extraction since 1990s and even though mine reform came about by 
popular demand and need to use mining industry in a neo-extractive state development model 
(see Kai, 2019), driven through by President Magufuli and the CCM party. I was informed by 
my interviewees that the policy came earlier as a mechanism to increase the party’s appeal. 
Actually, the party was heavily loosing political legitimacy due to lack of action to regulate 
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mining sector and to curb mining malpractices since liberalization of mining sector in the end 
of 1990s. Therefore, the reform of the sector was intrinsically political than economic 
development and it is still hard and early to depict developmental outcome of the reform. 
Furthermore, the use of political elites in the reform of mines have undermined the other 
regulatory institutions and the enforcement of rules, the case of Acacia’s failure to pay for the 
damage is a clear example. The Company leadership chose rather to talk with senior leaders, 
and especially the president, rather than passing through legitimate ways and pay the 
compensation.  
Correcting the domestic professional practice of labourers in Tanzanian institutions, 
especially by making more effective the collection of tax, is another challenge for the 
country. Local institutions lack transparency and accountability to prove and orient the 
MNCs. Since administrative reform of the Magufuli regime, including the reforms in TRA 
and BoTs, things are changing, but too early to be effective after only three years. However, 
the trend is positive towards holding MNC’s accountable and transparent but citizens and 
civil society, including EITI, expect more than reform itself.   
The other issue is the bargaining power of the state vis a vis the company. Companies have 
partnerships and subsidiaries in extraction and the more the state takes measures against one 
company, the more reluctant others become to invest. For instance, at the beginning, the 
owner of Kabanga mines: Falconbridge of Canada and Xstrata Plc of Switzerland were direct 
partners of Barrick Gold.  The same company is the biggest in gold mining in Tanzania and 
recently had an evasion case in gold export by its subsidiary Acacia – a case that compelled 
government official to take action, although they struggled to recall investors again after the 
closure of MDA.  
In addition, Barrick Gold has monopolised extraction in northwest region of the country in 
gold, copper, nickel products and, has a powerful voice both internally and internationally 
which has the potential of undermining Tanzania’s ability to hold multinationals accountable.  
Therefore, the outcome and practice of negotiation with companies is not something new, it 
existed before and between former leaders and companies and threatens to devastate the new 
reform as far as politicisation of mining sector is concerned. 
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6.3.2. Dealing with local resistance  
 
Local resistance to the extractive industry occurs in Tanzania but, after the mining scandals 
such as the failure to compensate displaced people and the human rights abuses against 
civilians, people are gradually fighting against company and state malpractices. In case of 
Tanzania, popular resistance against Acacia and Jeshi la Police now exists; in 2014, the 
human rights abuses in North Mara resulted in a local uprising in Bulyanhulu one year before 
the Magufuli reform started. 
Moreover, these issues are exacerbated by the fact that whistle-blowers looking to make 
public the MNC malpractices have faced resistance and political challenges, as demonstrated 
by the Zitto Kabwe and Tundu Lisu cases. Yet, some of the ordinary citizens consider these 
MPs as patriots:     
 “He is the one (referring to an active a Tanzanian, human right activist and lawyer 
Tundu Lisu), the one who was fired (shot) (during Magufuli leadership) this Tundu 
Lisu is really a patriot when it comes to mining. He says these mining contracts, they 
are stealing us, you are coming to the agreement in which we are losing and there is 
too much corruption. He was making much noise, you cannot imagine, and remember 
at that time (referring to end 1990s) investors were even killing Tanzanians to grab 
their land for these activities” (interview with a Tanzanian citizen, 1 July 2018).  
Investors and states have already attacked resistors who refused to surrender their land. The 
interviewee mentioned other instances of unethical behaviour by Barrick Gold in Bulyanhulu 
and in North Mara gold mines, as well as the aforementioned uprising in which hundreds of 
villagers retaliated by occupying the mining concession in 2014, resulting in the deaths of 65 
people and 270 injured (York, 2018). 
Similarly, there was an instance of human rights abuses when some artisan miners were 
found to be looking for gold in the soil dug out of the mines. The company security guards 
and state police, in a bid to protect the mines, shot the artisanal miners and raped the women. 
Some of the women became infected with HIV/AIDS as a result, whilst others involved in 
these attacks sustained lifelong injuries and disabilities. Neither the state nor the company 
were able to compensate, they had promised to build houses and offer employment to those 
affected, but this has not yet materialized. 
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6.3.3. Dilemma between mine nationalisation or privatisation 
 
In Mwanza and other regions of Tanzania, popular discontent has mobilised resistance to 
Barrick Gold.  One of the reasons for this was a highly publicised rape scandal in which a 
Barrick Gold employee used his dog to rape a 13-year-old girl in 2008 in Sengerema District 
in Mwanza (The Citizen Reporter, 8 July 2008). The scandal increased the tension over 
Tanzania population to ask the government to act.  
The Tanzanian population were further incensed by a tax evasion scandal in which the 
company made a false declaration of cargo of mineral concentrate going to the Indian sea. 
The government seized that property, closed Acacia, and entered into negotiations with its 
mother company Barrick Gold to pay the bill of 190 billion-tax charge. The intrinsic idea was 
to stop companies cheating on revenues and exporting unmeasurable quantities of 
unprocessed mineral deposits.  
“Time has come when the country should garner substantially, equitably and 
profitably from its precious resources, getting rid of irritating clauses like four per 
cent royalties previously agreed in the abolished outdated MDAs. It does not click 
well in mind that an investor comes here and finds us with our land and gold in it, 
human capital and uses our paved roads let alone enjoying lots of tax exemptions, yet 
we end up receiving a meagre four per cent in royalty (…) we cannot repeat these 
mistakes again”, said President Magufuli (see Mulisa, August 18, 2017).  
Tanzania threatened to nationalize the mines, but it has not done so yet and Acacia remains in 
place. Instead this threat worked as a temporary pressure to push the MNCs to correct their 
mistakes. Talking to the commissioner of minerals in Tanzania in May 2018, he asserted that 
Tanzania has no intention of nationalizing. The country was instead liberalizing several 
mines, including existing and new ones, with more applicants coming from multinationals.  
The argument in this chapter is that Tanzania is having probability of resource curse. Both 
socio-economic and political conditions show that the country is already in resource curse 
situation and with reform, it is trying to get rid of the situation. The state is also trying to 
regain its role in mining after losing largely its sovereignty over control of mineral rich 
territories, collection of tax and royalties, decreasing mining malpractice and containing 
violence in mines.   
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Reform conducted since 2017 seem to be effective on reawakening the role of state in mines. 
However, this is not a guarantee that Tanzania citizen will benefit from the deal due to 
political conditions highlighted above. It is hard to achieve such regulation challenges if 
regulatory institutions including the parliament, revenue authorities and budget and financial 
institutions in the country do not work in a manner that favor the interests of the whole nation 
apart from the party and some corrupt elites that have hand in mining activities along side 
MNCs.  
 
6.4. Summary 
 
The chapter discusses the specific conditions of the resources in Tanzania in terms of  
political and the socioeconomic conditions. It also discussed the company malpracticesand 
the challenge of Tanzania to hold MNCs accountable and transparent.  
The political conditions of Tanzania show that the country is in the midst a fierce and violent 
competition between CCM, which has held power since 1964, and CHADEMA its major 
opposition. This political struggle is politicizing the mining sector. CHADEMA elites blame 
mining failures on CCM and CCM holds hand with mineral companies, to increase its 
economic power and source of legitimacy. The country’s elites have shadowed states 
institutions and cooperated with MNCs for their own profit since the Mkapa regime in 1995. 
CCM was about to lose popularity due to the mining scandals of former elites, and for this 
reason they began to make reforms, to regain popular support. However, the reforms have 
been too violent and those who have criticised these violent malpractices linked to the 
reforms have faced threats and violence, including the MP Zitto Kabwe during the Kikwete 
regime and the MP Tundu Lisu during the Magufuli regime. In fact, Zitto was suspended 
from parliament and Lisu hardly survived the shooting. The mining sector reform has further 
increased hostilities and violence between the CCM and CHADEMA elites. Some 
CHADEMA members were systematically killed in February 2018 and the party accused 
CCM and its security organs of being involved with the deaths.  
Indeed, politically the country is facing pressure from the World Bank to reform and other 
donors, already a 300 million loan from W.B and 10 million aid from Denmark have been 
withheld.  This situation therefore is pushing the Magufuli regime to look East, which could 
have a bad effect on both the economy and on foreign policy.  
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The economic conditions show that gold, tanzanite and diamond are specific resources that 
affect the extractive industry the most in Tanzania, despite the country’s endowment of other 
resources including oil, copper, silver, and nickel, etc. However, among these specific 
resources, gold is paramount since the export of gold is almost half of the total export in the 
financial year 2015 and is 90% of the total mineral exports. Unfortunately, the chapter 
clarifies that gold, tanzanite, and diamond are depleting resources. Since the mineral sector 
was liberalized in the 1990s, the country excelled in gold, diamond and tanzanite export 
however, this has contributed very little to the national GDP, almost 3.8% in 2015. This 
shows that the mining sector of Tanzania has not been profitable to the state since the 1990s. 
Only ASM was somewhat profitable; the ASMs employ many people also for the production 
of gold and diamond. LSM have not contributed significantly, except for the case of 
AngloGold Ashanti in Geita where there has been a sizeable contribution to local 
development, livelihood, education and city development. Whereas, other companies such as 
Acacia, Tanzanite One and William Diamond Limited were accused of tax evasion, and 
money laundering.   
The second part shows the application of mining regulations in Tanzania and that companies 
generally do not respect mining practices such as paying tax, being accountable and 
transparent and improving local livelihood conditions or the CSR. Except for the case of 
Anglo Gold Ashanti, other companies were involved in tax evasion and mining malpractices, 
especially mistreatment of locals. The Acacia Company, moreover, was responsible for 
instances of rape, murder and grievous bodily harm against local people in Bulyanhulu and 
North Mara region, a case that raised popular discontent.  
The Chapter shows that Tanzania is weak in holding the MNC accountable and transparent. 
The reasons are (1) the politicisation of the sector, (2) the bargaining power of the country in 
relation to bigger companies such as Barrack Gold and, (3) the existing internal political 
struggles between CCM and CHADEMA and the corruption scandals in mines conducted by 
senior leaders from Mkapa to Kikwete. 
In conclusion, we can say that Tanzania is facing a resource curse case in its gold, tanzanite 
and diamond sectors due to a lack of profitability from their extraction in the last 21 years to 
national revenue and since mineral resources are used politically as an instrument of 
coercion, conflict and violence between CCM and CHADEMA. The history of reform and its 
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failure in Tanzania mining sector since the Mkapa regime threatens the success of the recent 
Magufuli reform. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7. CASE OF UGANDA 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter assesses mining regulations in Uganda in the context of globalisation. It shows 
that despite the policy of opening up the mining sector since 2001, and the huge mineral 
endowment in both metals and oil, the investment of LSM (Large Scale Mining) was delayed 
and continues to be less effective. This is a unique case in East Africa and especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where investment in the mining sector was delayed for a long time despite 
the former industrial and economic success in the Kilembe copper and cobalt mine in Kasese 
district during 1960s and 1970s. During that period, the mining sector export rose to 30% of 
the total exports, with the contribution of 6% to the GDP. Since nationalisation in the 1980s 
until now the contribution of the sector to the GDP fell by 0.5% in 2010 and 0.6% in 2016 
and 0.3% in 2018 (Republic of Uganda, 2018, p. i, UNECA, 2018, p.1, and ITA, 2016). 
Moreover, ASM (Artisan and Small-scale Mining) dominates the sector to an estimated level 
of 90% (Republic of Uganda, 2018). Moreover, Uganda is entering into oil extraction and 
increasingly finding new precious and base metal mines such as gold, copper and iron. Oil 
was discovered in Uganda 12 years ago and the country expects to have its oil on the market 
in 2021.  
The first part of the chapter explores the reason behind the above-mentioned decline of the 
sector and assesses whether there is a resource curse case in the country. The second part of 
the chapter highlights the major mining malpractices that occurred in LSM and ASM in 
Uganda since the liberalisation period in the last two decades. The third part of the chapter 
assesses the challenges that the country has with regards to regulation of mining in the 
context of globalisation.  
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7.2. Reasons of decline in mining sector and the probability of a resource curse 
 
Due to delays and failure of progress in the mining sector of Uganda, it is crucial to analyse 
whether there is a possibility of a resource curse or simply other institutional and regulatory 
failures that significantly weakened the sector. Therefore, in the following parts we analyse 
the specific conditions of resources, and the socio-economic and political conditions. This 
will help to understand the reason Uganda mining development production failed or delayed 
providing developmental inputs. 
 
7.2.1. Uganda resource conditions 
 
Uganda is one of the East African states with diverse and globally needed minerals. These 
minerals are types of metals, industrial minerals and oil, they include copper, cobalt, tin, 
phosphates, vermiculite, diamond, gold, petroleum, chromite, magnetite, uranium, and iron 
ore. The current country specific endowments are predominantly gold and iron. The country 
has 300 million tons of proven iron and 1 billion tonnes of reserve (Republic of Uganda, 
2018, p. 12). The county has several gold reserves and most of them are mined by ASM, for 
instance in Mubende. The recent geological survey of 2014 discovered new gold mines with 
7.8 million oz. reserves in Busia, Kamalenge, Mashonga, Kampano, and Alupe (The 
Republic of Uganda, 2018). Uganda counts 55 million metric tonnes of iron ore in Butare, 
Buhara, Muyembe, and Nyamiyaga in Kabare district and in many localities in the Kisoro 
district. Hematite iron ore abounds in 50 million tonnes in Kisoro and contains sulphur, 
phosphorus, and titanium. Magnetite iron reserves are 23 million tonnes in the Manafwa 
district, 18 million tonnes in the Tororo district and 45 million tonnes in Napak (The 
Republic of Uganda, 2018).  
Most of the minerals in Uganda are in the southwest, other regions also have minerals but not 
in the same quantity. The geological and mineral map of Uganda (see in annex) shows that 
the concentration of base metals (Cu, Co, Ni, Pb, Zn) and iron and special metals (Fe, Sn, W, 
Cr, Bi, Mn, Ti, Mo) exist in the southwest and continue bordering the line of the south and 
northeast Uganda. Most of carbonatites and carbonate rocks exist in many other places of the 
Ugandan territory and especially in the northwest and the south. This geological specificity of 
Ugandan minerals link with the other mineral rich countries such as northwest Tanzania on 
 129 
 
the Lake Victoria greenstone belt, Rwanda and the north Kivu territory of eastern DRC. 
Copper and cobalt mines, apart from the Kilembe mines, exist in Bobong in Karamoja; and in 
Kapono and Kitaka in the Mbarara district. Gold is in the Buhweju district, Kyamuhunga, the 
Bushenyi district, Kabale, Kisoro, Kanungu, Tira and Amonikakire in the Busia district. Gold 
also exists in Kamalenge, the Mubende district and in Kalamoja.  
Tin exists in the southwest in a quartz mic vein and in the sandstone rocks of Karagwe-
Ankole. It has the same geological nature as the Rutongo tin and Karagwe tin in both Rwanda 
and Tanzania. Other metals of the Palaeoproterozoic rocks exist in Uganda including lead, 
zinc, and nickel. There exists also mesoproterozoic rocks including tungsten, beryl, 
columbite, tantalite, lithium, bismuth, kyanite, kaolin and Platinum Group of Elements 
(PGE). In Uganda, other metallic industrial minerals exist as well, such as tantalite, vanadium 
and baddeleyite (zirconium oxide mineral), and Rare Earth Elements (REE) (Republic of 
Uganda, 2018, p. 13).  
The geological survey and mineral assessment under SMMRP identified 18 new mining 
potentials of Uganda such as nickel and PGE in Ibanga Kimberlite potentials in Kidera and 
other different mining potentials around the country. The SMMRP shows that there is a lot of 
potential in the aluminium and uranium of Makuutu, and for gold in Hoima-Kafu. The survey 
also highlighted a lot of potentials in iron. Therefore, Uganda is a mineral rich country and 
thus globally very valuable.  
 
7.2.2. Former experience in the extraction of copper 
 
Since the discovery of copper in Kilembe in 1927 by Magee from Tanganyika Concession 
limited; Rio Tinto Company, Frobisher and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited alternated 
and produced 16 million tonnes of copper ore and cobalt from 1956 to 1977. The extraction 
went along with the provision of local development whereby the mines and the city received 
thousands of local and international miners with good salaries, health facilities, education and 
infrastructure (Musisi, 2 July 2017). The finding of copper influenced much of the 
construction of the road from Mbarara to Kasese, and the railway from Mityana to Kasese in 
1953. The region benefited from an electricity line from Jinja to Kasese and the local power 
plant of 12 MW (Megawatts) to support the companies and the locals.  
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Internal political issues including anti-Idi Amin struggles and the fall of the copper price in 
international market triggered the companies to sell to the government, who handed it over to 
KML in the 1970s – a state owned company. The company failed to manage and develop the 
mine which closed in the 1980s. The consequences of closure among others was the loss of 
the government revenues as the mining share in the GDP fell from 30 % to 0.5%, the 
infrastructure was destroyed or spoilt including housing, railways and the local hospital. After 
the closure, the estimated reserve was four million tonnes of copper and five and half million 
tonnes of cobalt and the estimated life of the mine was seven years (Busisi, 2017).  
Since the policy of opening up in 2001 and 2003 (period based on key mining policies in 
these years) the copper cobalt was not being mined effectively until the competition of MNCs 
in 2013, whereby a Chinese company Tibet Hima Company limited (THMCOL) won a 25 
year mining licence. The company competed with other international companies including 
Gingko Energy Investment, Sino-Steel Limited (all from China), Konkola copper mines 
(Zambia) and Shree Minerals of Australia (Musisi, 2017).  
After only four years, the government again stopped the mine due to company malpractices 
and failure to meet company obligations.  These included the payment of signature bonuses 
of $ 4.3 million USD to the government, annual concession fee of $1 million for 
rehabilitation of the mine infrastructure, and the base capital for investment $175 million. 
The company failed to meet this government obligation (Ssekika, 2013).  
After three years of copper-cobalt extraction, THMCOL requested an export licence of bulk 
copper-cobalt ore. On the 2nd of November 2016, the company wrote to the government to 
request the export licence of bulk copper before they could manage to establish a local 
smelting plant. However, the government rejected the request saying that the company would 
comply with the obligations before requesting export of bulk copper-gold ore concentrate.    
The government also asked the company to meet new obligations such as providing a 
feasibility study of mining, total reserve of ore and the quantity of ore required to produce 30 
tonnes of copper, in agreement with testing the company abroad and the feasibility plan of a 
local smelter. Besides, after six months the director of DGSM (Directorate of Geological 
Survey and Mines), Eduard Kato, wrote to the company to remind them to provide the 
necessary requirements to proceed with their request. In June 2017, president Museveni shut 
down the mine by cancelling the licence. It was almost four years since the Chinese company 
owned it in 2013. The main reason for cancellation of the contract was the illicit export of 
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copper-gold concentrate since the company had since been exporting bulk quantity of 
unprocessed ore to China. 
  
7.2.3. Informality and continuation looting 
 
The specific problem of the mining sector in Uganda is informal mining as the country is 
endowed with gold and iron as well as other metals including copper and tin, which can be 
easily mined through ASM techniques and by individuals. Besides, the recent oil discovery 
has increased the complexity of informal extraction. The mining of gold and metals happens 
through unregistered and unorganised ASM in a manner that weakens the recovery of tax and 
administration (UNECA, 2018).  
The informality of the trade and looting of gold and metals happens in and out of Ugandan 
territorial boundaries. Internally, the informality and looting manifest themselves through 
smuggling and revenue loss (UNECA, 2018). The major internal territory mines are in 
Kigeyi, Mubende, and Karamoja. Most of ASM use illegal mining activities such as 
unregistered workers and productions as well as child labour. UNECA (2018) declared that 
20% to 30% of children are used in such mining activities in Uganda. There exists formal 
regulations for artisan mining in Uganda, but due to gold and tin rushes, several ASM are not 
registered. Since July 2018, the government started to register an estimate of 1200 ASMs to 
know “who is where”, according to the statement of the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Development Honourable Peter Lokeris (Wesonga, 27 July 2018). 
External illegal channels of mineral smuggling from DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) 
have affected the gold export of Uganda. Regional smuggling started at the end of 1990 to 
early 2000 during the Congo War I and II and continues to exist. Both officials and 
individuals have been involved in illegal mining scandals – cases that triggered the 
occurrence of regional mechanisms to counterbalance the effect of mineral conflicts. 
Therefore, Uganda is also a mineral conflict area in Central East Africa like Rwanda, Burundi 
and DRC. All this combined with informalities and looting boost exports even though they do 
not boost state revenues. The government recognises that there has been an extraordinary rise 
in gold export from $230,000 USD in FY 2014-2015 to $204 million USD in the next FY 
2015-2016 (UNECA 2018). The government recognises that this rise of exports is influenced 
by illegal flows of gold from DRC (See Uganda mining policy, 2018). 
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Uganda officers, UN agents and some civilian traders were involved in DRC smuggling of 
gold that transited to Uganda inearly 2000 (Ollio, 2001).  The UN inquiring panel mentioned 
that the USA, German, Belgium and Kazakhstan were leading buyers of DRC minerals (see 
Ollio, 2001) mainly because of the first and second Congo Wars (1996-1998, and 2000-
2003), and the ongoing loss of sovereignty of eastern Congo territory. The buyers of DRC 
minerals, including diamonds, gold, coltan and sometimes uranium, get them from transit 
routes of Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa (Leopord, December 19, 2001). The UN 
report declared that Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe maintain armies in eastern territories for 
different reasons associated to resource exploitation (Leopord, December 19, 2001). 
Therefore, these foreign countries had been buying through different mineral dealers without 
necessarily tracing the origin.     
As the region normally faces instability, eastern Congo is a haven for two major Ugandan 
rebel groups such as LRA (Lord Resistance Army) and ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic 
Forces composed of National Army for Liberation of Uganda, the Uganda Muslim Liberation 
Army, and Tablighi Jamaat Movement), Rwanda rebellion (FDLR) and Burundian rebellion 
(FNL). Uganda rebellions and FDLR normally operate near the Ugandan border in north-
eastern DRC. This increases the complexity and involvement of different actors in the eastern 
Congo conflict and in the whole region conflicts of interest mainly focus on metal resources 
(Mushimiyimana, 2011). Not only regional officials but also some of the UN agents, and 
international states have been involved in mining scandals since that period and some 
transitioned from the DRC to Uganda before selling their looted minerals.   
In the case of Uganda, UPDF (Uganda People’s Defence Force) officers, president security 
advisor Major General Salim Saleh and some politicians have been in the UN probing reports 
on the looting of eastern DRC minerals (Ollio, 2001). The UPDF officer, Mugenyi, who 
controlled northeast Congo, ordered the population to mine in Kilomoto. In 1999, there was a 
gold rush in Gorumbwa in Watsa through which Mugenyi grabbed 15 kilograms of gold (op 
cit). The report also says Rwanda was implicated in mining in Kasasa in north Kivu using 
almost 3 thousand war prisoners (op cit) while Burundi officials have been involved in illegal 
trading of weapons in exchange for minerals with rebels, including FDLR.  
Uganda abides with the traceability mechanism of ICGLR and with many other international 
conventions against the illicit trade of conflict minerals. However, the country does not fully 
implement these international regulation as required (Republic of Uganda, 2018). The 
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increase in the demand of gold, coltan and battery minerals that Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, and 
Burundi also have, goes hand in hand with the increase in implementation issues of regional 
mining regulation that are beyond territorial boundaries of the nations. Gold as well as metals 
easily finance wars and have been doing so for the last two decades in the region (Ollio, 
2018). DRC sued Uganda in ICJ to pay back the looted resources and invaded her territories 
during the war period. The international Court of Justice ordered Uganda to pay the DRC a 
compensation of $10 billion USD for the invasion associated with the looting of minerals and 
other natural resources (ICJ, 2006). However, Uganda declined the court’s decision to pay, as 
Ugandan Minister of Justice, Kahinda Otafiire and Deputy Attorney General, Mwesigwa 
Rukutana told the parliament’s Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee in 2017 (Uganda 
News Today, 3 April 2017).  
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uganda, Okello Oryem, denied the allegation and said that 
Uganda went into Congo to pursue rebel groups and they were joined by other militia groups. 
Even though Uganda pulled the troops to Congo in 2003, the government of Congo still 
accuse Uganda of stealing the country’ s natural resource by supplying weapons to warlords 
in eastern DRC for exchanges of gold, diamonds and timber (ICJ, 2006). The ICJ president 
Shi Jiuyong accuses Uganda of having created an atmosphere of terror to eastern Congo that 
has a negative effect on Congolese people (ICJ, 2006). 
Informality and looting of gold and metals in the Ugandan mining sector has paralysed the 
functioning and regulation of the sector and put the states into regional systemic conflict that 
continues to ravage the stability and security of Central East Africa. As mentioned above, the 
government does not have a hold over the quantity produced internally, and quantity 
smuggled internally and externally from its borders. There has been an illegal gold deal in 
Uganda which goes beyond the limit of regional traders to international looters including UN 
agents. Pierre Zanganazanga, a Congolese national, was arrested by the Ugandan police for 
transporting from Aruo to Kampala 4 kgs of gold for selling, equivalent to $100,000 USD 
(Kato, 15 December 2017). He was arrested in Nakulabye, Lubaga Division. He had an 
accomplice in the form of a UN agent who took the gold in a territory abandoned and 
controlled by rebel factions (Kato, 15 December 2017). 
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7.2.4. Delays in the development of mining sector 
 
7.2.4.1. Delayed metal extraction 
 
The major problem of mineral development in Uganda is its focus on gold, delay in metal 
mining development and the earlier dirty politics of oil. While other countries like Chile and 
Bolivia developed their mining sector only using the metal extractive industry, Uganda is 
failing to use iron and copper to increase its economy. Even the existing copper mine that 
started in the 1950s failed to take off after a period of nationalisation in 1980.  
Failing to develop copper production not only happened after nationalisation but also during 
the liberalisation period. The country has received an FDI in the former copper rich mine of 
Kilembe in Kasese district in 2013 but president Museveni stopped the company (Tibet Hima 
Mining Co. ltd) who won the 25 years license. Eventually, the company only accessed and 
extracted copper for 4 years. The reason to halt extraction was alleged corruption and the 
export of bulk copper-cobalt ores to China. The company allegedly gave $1million USD to 
senior officials in the Ministry of Finance, Energy and Minerals, and to the Attorney 
General’s Chambers (Ssekika, 13 September 2017, Mugerwa, 26 June 2017). 
Tibet-Hima’s project manager, Mr. Alex Binego Kwatampora, argues that the notice of 
termination came while they were still dealing with the government to find a solution 
(Mugerwa, 26, June 2017). He also added that they would have won the bid in an open 
competition with other companies. Although he accepts some company failure to perform to 
the expectations of government, he insisted that the government had an obligation to honor 
the contract (Mugerwa, 26, June 2017).  
In the case of Uganda, moreover, foreign investors do not fully enjoy a secure environment. 
In an interview it was explained: “Some investors have challenges including political issues 
in Uganda, some face security issues and are even killed and they say there are tourists who 
were killed but we finally find that some were investors” (interviewee, 2018). The unsafe 
environment weakens investors in Uganda, and it seems too that the state fails to guarantee a 
secure space for the mining environment. 
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7.2.4.2. The bad start of oil extraction 
 
The finding of tradable oil reserves existed in the early 2010s. Uganda has an estimate of 6.5 
billion barrels of Albertine Graben. However, the country planned to sell the first oil in 2020 
but the extracting company CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) decided that 
the first Uganda oil would appear on the market in 2021. The spokesperson of the company, 
Aminah Bukenya, mentioned that the company still awaits the final investment decision in 
which other companies including Tullow Oil and Total would take part (Biryabarema, 2018).  
The first oil on the market came about through an alliance of these three companies from 
three globally powerful nations and the Ugandan state – CNOOC from China, Tullow Oil 
from the UK and Total from France. The investment decision settled on building a refinery 
and a pipeline, which would bring oil for export close to the Indian Ocean market through 
Tanzania. The pipeline plan is set from an oil refinery in Hoima to Tanga – the northeastern 
port of Tanzania and the project is worth $3.5 billion for 1,445 kilometers of oil pipe (URN, 
2018). The state struggled to negotiate with the companies on taxes and strategies to initiate 
extraction. Uganda also needed a refinery that depended on multinationals as well. The 
General Electric (GE), an American energy and power company, rushed in as well and 
expects to spend $3 billion to $4 billion USD for the oil refinery.   
The country started building an airport in Hoima, which is situated near the oil mines in 
northwest Uganda. This is planned to help personnel transport and equipment, the project 
costs $625 million USD (Biryabarema, 2018). The project was extremely costly for Uganda 
which continues to require the state to ask for loans for that task. Oil had put the country 
deeply into national and international dependence on multinationals and the projects are quite 
expensive for an agricultural economy.  
There is deep concern with regards to the postponement oil extraction from 2020 to 2021 
organized by the government and the CNOOC. The EU diplomats, including the Belgian 
Ambassador Hugo Verbist and France Ambassador Stephanie Rivoal, visited the Hoima 
project of Kabale airport and said that they are deeply concerned with the delay. The Belgian 
Ambassador said that the delay of oil production also has negative effect as oil is competing 
with the agricultural and social sector. He mentioned “…one important factor is that the oil 
production should start” (URN, 2018).  
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Oil projects are taking too many loans from France and China to support the government to 
build facilities that would benefit companies and not the Ugandan people per se. Diplomats 
are busy harnessing the implementation of the project and ready to give whatever is possible 
so that the project can kick off. The Ambassador of France argued: “We can do more if the 
projects were to move ahead quicker. When I go to my government and ask for cheaper loans 
for Uganda for more projects, they are asking one question: how much was dispersed and 
done a year before on the project?” (URN, 2018).  
Even though the shift of oil production depends much on the MNC/government compromise, 
the decision of producing the first oil in 2021 coincides with an electoral process in the same 
year. President Museveni vowed to stand again after 32 years of rule representing the NRM 
(National Resistance Movement). While the MNCs spokesperson announced that they 
decided to shift the production to 2021, the minister of Energy and Mineral Development, 
Irene Muloni announced that the ministry postponed the production of oil in 2021/2022 
instead of 2020 and that this is in line with the industry target under control of joint venture 
(URN, 12 November 2018). The other reason, as Minister Muloni said in Africa Oil Week 
held in Cape Town, is not only that Ugandans are dragging their feet, but also because they 
require money from the resources but in a manner,  which means they will be a blessing to 
the country, and not a curse. (Monitor Reporter, 11 November 2018).  
However, an anonymous informant told me that the company has already been exploiting and 
exporting crude oil through the legal mechanisms and with an export license. “It is being 
exported in barrels,” she mentioned. These activities involve both companies and the senior 
government officials.  If this proves to be true, Uganda will continue to  postpone the official 
trading of oil and prevent the state from benefiting from taxes until 2021 – a fear raised by 
the Belgium Ambassador in reference to the allocation of the money from oil to other social 
and agriculture products (URN, 12 November 2018).  
The recent MoU between the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) and China National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) signed in Beijing on 6 September 2018 also posits the 
question of dichotomy and confusion between exploration and exploitation of oil in Arbertine 
Graben (Ssekika, 25 September 2018). The UNOC CEO Dr. Josephine Wapakhabulo and the 
Chairman of CNOOC International Mr. Fang Zhi signed the MoU in Beijing in the presence 
of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Sam 
Kutesa and the Attoney General, Mr. William Byaruhanga. The fact that the MoU was signed 
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in Beijing is also questionable in terms of national sovereignty and accuracy of the whole 
MoUs.(Ssekika, 25 September 2018).   
The UNOC-CNOOC MoU would be implemented in October but signed in September 
(Ssekika, 25 September 2018). The time limit is too little for such heavy joint work, indeed, 
the fact that the Ministry of energy and minerals will grant the UNOC-CNOOC an MoU is 
legally and institutionally dubious since it is not reasonable to approve again the contract for 
a Ministry for a MoU already signed under witnesses of president and state Attorney General. 
In short, the politics of oil in Uganda started badly and risks overshadowing the state. It 
confounds the power of the political elites with that of the state and subjugates the 
sovereignty of the state to foreign companies. The consortium seems to not work properly, 
countries like France already have started to engage the Ugandan militarily and has already 
deployed contingent in a mineral rich zone, which helped UPDF to defend itself and its 
capacity, especially against the Islamic ADF-NALU. During the signing of MoU, Museveni 
went home with a package of money called emergency aid for vulnerable people in Uganda 
and, a Chinese loan through FOCAC (Forum for China Africa Cooperation). 
 
7.2.5. Political conditions  
 
Ugandan politics has been polarised by ethnic divisions, clustered by regions. From the 
northern side, mainly Acholi, and the western, mainly the Rwenzururu people, the 
government faced a challenge of uniting all polarized regions since its national independence 
from the UK in March 1961. Moreover, resources are concentrated in south-west areas, and 
very distant from the capital city Kampala. This domestic factor of being distant affects 
resource politics within the country (Le Billon, 2001).  
7.2.5.1. The Conflict in Kasese   
 
The situation of poverty and political conflict that prevails in Kasese against Kampala 
happens because of copper production decline. The copper production has been an ingredient 
of both local and regional wealth, keeping Kasese thriving since the 1950s. This time Kasese 
development deteriorated and therefore this increased local conflict between the local 
kingdom and the central government the former accusing the latter to have been 
marginalising the area and so claim more autonomy to revive their economy. Two reasons are 
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behind the grievances. One is that the region knew already how important the mine was to 
people in terms of employment and local development. Second, the Kampala government 
respond to the Kasese region by enforcing its will using military might rather than developing 
what the people originally wanted – local livelihoods or their land. Second, there is an issue 
of distance between Kasese and Kampala, which exacerbates the geopolitics of mineral 
conflict. The distance from Kasese to Kampala is 421 km, a drive of between 7 to 8 hours. 
While the central government is in Kampala, a city close to Lake Victoria and easy for 
transport and business, Kasese is on the border with DRC in west Uganda close to Beni a city 
in north Kivu and where most of Uganda anti-government rebels live – the ADF-NALU 
(Allied Democratic Forces and National Army of Liberation of Uganda) and the LRA (Lord 
Resistance Army). This far location has meant mismanagement of the copper produce as the 
mine was an enclave of Tibet-Hima Company for almost four years, without deep control by 
government officials such as the general auditing office or the ministry of energy and mine. 
Because of the forest and mountains around the region and the instability in the neighbouring 
DRC, the Ugandan government did not find an incentive to rework on the Kasese 
development as it has a history of insurgence, first against Idi Amin in 1970s, and second 
against the Museveni rule. The national army for liberation of Uganda (NALU), under the 
leadership of Amon Bazira, originates from Kasese (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008 p.17). The link 
with ADF and the other former Obote Loyalist continues to influence western Uganda, 
making it more insecure and unstable compared to other regions. The pay-off then was that 
the government focussed on the militarisation of the region as a buffer to the unstable region 
than development plan.  Besides this, political instability and resistance within and without 
the Ugandan territory, such as northeast Congo and southern Sudan, has hindered the 
inclusive economic promotion of the region and social mobility.  
The current decade shows that the resource-based conflict exists and is associated with 
grievances of people in Kasese who claim that the Kampala government has marginalised 
them. The government of Uganda and the people of Kasese did not agree on the way the 
region has been handled. People from Kasese have accused Kampala of not taking into 
consideration the development and the inclusion of the Kasese region. In Uganda, for 
instance the Rwenzori Mountain people claim that the Museveni government has 
marginalised them for a long time. Whilst, the Bakonyo ethnic group have taken up arms to 
claim more recognition.  
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The Rwenzururu secessionists, who are mostly taken as terrorists by the government, are 
demanding the creation of Yiira State, an independent State that would join Bakonzo in 
Uganda and the Nande in DRC (see Titeca and Reus, 2017).  From 26 to 27 November 2016,  
the conflict took the lives of 155 people in Kasese during a fight between UPDF and 
supporters of the Rwenzururu Kingdom. Dozens of government security forces lost their lives 
in this sub-territory. The government forces arrested 149 people and violence started once the 
insurgents attacked the government and civilians in 2014, as Brigadier Peter Elwelu noted 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 2016) – just one year after the government auctioned the Kilembe 
mine to the Tibet-Hima company.   
The major issue apart from generalised marginalisation to this remote territory is the land 
grab supported by government officials and the security organs under the name of 
privatisation. Many local communities lost their ancestral land and relocated from owning 
fertile wetlands surrounding the Mubuku River, the game park and the forest, while giving 
land to other people. The district officials claimed that nobody owned the land before, but 
local people have culturally inherited the land. Justice Catherine Bamugemereire argued that 
many local communities are homeless and internally displaced persons and now have no 
access to necessary facilities such as toilets, homes and shamba (farming land). Security 
organs are being used to evict people and destroy natural resources such as wetland and game 
park. She mentioned that lakes, forests and rivers are used by people who are intending to 
invest in them by finding ways of privatizing and owning public resources (Isiimwe, 2010).   
Before the mines were revived in 2013, there were cases of individual locals who  had been 
invading land, especially in the concession of copper mine zones claiming that it was the 
property of their grandfathers. In 2010, seven people were arrested in Kasese because of land 
grabbing. The district police commander, Paul Mumbogwe, said that they are part of 100 
people from localities that have attempted to grab land from the Kilembe mine concession 
established in 1957, they raided the land, destroyed the crops such as cotton and maize, and 
threatened to beat up people cultivating these lands, this incident happened in Nyakabingo 
and Katadoba sub-counties (Isiimwe, 2010).  
These people are searching for a survival mechanism as most of their livelihood depend on 
the land for farming but also to resist the privatisation framework that diminish their lives 
without providing other alternatives. Most of them are young and it is through land that they 
build new lives; owning a house and getting married depend on land property. They claim 
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that they are the rightful owners since the land was their great grandfather’s (Isiimwe, 2010). 
In order to resist and show their grievance to government privatisation policy, they target 
industrial land, Mubuku Irrigation Scheme zones and Kilembe mine.  
 
 7.2.5.2. Domestic political competition  
 
Domestically Ugandan politics is characterised by the 32 years power of the Museveni 
regime, a multiparty system with a dominion of NRM, regular elections which are considered 
transparent but with instances of corruption, as well as authoritarian and patrimonial 
tendencies. This relative stability has allowed the country to maintain internal peace and 
development from 1987 to 2010. The period in which president Museveni managed to win 
over the opposition and rebels from the north and western part of the country, especially the 
RRA and the ADF-NALU, which are still operational in northern Kivu and southern Sudan 
regions. President Museveni also managed to curb internal cleavages in the NRM party and 
the rising opposition leaders including Colonel Dr. Kiiza Besigye from FDC party. The 
Museveni regime also managed to curb the rise of ethnic violence that increased between the 
northern Nilotic and southern Bantu people, especially during a period of state building.  
However, since 2010 the pressure to democratise has increased, and the country opposition 
leaders are pushing Museveni to peacefully prepare a transition. However, the government 
has suppressed the opposition by using military power. Internally people are demanding more 
recognition and inclusiveness. In July 2014, the Rwenzururu youth attacked Kasese and 
Bundibugyo, leaving 150 dead and in November 2016, the UPDF attacked the Rwenzururu 
Kingdom Palace and killed several civilians and loyal supporters of the king Charles 
Omusinga Mumbere. The conflict with the government and the kingdom started in 1960s 
when the region was searching for autonomy and independence (Beevor and Titeca, 29 
August 2018).  
Since 2010 the political push to democratise increased, however the government continues to 
resist the course, which has had a deteriorating effect on state institutions. The period 
therefore is characterised by institutional decay, rule of law, voice and accountability, anti-
corruption and gaps in procurement and social inclusion. The CPIA (Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment/by World Bank) scores decreased from 2008 to 2017. In 2009 the 
CPIA score for Uganda was 3.9, 3.7 in 2012 and in 2016 and 2017 CPIA the score decreased 
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again to 3.6 (The World Bank, 2017). This shows that Uganda has been institutionally 
sinking and underperforming since 2008.Transparency, accountability and corruption in 
public sector is scored the lowest in Uganda, 2.0 in 2017, and both the quality of public 
administration and the quality of budgeting and financial management score was 3.0 in the 
same year. Economic management, policy management and institution, and social 
inclusiveness all declined in the last 9 years.   
In 2016 the election was the costly ever and, in order to recover money for electoral 
expenses, political elites made deals with MNCs (Whitfield et al, 2015). The USA court 
convicted Mr Patrick Ho Chi Ping of bribing the foreign Minister of Uganda Sam Kutesa in 
order to provide CEFC China Energy with access to Ugandan oil. The FBI accused Ho of 
having wired the sum of money from HSBC Hong Kong, $500,000 (1.8 billion Ugandan 
Shilling) to the Kutesa-Uganda NGO account in Deutsche Bank in New York. The Court also 
convicted Ho of having committed the FCPA (foreign corrupt practice acts) to facilitate his 
company access to oil in both Chad and Uganda (Wasenga, 6 December 2018).  
 
7.2.5.3. Foreign politics 
 
Mineral resources characterise the current relationship of Uganda with other states, it is in 
direct cooperation with France and China, this cooperation is based almost entirely on 
extractive activities. In the case of France, the relationship increased after the discovery of oil 
in Lake Albert, but also after the end of a long conflict where France opposed Uganda during 
the Congo wars. This was preceded by another important official and diplomatic visits, such 
as from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sam Kusesa in 2006, the Ugandan Minister of state 
for regional cooperation Mr. Isaac Musumbe, and the French Minister of Cooperation Mr. de 
Raincourt to Kampala in 2011. In 2016, president Museveni visited Paris again and 
announced that the French and Ugandans would cooperate in areas such as irrigation, 
transport, water, revitalisation and the national airline (France Diplomatie, 2018). 
In fact, there are 30 French companies in Uganda operating in hydrocarbon, 
telecommunication, services, and industry including Hima Ciment-Lafarge. The FDI of 
France in Uganda was 58.3 million Euros in 2016 and mainly in manufacturing such as 
pharmaceuticals, building and mining equipment. The FDI in hydrocarbon increased due to 
the total engagement in oil extraction, which will generate 200.000 barrels a day with 
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incomes of 2 billion per year. Uganda has a trade deficit with France of 45 million Euros as 
of 2017. France buys food and coffee from Uganda.  
The French Development Agency (Agence Française de Developpement – AFD) has been 
present in Uganda since 2009 and support in areas such as water, sanitation, and energy. Its 
expenditure is 240 million euros in three years. The AFD helps Kampala in the programme 
Sustainable Cities with the initiative of curbing carbon emissions (France Diplomatie, 2018).  
The French-Ugandan cooperation has increased a lot since the discovery of oil in Albertine 
Graben and since the French deployed the military, under the request of government of 
Uganda, in the oil zone to help the country strengthen its territorial sovereignty or possibly to 
lose it because of the presence of foreign forces. In 2015, the government called upon the 
French military force to be present in the Lake Albert areas to train and help UPDF soldiers 
(Embassy of France in Uganda, 2018). In October 2017, French Forces in Djibouti (FFDj) 
launched an operational training detachment project to UPDF and in from May to June, there 
was first aid training to UPDF (Embassy of France in Uganda, 2018). 
The search for natural resources and infrastructural market triggered China to increase its ties 
with Uganda and the east Africa as a whole. In 2014, China accepted an investment of more 
than $3.7 billion in infrastructure, particularly for the building of a railway from Kenya, 
Uganda and Rwanda, 2 billion in CNOOC project of oil, and another 557 billion in the two 
other hydroelectric projects (Richards, March, 04, 2014). This increased more after western 
countries cut or threatened to cut aid due to the anti-gay law as mentioned above. Through 
FOCAC president Museveni and his delegates have managed to sign MoU over other oil 
exploration blocks in Albertine Graben. The country is also receiving humanitarian 
emergency aid and loans for infrastructure through a $60 billion China-Africa cooperation 
loan. 
However, the incentive of China’s investment to Uganda is more linked with China’s access 
to mineral resources as Munu and Shinyekwa (2018) mentioned. It has been questioned as to 
whether this diplomatic link triggers development in the region such as through job creation 
for Ugandans, tax and revenues, and technology transfer. Chinese aid to Uganda, according 
to the analyst, may affect the handover of mineral concessions to China, as the country is not 
able to pay the loan, similar to the Sri Lankan case which had to hand over her port and 15 
acres around it to China for 99 years after the country failed to pay back the loan (Munu and 
Shinyekwa, 2018). Uganda has received a loan of 790 billion Ugandan Shilling from China 
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for rural electrification, which is currently at 7% according to the Chinese Ambassador in 
Uganda Zheng Zhuqia, in 2018. In 2017, Uganda signed a contract with Exim bank to 
provide a loan of $500 million for building a road in the oil rich zone. The think-tank director 
of the Ugandan Debt Network raised concern that most of the loans were misused and that 
Uganda may fall into dept traps and distress. In 2016, the loan was $10.3 billion and has 
increased mostly due to oil projects since the external loan was only 3.8 billion in June 2013 
(Biryabarema, March 22, 2017).   
Regionally, the initial plan after the oil discovery was to enhance a regionally inclusive 
exploitation mechanism that would include EAC member states and the private sector. The 
plan failed though as only companies from bigger global powers took over.  Even though 
Uganda called upon the regional leaders to join hands in oil exploration, the oil and resource 
discoveries created disparities and conflict between Rwanda and Uganda and, between 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
  
7.2.6. Socio-economic conditions 
 
Despite the increase in mining investment in Uganda since 2003, the sector contributes less to 
national revenues. FDI in the mining sector increased from $5 million USD in 2003 to $800 
million in FY 2016/2017 and the revenues and royalties increased from $ 500,000 USD to 
$4.14 million USD in FY 2016/2017 (Republic of Uganda, 2018).  The government provided 
100 mining licences in 2003 and 818 licences in 2016/2017. The mining sector growth 
increased by an average of 19% of total annual growths of the sector since liberalisation. 
However, the current contribution of the mining sector to Uganda’s GDP is less than 1% 
(Republic of Uganda, 2018, p. 12). ASM is bigger than LSM in Uganda in terms of financial 
contribution (Republic of Uganda, 2018). The most prominent ASMs concentrate in 
extracting minerals, gold and metals such as iron and tin. ASM extract more than 90% of 
metals, industrial and building minerals. The sector employs more than 200,000 people 
(Republic of Uganda, 2018). There has not been large-scale mining until June 1, 2016 in 
Uganda, which means that the extent of investment is still low in Uganda. 
The minerals in Uganda have the potential to be a key to the country’s development as it has 
considerable reserves of oil and metals. Iron would provide steel for construction metals in 
addition to copper. For instance, the country is rich in phosphate, which is important for 
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agriculture fertilisation but not developed enough to be effective for the sector. The country 
also has uranium capable of generating enough electricity for rural and urban power 
shortages countrywide (Republic of Uganda, 2018). Uganda also is rich in rare earth minerals 
for IT and electronic technologies according to the recent geological survey under support of  
the World Bank and the Nordic Bank (Republic of Uganda, 2016).  However, it did not 
manage yet to use all these resources for either profitable trade or processing (Republic of 
Uganda, 2018, p. 12).  
The recent policy paper to reframe the mining sector policies in 2018, highlights the two 
major concerns: first, there is “scepticism as to whether the subsector policy and legal 
frameworks present opportunities for increased government revenue from mining” (Republic 
of Uganda, 2018, p.12). Second, the relative average increase of the sector by 19.4% since 
2003 has not yet had a positive or significant impact on the national economy. The sector did 
not meet the set SDGs and NDP II targets.  
SDGs in mining focus on international investment in mining at the local level, including the 
inclusion of local people in the process of mining skills development. They also focus on 
improvement of local livelihoods, protection of the environment, peace, justice, and 
strengthening institutions by avoiding conflicts between companies and local people , respect 
to human rights, transparent payment, recovery of revenues and avoiding illicit transfers of 
funds to leaders. In terms of economic development, SDGs in mining consist of enhancing 
the local, regional and national benefits of development by helping to set up new 
infrastructure, new technology, and workforce opportunities. It also focusses on the creation 
of decent work providing jobs to rural people, and training, development related to mining 
operations, provision of services to the community and the creation of a linkage to local 
economies. Besides that, they include infrastructure development and partnership with other 
industry sectors, civil society and local communities (Sonesson, Davidson, and Sachs 2016). 
The first indicators of the failure of the mining sector to meet these goals is the use of child 
labour whereby 20 to 25 % percent are employed in quarrying stone, mining gold, sand and 
salt (US Department of Labour, 2016, p. 1). In Uganda, the child labour average percentage 
of the population is 30.9 % at the age of 5 to 14 or 3,034,126 population.  Children that 
combine work and school are 34.4% and ranging from seven to fourteen years old. The 
primary completion rate is 53.1%. Most of the activities of child labour can be found in 
agriculture with a rate of 95.5 % especially in activities such as cultivating and harvesting 
 145 
 
cocoa, coffee, corn, tea, tobacco, rice, and sugar cane and acting as scarecrows in rice 
plantation. They are also in vanilla and palm oil production of charcoal, as well as cattle 
herding.  In services, children are involved in domestic work, street work, including vending 
and car washing, begging, scavenging, and selling scrap metals, and work in hotels, 
restaurants, bars and video halls as well as collecting firewood for sale. As far as mining is 
concerned, the situation of having a big number of children in the sector posits a problem to 
the deterioration of children rights in the country, including attending school.  
Furthermore, the economic growth of Uganda started to decline 8 years ago. From 1990 to 
2010, the economic growth of the country was 7% annually and in 2011 until now, the 
economic growth has shrunk to 4%. In 2015, the GDP increased to 5.6% due to infrastructure 
development under Chinese support. The country still relies on the agriculture sector and low 
paying jobs for most of the population.  
In 2014 foreign aid to Uganda, especially bilateral aid, diminished due to its anti-homosexual 
law which handed homosexuals the death penalty since 20 December 2013. Denmark 
withheld USD 9.2 million in aid and rechannelled it to civil society organisations. The 
Netherlands withheld $9.6 million, which was budgeted for judicial support. Norway 
redirected $8.3 million USD to human right activists. The same happened to Austria and 
Sweden where they had already cut aid. USA temporarily withheld $456.3 million USD, only 
the UK maintained it, channelling aid through DFID and NGOs (Whiting, 2014). 
The cutting off aid affected heavily the value of the Uganda-Schilling whereby the price of 
the dollar increased overnight in mid-February 2014. Its value decreased at 1.8% from 
exchange value from 2453/2458 to 2,495/2505 selling and buying $1USD. Currently the 
dollar continues to appreciate more and more, and the rate reached 3.717,25 Ugandan-
Schilling for $1USD on the 27th of December 2018. 
In 2011, Uganda got a double-digit inflation for government overspending during the 
presidential election (Deloitte, 2016). The inflation was 22.7% in November 2011, and the 
average inflation rate is 7.25% from 2006 to 2018. As mentioned earlier, the government 
spending accumulates especially during the electoral campaign with the increase of party 
spending in order to buy off the election as internal cleavages in political factions inside and 
outside NRM increased, as we discuss below.  
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Poverty levels in Uganda have reduced since 1990s though there is a considerable number of 
the population still in poverty. The poverty level reduced from 56.4 % in FY 1992/1993 to 
21.4% in 2016/2017. Though the government reached the MDG target by cutting the poverty 
level in half by 2015, it still has challenges to decrease poverty levels, especially in rural 
areas. Income inequality is about 0.43 in 2010 with 0.49 HDI, and 0.35 MPI 
(multidimensional poverty Index).   
In the midst of inequality and poverty, Uganda is increasingly in need of boosting social 
expenditure especially on health and education as well as creating jobs for the youth. The 
population of the country is very young, in fact it has the youngest population worldwide 
whereby 49% of population is below 15 years old (UNICEF, 2018).  In recent financials 
years, Uganda has increased the budget expenditure in education and health. In education, the 
budget is increasing from 374.721 Billion Uganda Shilling in the FY 2016/2017 to 618.017 
billion Uganda Shilling in FY 2017/2018. The budget for health increased from 626.482 
billion Uganda Shilling in FY 2016/2017 to 971.740 billion Uganda Shilling in 2017/2018.  
However, this is still little compared to the quantities of money the government put in the 
energy and mineral sector. The energy and mining budget was 1,994.520 billion Uganda 
Shilling in the FY 2016/2017 and1,878.181 billion Ugandan Shilling in FY 2017/2018; and a 
projection of 2,164.880 billion Ugandan Shilling in 2019/2020. Most of the money goes to 
electricity plants and oil projects. The oil projects have been so costly to the government that 
the sector forgot other mineral resource extraction as we highlighted above. Most of money 
goes to the Hoima airport project, the crude oil processing plant and the pipeline project that 
started in early 2017. Even though the government agreed to harvest about 60% of oil 
interests, the continuation of the delay to officially extract oil and sell it to the international 
market is very risky to the country’s economy and rational planning. The sector received a lot 
of budget allocations despite being the lowest contributor to the national economy.  
Agriculture generates significantly more for the Ugandan GDP but receives much less from 
the budget allocation. The government allocated only 153.137 billion Ugandan shilling in FY 
2016/2017, 330.941 billion Ugandan Shilling in FY 2017/2018, and the 340.024 billion 
Uganda Shilling in FY 2018/2019, nine times below the budget of energy and minerals as 
above provided (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economics Development - Uganda, 2018). 
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7.3. Mining mal-practices   
 
In the oil sector in Albertine District of Hoima, there have been reported human rights 
violations including the intimidation of people, forced resettlement that put people in 
internally disciplined camps, devaluation of property during compensation mechanism, rape 
and sexual exploitation. (Mutaizibwa, June 11, 2018). In fact, the extractive industry of oil in 
Uganda is the bringing brutal behaviour by the government and the company against local 
communities.  The local people are developing resistance to it but in vain. 
“When oil exploration commenced, there was a scramble for land as oligarchs and 
speculators began to eye these lucrative deals to the detriment of the local community. 
In a sub-region historically marginalised, local vigilante groups emerged to fight for 
their interests. (In Rwamutonga) In 2014, Enock Darakarim Buchali and his wife 
Yunis Akumu, who were residing on the land, were burnt to death. It is not clear 
under what circumstances their hut was torched” (Mutaizibwa, 2018). 
In the same year of 2014, security guards displaced 200 families into camps (Mutaizibwa, 
June 11, 2018). The security guards used gunshots, and fire to displace them. They torched 
their huts. Rwamutonga is one of the selected regions for oil waste plants. In the process of 
expropriation, the company deals with local agents, but these local agents mostly cheat on 
people and steal money. The American-Ugandan owned company, McAlester Energy 
Resources ltd, which was contracted to build an oil waste plant have also had confrontations 
with local people, where there was resistance to relocate because of inaccurate payments of 
compensation (Mutaizibwa, 11 June 2018).  
The Resettlement Action Plan in the oil zone is estimated to relocate 7,118 people from 13 
villages. Civil society claimed that this policy came with mistrust, fear and the deployment of 
heavy weaponry guards (Daily Monitor, 20/03/2014). Dr Amooti Katebalirwe, who chairs 
UHRC (Uganda Human Rights Commission), confirms that his institution acknowledged 
such scandals as malpractices in oil rich zones and that it is likely to fail the Uganda oil 
project (Daily Monitor, 20/03/2014). The executive director of Global Right Alert, Ms 
Winifred Ngabiirwe, claims that local authorities always deny media permission to cover the 
atrocities in land resettlement activities.  
These incidences of rape occur mostly when women in internally displaced camps dare to go 
back to the farms to harvest food. Anna Munguriek was a victim of rape by security guards of 
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the companies. She consequently died in the camp and so far she has received no justice, as 
locals have been forbidden from informing on the security guards to the local police branch 
(Mutaizibwa, June 11, 2018). 
Before the copper mines closure in 2017, the company did not manage to revive houses and 
other infrastructure from the localities and to import locally available goods such as lamps, 
papers and electrical sockets, as the report office of the general auditor noted. Besides, the 
company violated the right of workers including the right to express their views and 
concerns. In 2015, the Tibet-Hima Company sacked 10 workers simply because they talked 
about company conditions and their safety issues with media after the death of two of their 
workmates (Mumbere, 30 December 2015).  
Apart from other mining malpractices, including the failure to revive the existing 
infrastructure and houses, boosting employment and especially from the former KML 
employees, the company was reported for exporting bulk copper illegally. The account of the 
Auditor general said: 
 “I further observed heaps of copper concentrate at the mining site ready for export. 
However, the concessionaire did not present any export permits to export the copper 
from the ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. I advised management to 
pursue the matter with the relevant authorities to avoid loss of government revenue” 
(Ssekika, September 13, 2017). 
Illicit copper export is a serious malpractice since it thwarts the government’s ability to 
recover tax. Because the Tibet-Hima paid royalties only once in 2014 and then failed to pay 
other money which due to the government, one can say that the copper mine in Kilembe was 
an example of the malpractices of mining that existed since privatisation in Uganda. The 
company had allegedly bribed the minister for mineral access which resulted in the closure of 
the mine by president Museveni in 2016.  
There is a necessity to do in-depth research on quantity and way Tibet-Hima Company 
exported copper cobalt concentrated, since further investigation terminated with the mine 
closure. This meant that the involvement of senior Ugandan elites also never came to light. 
Uganda has a decree law on mineral prohibition act since 1975, especially for exports, which 
is still active. This law gives rights to the Ministers responsible to schedule any type of 
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mineral on these acts. Since then, copper, whether unwrought or otherwise is prohibited 
(Uganda Legal Information Institute-ULII, 2018). 
Other mining malpractices happen in non-organised and non-structured ASM, these include 
internal and foreign actors, children and women who are drawn to roles as speculators and 
smugglers in gold rushes in Uganda. This happens especially in Buhweju and Mubende gold 
mines and includes the government officials operating in shadow ways (Musisi (28 may, 
2018).  An ACP-EU report in March 2018 highlighted that women working in ASM are 44% 
of the total 390.000 employees, there is a prevalence to worker exploitation because of its 
informal structure, land owners, site owners and others are often mine stakeholders as well as 
receiving a share of ASM mineral products. As a general result the majority of workers in 
ASM receive little pay. The ACP-EU report (2018) acknowledges that ASM sectors, which is 
83% of the total Ugandan mining sector, is still in need of greater structure, support, 
regulation and organisation.   
 
7.4. The current challenges of Uganda to redress the mining sector 
 
The major challenges of the government of Uganda is to regulate, the funding of the sector 
and its inadequate and outdated policy, as the recent policy paper highlighted (Republic of 
Uganda, 2018). There exists a liberalisation policy of the sector since 2001 and the country 
has had inflows from the FDI in the mining sector since then, either in metal mining or other 
type of minerals. The FDI increased their contribution from $5million in 2003 to $800 
million in 2017 (Republic of Uganda, 2018, p.i). The budget allocation also increased and the 
investors, as well as the government, have pumped money into the sector since then. 
Therefore, sectoral issues are based not on budget allocation but rather based on policy, rules 
and regulations and, finance.   
However, I concur that the sector faces other challenges, challenges which were pointed out 
by the government policy paper (1) inadequate mineral marketing; (2) conflicts arising from 
competing land uses; (3) lack of clear mechanisms to enforce environmental obligations. 
Possibly the sector did not manage the marketing well or transform the mining sector into 
something marketable as has been the case in other countries including Botswana. Uganda 
has gold, copper and iron deposits that are economically and globally relevant, the problem 
has been to make the industry more market driven in the last two decades. In terms of land 
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use, the law does not differentiate customary rights on land and formal legal land tenure and 
that is why there are tensions with expropriation. Indeed, the process of expropriation was 
complicated due to this informal cultural land entitlement. The government officials did not 
first solve the land entitlement problem or help to mitigate the violence in land expropriation. 
Institutionally, the Ugandan government still has the capacity to ensure smooth and 
transparent actions over land issues that would favour the local community.   
Other challenges presented were (4) limited national and community participation in mineral 
development; and (5) insufficient royalties disbursed to districts and sub-counties that are 
unable to spur long-term social and economic development of the mineral host community 
(Republic of Uganda 2018, p. 14-15). In the case of resettlement of more than 7.000 families 
in oil rich regions, the consultation and engagement with people did not happen. This 
frustrated peaceful resettlement, resulting in several malpractices and violation of human 
rights. Besides, the money that should help local leaders and the traditional king as 
compensation for property loss or risks of changes was not properly given. The government 
still has this challenge. 
The other challenge is (6) large informal artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sub-sector 
with (8) human rights, gender and child labour issues; and the (9) low commitment, 
domesticating and implementing regional and international mining conventions (Republic of 
Uganda 2018, pp. 15-16). The mining law and international organisation conventions request 
that the government formalise and support ASM. There are funds on these and technical 
supports that come from different institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP and the 
government through mining institutions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Tanzania’s 
strategy for ASM is far better than that of Uganda. Besides, since Uganda is one of the 
mineral conflict states, abiding to regional and international conventions would help the 
country to overcome the challenges of falling into regional mineral conflict and curb 
smuggling of gold and metals. However, a further challenge for Uganda is that they are not in 
fact abiding by these conventions, such as the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism, the 
Minamata Convention, and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), as the policy highlighted (Republic of Uganda, 
2018, p. 16). 
The Minamata Convention prohibits the use of mercury, which has a dangerous effect on 
human health. The World Health Organisation (2014) highlighted that methyl mercury is 
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dangerous for early child utero development and early life, whilst for adults it effects badly 
the kidney, skin and eyes. Mercury helps in artisan gold mining as Most of ASM use mercury 
in dissolving gold. Another obstacle for Uganda is that because of gold rushes, mercury is 
often used in or close to rivers which flow into lakes and contain fish. The executive director 
of SAICM National Focal Point, Dr. Aryamanya Mugisha (2011, p.5), in the report on the use 
of mercury asserted that Uganda must involve the public in a fight against the use of mercury, 
especially as a signatory of the international convention on mercury use.      
Other challenges are the extra mineral value activities including processing and increasing 
local benefitn; the regulation of construction minerals especially in terms of socio-economic 
contribution and state transformation; and inadequate institutional and human capacity (The 
Republic of Uganda, 2018, pp 15-16). However, this is due to institutional decline since 2010 
and political issues as mentioned above. Corruption and unfair political competition outside 
NRM elites posit the problem of transparency and regulatory capacity of the growing mining 
opportunities of the country in oil and metals. Even though institutionally Uganda involved 
the Ministry and the police in regulation of the mine the political and administrative 
functioning of the states does not allow the benefit of billions of dollars flowing from the 
mining sector. The expenses of elections and buying off of the opposition continue to shadow 
the mining revenue of the states into political elite’s coffers. The country institutions are 
failing to curb violence in the local communities which are turning into populations of 
internally displaced people in their own village, as seen in the Hoima case. In short, Uganda 
has a resource curse case and institutional failures are exacerbating the failure of the mining 
sector regulation despite the immense opportunity of the country in regard to mineral access.  
  
7.5. Summary 
 
The liberalisation policy of the mining sector in Uganda started in 2001 but with little 
success. The key points in the Mineral Policy of Uganda were to stimulate investment, induce 
mineral wealth to become a major support to the national and social development, regularise 
and improve ASM, minimize or mitigate adverse social and economic impacts, strengthen 
local capacities for mining development, improve mineral addition and optimise mineral 
trade (The Republic of Uganda, 2018, p. 16). However, the policy failed to meet all these 
objectives, investment flow went low, the country claimed to have received few effective 
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investors. Investors had also faced difficulties to maintain their position in the mining sector 
as the case of Kilembe copper and cobalt mine shows. The company closed after only 4 years 
of extraction and has been involved in various malpractices such as exporting bulk copper-
gold concentrate illegally and bribing ministers involved. 
Oil of commercial relevance existed 12 years ago in Albertine Graben but up until now 
Uganda has delayed the official commercialisation of this product. On the contrary, the 
country continues to become increasingly more indebted by oil endeavours such as Hoima 
airport and loans. Powerful nations that back their companies including China and France 
continue to give loans to Uganda, which increase the country’s risk of foreign indebtedness 
and lower institutional performance. 
The challenges of Uganda regarding regulation are in fact centred on bad institutional 
performance, corruption and unfair political competition. This triggers the malfunction of 
other institutions and the benefit of the sector to the economy. It thwarts the effective 
investors as well, as the MNC and political elites continue to work jointly to the detriment of 
the local community and state development. MNCs have been involved in corruption cases 
and despite some effort of the general auditing and state mining institution, the political 
configuration of the election and elite competition over power in and outside NRM party 
weakens the power over mining as well as accountability and transparency in mining. As 
president Museveni has ruled the country for 32 years and the fact that growing resistance 
exists in mining territories, in a political system mixed with violence against the local 
communities, Uganda has, and continues to have a resource curse, one that is difficult to 
manage and control. The political conditions thwart the regulation of mining and trigger the 
country to fall into regional and national oil and metal conflict.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
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8. CASE OF RWANDA 
 
This chapter provides three major parts: the assessment of the probability of a resource curse 
in Rwanda, the practice of mining in Rwanda, and the existing challenges of the country in 
regulating the sector in the context of globalisation. The first part includes the analysis of 
resources, the political and socio-economic conditions in the country with the aim of 
assessing the probability of a resource curse. The second part comprises mining procedures 
and malpractices with focus to Rutongo tin mines. The third part analyses the major 
challenges that the government of Rwanda has had in regulating the mining sector and in 
increasing the benefit of mineral revenues to people, including the enforcement of corporate 
social responsibility and local content.  
  
8.1. The Probability of Resource Curse in Rwanda 
 
8.1.1. The Resource Specific condition in Rwanda 
 
In this part I discusses the types of resources in Rwanda which are mined, specifically the 
3Ts (Tin, Tungsten and tantalum), their exploration and exploitation mechanisms and the 
extent that these minerals are involved in the life of the country and its citizens.  
 
8.1.1.1. Resource types and degree of abundance 
 
Rwanda is a metal mining country found in the Kibalan belt, consisting of the same 
geological components as southwest Uganda, west Tanzania, Burundi and eastern DRC. 
These minerals are 3TG (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) but concerning extractive industry 
development, only 3Ts have been mined in Rwanda with economic relevance. . Since the 
liberalisation and privatisation period, multinationals such as TINCO Investment limited, a 
subsidiary of NOBLE Mining, and specialising in tin in Rwanda since 2008, and Wolfram 
Mining and Processing (WMP) specialising in wolframite since 2006 and many others came 
in and invested in these metal mines, these metals are very important for the global market 
economy in terms of IT industry, airplanes industry and other battery use.   
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However, before liberalisation, the mining industry in Rwanda started earlier in 1930s and 
was very productive, led by two major companies: Rwanda-Urundi tin mine (MINETAIN) 
and the Muhinga Kigali Mining Company (SOMUKI). By that time, Rwanda and Burundi 
was one country, joined under a Belgium protectorate, not independent enough to initiate the 
control and production of the said companies. Most of the production was controlled and 
exported by Belgium. From the 1930s to the 1950s, metals were explored and mined in 
different territories of Rwanda: Cassiterite (tin ore) in Rwinkwavu, and Rutongo mines; and 
both cassiterite and colombotantalite (coltan) in Bisesero, Gatumba, Ntunga, Mugesera, and 
Bugesera mines (RMA, 2019). In 1933, cassiterite, colombotantalite and wolframite were 
explored and extracted in Rutsiro, and in 1940 to 1950s wolframite was discovered in 
Gifurwe Nyakabingo and Bugarama (RMA, 2019). In 1968 until 1985 an exploration found 
thorium and uranium deposits in Nshiri (Nyaruguru District) as well as monazite in 
Musebeya (Nyamagabe district) and of gold in Nyungwe forest (Nyamagabe and Rusizi 
district and in Miyove, and Kinyami in Gicumbi District).  Wolframite is also found in 
Muhanga, Karongi, Ngoma, Nyagatare, and Rusizi districts (RMA, 2019).  
The first public-private company SOMIRWA (Societe des Mines du Rwanda) was 
established on 3rd February 1973, after 11 years of independence, formed as a merger of 
SOMUKI and MINETAIN, with the government holding minority shares of 49% (RMB, 
2019). However, the company went bankrupt in 1985 due to the low price of metals and 
inefficient management. 
Currently Rwandan mining potential relies mainly on metals and other minerals such as 
gemstone, methane gas and gold. This was a result of geophysical and geological study on 
Rwandan territory conducted by NRG from South Africa 2006/2007, PGW from Canada in 
2008 and BTB from Russia 2016. The NRG and PGW used electromagnetic, radiometry, 
gravity methods while BTB used airborne geophysics in almost all the Rwandan territory. 
The director of explorations in RMB, Mr. Ndenge, during the interview in April 2017, 
mentioned that the quantity of reserves found increased for the 3Ts, as well as for gold and 
gemstones including amethyst, aquamarine, and sapphire.  
Metal in Rwanda is generally abundant. The production of tin and wolfram were 2,200 tons 
and 825 tons in 1976 which increased in 1981 from 2500 tonnes to 1500 tonnes in 1981 
(RMA, 2019), Currently the deposits in metals in Rwanda are underexploited since the 
mechanism used so far were semi-industrial extraction and have been dominated by ASM. 
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Besides, each of the 30 districts of the country has active mining concessions, mostly in 
metals according to officials in RMB. Last year the mining sector was the second largest in 
terms of export.  
The economically relevant minerals that are being mined in Rwanda are: Cassiterite, Niobo-
tantalite also called Colombo-tantalite or Coltan, Wolframite, Beryllium, Spodumene, 
Amblygonite, Monazite, and Gold (RMA, 2019). Rwanda also has an unexploited 
polymetallic deposit which includes nickel and zinc, copper and cobalt at surface of 100km2 
(RMA). According to Alain Joseph Ndenge, (interview with officials in RMB, in 2018), the 
recent exploration research confirms the abundance of battery metal lithium 2017 and an 
increase in quantities of gold deposits.  
 
8.1.1.2. Resource sector management and the local communities 
 
In terms of employment and the building of local infrastructure, the Rwandan metal 
extraction industry was very successful from the 1930s until the1980s. Since the 1930s 
thousands of workers from the region and from neighbouring countries, especially eastern 
DRC, have been coming to tin mines in Rwanda. This brought about the creations of some 
small cities, including Rutongo and Shyorongi in the Rulindo District.  
In terms of infrastructure, there have been hospitals near mining sites, e.g: Rutongo Hospital, 
Masoro football playground, swimming pools, bars and houses for miners in Masoro, 
Murambi, and Shyorongi Sectors of Rulindo District. There is a noticeable difference in 
livelihood for communities in the vicinity of mines, however there exists also other negative 
signs including a high level of school dropouts and people whose livelihoods depend on 
menial and difficult labour such as pounding stones and mining sand.  
Mining has had a direct impact to these neighbouring communities especially in the early 
period of extraction, governed mainly by Belgians. The loss of the country and the 
community in general started mainly in the 1980s with mismanagement of the semi-public 
company SOMIRWA and the national company REDEMI in 1990s. Since this period, most 
of the employees lost their jobs, especially in Rutongo mine. However, local people were 
able to take over the mining sector through ASM and managed to develop skills and financial 
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capacities, even if the production was quite poor and less effective in terms of fiscal 
revenues. 
Due to nationalisation in the 1980s, the government was totally unable to manage the sector 
from 1986-1988. It used to spend 100 million Frw per year to pay for caretaking of the mines 
left (RMA, 2019). In 1988, the government helped to organise artisanal mining cooperatives 
under COPIMAR and in 1989, the government created a public company (REDEMI) which 
occupied at least 104,000 ha of formerly owned companies (RMA, 2019).  As mentioned 
above, REDEMI was also not working in a safe and secure environment for long since the 
country had a civil war from October 1990 to July 1994, which broke into genocide against 
Tutsi. The Rwandan refugees who were in Uganda, Burundi and other neighbouring countries 
for 30 years formed an armed group, the Rwanda Patriotic Front to gain rights to repatriation 
which had been refused to them by the government before. Besides, internally, the opposition 
parties were violently fighting with MRND (Mouvement Republicain National pour la 
Democratie) which was refusing a democratic transition and multiparty system. Since the 
independence of Rwanda in 1962 from Belgium, the country has had no democratic transfer 
of power, all have been marked by military coup, violence, and civil war.  
Since the end of the civil war, Rwanda has entered a phase of reform, establishing the 
government of Unity and Reconciliation and reforming mining political economy through 
privatisation. Since 2006 and 2008, the most productive tin and wolfram mines were 
privatised. The country also privatised the tin smelting plant in Karuruma (Kigali). The 
government had established this plant to add value to cheap selling of tin ore in the 
international market in 1980s. It was privatised to Phoenix Metal ltd, though it took a long 
time to begin operations due to electricity issues (Markram, January 21, 2015) and 
certification issues since the plant had to show the source of tin products to avoid conflict 
minerals but also to avoid mixing smelting activities and buying minerals (Kabona, August 
20, 2016). It is no clear whether Phoenix Metal in Karuruma was a subsidiary or a venture of 
Phoenix Metal Recyclers originally from New Zealand. What is important to highlight is that 
establishing a local smelter proven difficult due to different challenges highlighted above 
such as licence, and lack of compliance between the government and the company. It was 
sold to I&M Bank Rwanda in January 2018 and resold again to LuNa Smelter in October 
2018. LuNa is a company owned by a Polish venture film and local company – Luma 
Investments and Ngali Holdings.    
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Wolfram Mining and Processing Ltd started on 22nd December 2006 in Gifurwe mine in 
Burera district in North Province, and the Rwikwavu mine in 2008 Kayonza district in East 
Province. According to RMB officials the two mines of wolframites are mostly owned by a 
Belgium company and they display good mining practice in terms of safety, treatment of 
workers and improving production quality and national revenues. In 2014, the WMP was 
awarded the Best Miner Award by the government of Rwanda through MINIRENA’s mining 
week under the theme of “professional mining as a pillar of growth and sustainable 
development” (Mugarura, December 8, 2014). In WMP ltd, the employment increased from 
300 employees in 2006 to over 2000 employees in 2018 (WMP, 2019).  
Since privatisation, the best performers awarded along with WMP are the New Bugarama 
Mining, Blue Change Mining, Ruhango Mines Limited, Rwanda allied Partners, 
Etablissement Sindambiwe, and Mineral Supply Africa, and the I&M Bank (Mugarura, 
December 8, 2014). The latter is a bank which has managed to provide financial support to 
miners.  As Rwandan policy is not only to promote the private sector but also the 
enhancement of the New Public Management (NPM), awards are a sign of performance but 
also a punishment to the worst performers. One of the biggest companies in Rwanda which 
inherited a larger tin area in 2008, was not on the list of good performers in 2014 – this is 
Rutongo Mines. The following analysis highlights some of the reasons behind the lack of 
performance in the six years of owning and exploiting cassiterite concessions.  
 
8.1.1.3. Case of tin mines and local community 
 
In the case of the Rutongo tin mine, the company accessed the mine in 2008 during the 
exploration phases of four years and in 2012 the company applied for a mining licence. The 
company expected to set up industrial mining and processing (Interview with TINCO 
manager, 2017). However, the government of Rwanda was cautious about granting a mining 
licence to the company, in the end it took 3 years for the company to get the mining licence 
and resulted in the state owning 25 percent of the shares.  
One of the reasons is that government remained unwilling to grant the company a long-term 
mining license after an incident of malpractice four years previously during the period of 
exploration. In an interview, one of the TINCO managers had this to say:  
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“we put a business plan together to apply for a license – and that is on industrial type 
of mining with processing plant. We had the investment ready, all session labour 
plans we did all a lot, we submitted these to the government in August 2012, and for 
secondary reasons we only got their license on the 29th January 2015. It took three 
years to get a license and the agreement was that the government maintains 25% and 
the company gets 75%. There was on a license agreement in 2015. {However, from 
2012} the final agreement is not finalized so as we say, we still have hope it is going 
to be finalized. There are 6 years now” (interview with one of TINCO managers, 
2018).  
Another reason for the delay relating to the license rested on the fact that the company was 
looking to begin using industrial machinery which would have proved very damaging to the 
local community, effectively creating management issues at the outset. Industrial mining 
decreases employment and depletes the mines quickly. The government of Rwanda was 
cautious about having an industrial mine in Rutongo, as the company was initially not 
performing well, facts that would affect national benefit.  
This mistrust between TINCO and the government triggered low investment in the company 
and the exercise of rational benefit of minerals within short time including paying a meagre 
salary to the miners, limiting jobs and firing some workers. The company had to not remain 
in a space for a particular length of time and so has been reluctant to invest much capital and 
build durable infrastructure.  
Besides, the bad legacies of the extraction industry in Africa caused hesitation, such as, 
mineral price fluctuation in the international markets and unstable governments. Thus, they 
prefer to use the existing pipes and infrastructure. Asked why the company is not building 
new infrastructure, apart from one or two new pipes and cleaning roads, the leader of the 
company answered: “and the world price! The money and you go and make an investment 
because you have got to know your ownership, you could lose it! You see? So, if you push a 
lot of money in and you start developing and it’s taken away what will you do?” (a company 
manager Rwanda, 2018).  
Nevertheless, the mineral value increases especially of coltan and tin induced an increase in 
sensitivity and security of the mineral exploitation and trading in Rwanda. The Rutongo 
mines hired over 300 security personnel and the government deployed military personnel in 
the mining vicinity; private security has played a big role in protecting companies’ assets. .  
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The government deployed both the security personnel to ensure sovereignty over its mines 
but also to regulate the security conflict that started to arise between the company’s private 
security personnel and the illegal miners and smugglers. As the tension to access mines was 
high, private security personnel needed to impose their own sanctions in case of tin 
smuggling but the government refused. The state forces do not interfere in the management 
of company private security personnel, but they are there as a vanguard of state legitimacy. 
They also help in keeping the safety of explosives used in blasting.  
The local community do not have a direct participation in the regulation of the mine and the 
functioning of MNC in their local vicinity. However, some form of indirect participation 
exists as the district and sector leaders participate in company activities and the company 
utilizes them as a sources of  advice and cooperation. Letters and correspondence between the 
Rutongo mines and local leaders at the provincial to sector level indicate a wish from the 
company to be involved in development activities and public works- such as the building of 
schools and paving roads. One letter from the former Governor of the Northern Province 
Aime BOSENIBAMWE written on 16/05/2011 thanks the company for accepting 5,500,000 
frw (5,500 Euro) for the Nyakatsi (traditional huts) eradication programme. The governor 
provided the Bank account number of Guca (eradicating) Nyakatsi/Province du Nord found 
in the Bank of Kigali. The company deposited the said money after 3 days on the said 
account as is shown by the payslip (see the annex for details). Another example is the letter 
No 68/07.0401.04 from the Executive Secretary of Murambi Sector, Mr. Birimwabagabo, 
Edouard, in which he applied to aid in the building of classrooms for the 12 Years Basic 
Education programme. The company did not have an official CSR policy but intervened at 
local leaders’ requests. In 2012 and 2013, their contribution to  local community projects was 
higher than it is today, this is down to a change in management.  
However, apart from some indirect involvement by local leaders, local sectoral councils or 
district council have little say in the management of the company and in particular are unable 
to hold the company accountable in cases of malpractice. For instance, the Rutongo mine had 
a problem with ISANGE Cooperative. The cooperative is owned by an association of local 
people that have land that reaches to the rivers of Rusine and Sanzali that benefit from the 
affluent surroundings of the Rutongo mines and its fruitful sands and stones. The cooperative 
used to mine and sell the sand and stones crushed mostly by local people with hammers. Both 
the company and the district were getting more revenues than the people because they were 
both taxing greatly the businesses for the portion going to Rutongo Mines and the other to 
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Rulindo district. People were sometimes getting approximately 3000 for mining and selling 5 
m3 of sand, this requires arduous work that a man normally does for 3 to 5 days depending on 
the deposit of sand in the river. The Rutongo mines have annexed the land in which sand is 
mined under the pretext that it is within its own concession. The local sector and district 
failed to solve the problem until the issue rose to the central government and engaged the 
RNRA/GMD.  
In an interview with the director general of production in RMB, Mr. Donath Nsengumuremyi, 
he mentioned that the government strategy to solve the MNC-local people tensions was to 
increase the involvement of local government.  
“Another challenge that the RMB faced in mining was a limited involvement of the 
stakeholders (…) So, there was no involvement of local government, no involvement 
of security organs. Therefore, mining companies took advantage of hiding 
information. You know mining companies are looking for profits, if they know that 
there is no enforcement, no monitoring, they try to do whatever they want. That’s why 
that limitation of stakeholders’ involvement was always a big challenge to comply 
with the required practices. Therefore, we are fixing it by the engagement with those 
stakeholders especially the districts” (Interview with Donath Nsengumuremyi). 
The other mechanism was to develop local mining skills so that the community would have 
access to international standards of mining. Rwanda has opened mining schools in IPRC 
Kigali and a programme of geology and mining at the University of Rwanda and is 
developing another mining school near the Rutongo tin mine. The RMB also encourages the 
company to have security personnel and the district to locally monitor mining standards and 
practice in which at least 2 to 5 personnel are deployed in the district to help ensure good 
practice and safe mining.  
In short, though the type of minerals and the level of abundance could guarantee the creation 
of a mineral curse, the functioning and administration of mining institutions are effective 
enough to counterbalance these effects. So far, except for some accident in mines in deep 
tunnels, we have not seen any violations of human rights including rape and civilian killing in 
relation to minerals. There were cases of the forced movement of people in coltan mines, 
such as in the Muhanga district, and land annexation of especially sand and swampy land in 
case of the Rutongo mine, but these cases were solved before they escalated into a local 
crisis. Other tensions between communities and MNCs happened as a result of mining 
 161 
 
malpractice, such as meagre salaries and poor local CSR involvement which encourages 
incidences of smuggling.   
 
8.1.2. Political Conditions 
 
Politics in Rwanda has evolved since the civil war and genocide atrocities in 1994. The 
democratisation process that occurred in 1990s fuelled a multiparty system based on the Hutu 
Tutsi divided. For instance, the creation of multiparty system ended up by having an internal 
division based on Hutu power in opposition parties in the 1990s (MDR – Mouvement pour la 
Democratie au Rwanda, PL – Parti Liberal, PSD -Parti Socialiste Democratique, CDR – 
Coalition pour la Defence de la Republique and others). This was a creation of resistance to 
forced multiparty system in 1990s in Africa. The parties were created through ethnic hatred; 
the partition of parties was a creation to a Hutu dominated government in 1990s that has 
discriminated Tutsis since the 1960s. Therefore, parties like MDR had also ‘MDR power’. 
The aim was to maintain power based on the Hutu majority aspects as the quota said they 
were 80% of the population and to exterminate Tutsis and thwart repatriation of  refugees of 
the 1950s who were settled in Uganda and other neighbouring states. The civil war was 
unstoppable in the country because of the country’s bad governance regarding human rights 
and citizenship.  
Since the end of the 1990s, Rwanda has adopted a de-ethnicization strategy by creating a new 
identity for the Rwandan (Ndumunyarwanda). This policy aims at overpassing the 
psychological feeling of being a Hutu or a Tutsi or a Twa (the other marginal and  historically 
marginalised  minority).  “We cannot turn back the past time or remove the bad deeds of our 
history, but we have the capacity to plan the future of Rwanda and to prevent that what 
happened happens again. To be a true Rwandan, this is the politic that we all should follow. 
{Ntidushobora gusubiya inyuma cyangwa ngo tuvaneho ibibi bzatubayeho ariko dufite 
ubshoboyi bwo kugena ejo hazaza h’u Rwanda no gutuma ibzabaye bitazongera kuba ukundi. 
Kuba umunyarwanda muzima niyo politike twese dukwiye kugenderaho} President Kagame 
said, (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, N.A, p.4). 
This policy was publicly launched in 2013 when different leaders started to talk publicly on 
the issue and called upon a nation-wide recognition of misdeeds that the communities, 
especially Hutu community did against Tutsi communities. However, it was preceded by 
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other policies such as the removal of a traditional identity card that included ethnic groups in 
the identification of citizens. Political parties were also forbidden to follow ethnic or religious 
lines. The implication of this policy is a promotion of meritocracy rather than ethnocracy that 
has paralysed many African states, notably the Central Eastern Africa. The 2003 constitution 
aimed at the “eradication of ethnicity, regional and other divisions and promotion of national 
unity” (The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003, art. 9, point 2).  
Power sharing mechanisms were initiated in 1995 and in 2003, the constitution allows 50% 
of seats in government to the winning party, which has been mainly won by the RPF due to 
its legitimacy of having toppled down dictatorial regimes of the MRND and brought about 
peace and stability after the genocide.  Other parties share the remaining 50% basing on the 
electoral threshold of 5% during parliamentary election. This allows the opposition party to 
align with the existing political competition peacefully to win seats in both the cabinet and 
the parliament.  
However, Rwanda is still having problems with its political opposition: military dissidents 
such as General Kayumba Nyamwasa who fled to South Africa, formed RNC movements and 
merged with the former rebel FDLR and external forces of opposition based in Europe, 
America and in regional and neighbouring states, who are looking to attack the county. 
Nowadays the rebel movement has a military base in South Kivu (Eastern DRC).. Since 
independence in 1962 from Belgium, the country has never had any peaceful transitions of 
power without a coup d’Etat, impeachment or civil wars. Belgium assassinated the King 
Mutara Rudahigwa in the 1960s and supported the puppet Hutu majoritarian policy until the 
1994 genocide and within this system all sorts of military coup and civil wars were the 
mechanism of accessing power in Rwanda.  
Moreover, Rwanda is dedicated to integrating into the world and overcoming the global 
marginalisation that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa from the end of the cold war in 1990 to 
2000. The Rwandan policy has been to attract investment and avoid extreme nationalism. 
Different foreign people can easily get business right, public jobs and travel facilities 
regardless of their country of origin. Property rights are respected, and land tenure is 
enforced. This has allowed the country to receive more FDI inflows than any other state in 
the EAC since 2000 and to rank among the best in easiness to do business with.  
The country also initiates the policy of integrating in regional and international organisation. 
In 2007, the country integrated into the EAC, in 2016 it reintegrated CEEAC and in 2018, a 
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former Minister of Foreign Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo won the leadership of Francophonie. 
Rwanda is also an active member of the AU reform through the leadership of President 
Kagame. Rwanda withdrew from SADC membership application in early 2000 and needs to 
integrate into the OECD. This regional and international integration is triggering Rwanda to 
emphasise more the values of democracy and political tolerance. Though the country still has 
many steps to reach a fully-fledged democracy, the initiative to release political prisoners, 
and to integrate the former combatant and the FDLR repatriated members into the national 
unity process are achievements of the unity and reconciliation policies.  
Multinationals recognise their role in the reconstruction of the country. Some CSR initiatives 
policies aim to protect the most vulnerable social groups such as poor rural households and 
the widows of the genocide. During his interview, the Rutongo mine leader asserted that the 
company helped to give jobs to genocide widows and support the rural poor through 
increases in household income and school fee payments.  
Institutionally, Rwanda’s regulatory mechanism is one of the best in Africa, corruption is at a 
minimum compared to the rest of the East African member states and, Rwanda is among the 
5th least corrupt state in Africa. Rwanda initiates a state driven promotion of the private 
sector, whereby the private sector is not only asked to follow the developmental policies of 
the state but also where political and religious organisation must follow and invest in 
development activities. Since 2000, local people have also been encouraged to adopt healthier 
behaviours, such as eating a balanced diet and wearing shoes in public – popular centred 
approaches that promote the way towards a global civilisation. Most of the young people, 
especially miners in Rutongo, live in new urban villages called imidugudu where they have 
free access to water and electricity. Such villages can also be found in Murambi, Masoro, 
originally used as a miner’s facilitiy, they have since been expanded to others, this is in fact a 
county wide policy of urbanising the state.  
 
8.1.3.1. Regional 
 
Rwanda is situated in the unstable Great Lakes Region within Central East Africa, where 
mineral conflict occurs. The CEA comprises of the ICGLR member states such as Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Even though these states are affected by metal mine conflict 
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and instability, the more vulnerable areas are Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern DRC 
due to their abundance in minerals and socio-political conditions like density of the 
population, extra-territorial ethnic conflicts, political instability and dictatorships.  
In fact, mineral conflicts, especially concerning tin, tantalum and tungsten gold, have 
occurred since 1996, resulting in the regional institutions destruction after the Tutsi genocide 
in Rwanda in 1994. This was followed by the invasion of the DRC through the Congo War I 
(1996-1998) and the Congo War II (1999-2003) – wars in which the Mobutu regime fell, the 
Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese in both north and south Kivu were expelled and killed and, 
there was an ethnic pogrom between Hema and Lendu in 2003.  
Mobutu ruled DRC through a marginalisation of the eastern parts, extremism, nationalism 
and xenophobia since 1970s and Mobutu was also an ally of the regime of Habyarimana in 
Rwanda, this strengthened regional dictatorship and nationalism. In 1973 Mobutu expelled all 
European mining companies and nationalised them without compensation. His divide and 
rule strategy promoted minority Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese at the detriment of other 
groups in eastern DRC such as the Bahunde, Bashi, and Bafurero. This increased regional 
tension among ethnic groups in the region have and continue to affect Rwandan politics and 
resource management decisions.  
There has been a rise of grievance seeking factions in both Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and 
DRC since 1980s and 1990s and some remain, and all militarily and territorially operate in 
eastern DRC bordering the said countries. These are, for instance, the FDLR from Rwanda, 
the FNL from Burundi, the ADF-Nalu, RRA from Uganda and Mai Mai groups from eastern 
DRC. In fact, the more mines the more armed groups appear in this Central East African 
region.   
Indeed, Rwanda was also affected by the regional crisis since many have accused the country 
of engaging in a proxy war along with global powers to seek access to DRC influence. 
During the Congo war the USA was involved in the overthrow of the Mobutu regime by 
backing Rwanda, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi who were also pursuing their own rebels. On 
the other side, France has been behind Congo, Sudan, SADC allies including South Africa, 
Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe who also had a regional influence for resource and security 
purposes. There was also indirect involvement of Belgium, Morocco, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Congo Brazaville, China and other regional powers in the regional issues. 
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Moreover, the Congolese and the UN have been accusing Rwanda of being backed by the 
USA in regional resource wars (Jones and Smith, 20 June 2012).  
Besides, this the issues of minerals and mineral looting has been very prominent in the region 
during the last two decades. The UN group of experts on illegal trade of minerals accused 
Rwanda and Uganda of smuggling DRC mineral resources including coltan, gold and other 
metals that are implicated in mineral conflicts.  
However, even though there have been cases of looting in the DRC, both Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi have some geological similarities with the said looted eastern DRC, this puts the 
issue of mineral conflict in a more complex situation. The region is geologically under the 
Kibalan Belt, rich in 3Ts and gold. This has triggered more regional and international 
initiatives in the region (see the chapters on international and regional mining regulations). 
Moreover, the complexity of regional conflicts mixed with ethnic and dictatorship-based wars 
has amplified regional vulnerability. Most of the mineral income enables rebel groups to 
engage in war and induces local states to subjugate their national sovereignty to global and 
regional powers – which produces proxy wars in the Great Lakes Region and further 
instability and disagreement within EAC members.  
Regionally, Rwanda recovered fast from the genocide three decades ago and has relatively 
strong institutions that limit the internal resource curse. In an interview in RMB, officials said 
that Rwanda is first performer in ICGR mining rules followed by Zambia. Moreover, the 
regional traceability mechanism is not enforced equally in the region and the fact that only 
Rwanda and Zambia focus on traceability standards means that other countries are 
performing poorly in this area and that has made the regional rules less effective.   
ICGLR put more pressure on Zambia and Rwanda to curb channels of resource leakage at the 
borders as the two countries are strategically important for the DRC mineral rich zones. 
Zambia serves as a southern corridor of trade of minerals from DRC to South Africa, 
southern Africa and east Africa while Rwanda serves DRC as a close strategic border to 
eastern Africa and the Indian See market. At the Zambian border the control is based on 
metal mines but also checking the uranium from the cobalt and copper cargo content since 
the region is close to Congolese Uranium mines. Whilst in Rwanda attention is focused on 
metals especially tin and coltan.  
 166 
 
8.1.3.2. Internationally  
 
Rwanda is currently receiving MNCs from different corners of the world that are investing in 
its mines, this is important as it prevents Rwanda from becoming a mere enclave of certain 
regional and global powers. There are two big companies from South Africa investing in the 
Musha and Rutongo tin mines. Rwanda is hosting different exploratory companies either 
from Russia or South Africa. Rwanda is also extracting methane gas in Lake Kivu through a 
USA based company. The Wolframite is mostly mined by the Belgium company and there is 
small-scale mining done by companies from Arabic states and China. In short, the Rwandan 
mining policy is more open, and the mining sector is less likely to divert the country’s foreign 
policy or image of being an enclave of certain foreign power in mining.  
Moreover, Rwanda is making more use of hybrid and multi-level resource governance than 
any other country in the EAC (see conceptualisation in Chapter 1). As reiterated, Rwanda 
was first among 11 members of ICGLR to respect and enforce the ICGLR traceability 
mechanism. The country abides in the USA Dodd Frank mining rules and respects the 
international private company in terms of tracing and scrutinising the commercialisation of 
minerals especially the ITRI, BSP, and ITA. Rwanda and the mining company pay a lot of 
money to the said international companies but, according to officials in RMB and in the 
Rutongo mines, traceability, though expensive, is important to bring order to the mining 
sector. However, some officials mentioned that international companies have more to gain 
concerning the mining regulations than the state does from taxes and development. It is clear 
also that too much regulation hinders rapid development of the sector, as shown in the case of 
the tin smelting plant reopening. The demanding nature of international regulation put the 
state and the companies into losing profits they would otherwise have received without 
regulations.  
Abiding with international standards and complying with them are costing the rapid 
development of the mining business. Even though it brings order, compliance is costly. 
Therefore, from state level to the global level, we see some cases in Rwanda that limit the 
sovereignty of the state in regulating the mining activities, thwarting self-determination of 
selling and buying minerals. The illustrative case is issuance of certification and the cost of 
compliance to international standards. Compliance is costly since international agents 
involved in compliance require certain thresholds of money from the business. The tin 
company told me that they pay a lot to the international traceability company even though 
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both RMB and the company recognize the importance of this multi-level, hybrid governance 
especially in terms of security and stability.   
Another cost is subjugation of sovereignty over to international scrutiny. For instance, the US 
Dodd Frank rules and OECD reports were reluctant to provide certification of Phoenix Metal 
Ltd tin smelter in Rwanda in 2015. Phoenix Metal is a Private Company which operates in 
Kigali, Karuruma, and which owns a former public owned tin smelter established in 1980 and 
managed by SOMIRWA. It acquired the smelter through privatisation. There was no clear 
link whether the company is the one from New Zealand. Later, after hardship and regulatory 
problems as mentioned above, the company was disfuncional and in October 2018, the 
company was sold again to Luna Smelter ltd a subsidiary of a Polish company Luma 
Investment and a Rwandan company Ngali Holdings. Even though the reason for not granting 
permission was clear in the audits, the fact of halting any business activity in a certain 
country without any other business failure between the buyers and sellers seems to interfere 
in local sovereignties in a non-economic manner. Phoenix Metal started in 2002 with the 
capacity to smelt 10 tonnes a day and this is more than manageable, considering the tin 
production in Rwanda and the value increment is about 40% from 1.5 million turnover of the 
tin industry annually (Kabona, 12 September 2015).  
Besides, the delay in certifying MNC operating in Rwanda decreases the mineral industry’s 
development even though it serves regional or international interests. It thwarts the direct 
supply of processed minerals from Rwanda to different corners of the industrialised world 
without selling minerals cheaply to semi-industrialised countries. The operation manager 
Jean de Dieu Mutunzi, has informed that Phoenix Metals ltd had order to supply ingots 
directly to the aeroplane manufacturers and electronic device makers but was worried that the 
traceability certificate would thwart the deal (Kabona, 12 September 2015).  
 The government of Rwanda also work in partnership with doner agencies to build the 
capacity of the mining agents in traceability auditing and control mechanisms in RMB. These 
agencies are, for instance, DFID from the UK and GIZ from Germany. Besides, the country 
has a good image in the regulation of mining internationally after different reports alleged 
Rwanda had looted in Congo. The World Bank has no problem with the regulation of mining 
in Rwanda as was the case for Tanzania after mining reform, as mentioned in early chapters.  
However, based on international demand for the 3Ts and for gold, Rwanda needs to put more 
effort in regulating its mineral market to abide in international mineral conflict rules but also 
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to increase its domestic profitability. Besides, Rwanda is not an official member yet of the 
EITI. 
8.1.3. Socio-economic conditions 
 
The Rwandan economy has been thriving since the government of Unity and Reconciliation 
was established after the genocide of 1994. Statistics shows that Rwanda was greatly 
damaged during the 4 years civil war in terms of manpower, sustainable household, and 
GDP. Recovery only began in 2000, meaning that from 1995 to 2000 there was a period of 
redeveloping the economy to the level it had in 1990. Therefore, this following economic 
analysis will mainly explore results from 2000 until 2018, during which Rwanda’s economy 
grew steadily but very slowly. 
The Rwandan GDP PPP was $1306.2 GDP in 2000 and $1854.2 in 2017 (Trading 
Economics, 2019). The highest GDP growth rate is 13.20 in 2002 and the lowest was -2.20 in 
2013 (Trading Economics/World Bank, 2019). The GDP increase was 7.3 in 2012 and 4.6 in 
2013 based on economic data from 2011 (Mwizerwa, April 8, 2014). From 2000 to 2018, 
Rwanda had an  economic growth of 2.68 However, it is less than a set GDP growth of any 
developmental states, which is 5% in the period of ten years, as happened in the East Asian 
tiger states in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, as highlighted in the case of South Korea which 
marked a GNP growth of 10% from 1965 to 1980 (Minns, 2001, p. 1025).  
Rwanda responded well to the aid shocks of 2012, when the EU members states including 
German, Sweden, Britain and the Netherlands had temporarily withheld aid due to allegations 
from international NGOs, such as the Human Right Watch and blocked UN reports in 2012, 
that Rwanda was financing M23 rebels in Eastern DRC (Kelly, 6 September 2012, see also 
Jones, 20 June 2012). The UK government withheld £16 million ($25 million USD) worth of 
direct support to the government in June 2012. However, they later unblocked half of the aid 
based on successful negotiations with Rwanda and a positive response in Rwanda to security 
issues that had displaced 220,000 people in eastern DRC, as highlighted by the UK 
international development secretary Andrew Mitchell (Kelly, 6 September 2012)   
The cutting of aid in 2012 triggered reflection on the mechanism of self-reliance policies in 
Rwanda since 2012 (Mpyisi, December 6, 2012). This included the establishment of Agaciro 
development programmes, Kwigira (self-reliance) policy, and replacing aid and loans to 
launch an international bid of investors in public assets including the transport sector, civil 
 169 
 
aviation, industry and mining sectors. The government established the threshold for 
borrowing, as well as the mechanisms governing such borrowing for non-residents from 
December 2, 2013 to end of June 2015 and included Bank of Kigali which can give loans to 
the government without guarantees (IMF, 2015, p. 53). The country also increased efficiency 
in taxation mechanisms whereby the private sector and mining companies registered for VAT 
and in other cases also for electronic billing machines.  
From 2013, the economy of the country has been thriving especially in terms of development 
of mining and manufacturing. From 2009 to 2013, Rwanda exported tin, 4,955 tons, and 
coltan 1,239 tons, wolframite 1,338 tons (MINIRENA, 2014, p.7); the mineral export value 
rose from 2008. The value of mineral export was $96.4 million in 2010 and $226 million in 
2013 (MINIRENA, 2014, p. 5). In 2017, the country exported 7,000 tonnes of minerals with 
the value of $373 million and this was due mainly to the relatively good price of the 3Ts on 
the international market according to the CEO of RMB (Mwai, June 6, 2018).  
However, the value of mineral exports has diminished from 2014 to 2016 before rising again 
in 2017: $210,283,513.00 in 2014, $147,936,651.00 in 2015, and $166,733,414.00 in 2016 
(ITA, June 26, 2017). This decline was mainly due to international commodity pricing in 
minerals not by quantity. Rwanda is one of the largest 3Ts exporters worldwide and therefore 
is subject to Section 1502 of US Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (ITA, June 26, 2017). The sector is currently employing over 40,000 workers in the 
population of 12 million. This is a considerable number of workers and is in line with the 
policy of diminishing dependence on agricultural sectors. Mining licence rose from around 
30 in 2008 to almost 416 in 2014 (MINIRENA, 2014, p. 6). 
The economy of Rwanda is mostly based on a service sector which contributes 46%. The 
agriculture sector follows with a contribution of 32% and the industrial sector contribution is 
13% in a country GDP of 1,817 billion Rwf in the 1st quarter of 2017 (Mwizerwa, 5 July 
2017). The total GDP increase was 1.7 percent in the first quarter, food crops increased by 4 
percent while industry decreased by 1%, this was due to relative decline of mineral exports in 
the period of 2016 (Mwizerwa, 5 July 2017). 
Manufacturing increased by 7% and mainly focused on the food processing increase of 13 
percent and the production and manufacturing of chemicals, rubber and plastic which grew 
by 28% (Mwizerwa, 5 July 2017). However, the wholesale and retail trade decreased by 12%, 
this was due mostly to the ban on second-hand clothes in Rwanda and in some of the EAC 
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community – a fact that caused an economic dispute between Rwanda and the USA, who 
considered it protectionism for a young growing garment industry and therefore contrary to 
liberal trade and asymmetric exchange facility with AGOA. Manufacturing in Rwanda is low 
but growing fast since the country opened its special economic zones to build up 
manufacturing industry and to facilitate private sector investment in the major four industrial 
park such as in Bugesera, Huye, Nyabihu and Rusizi with a target to have the manufacturing 
contribution 26% of GDP in 2020 (RDB, 2018). 
The Mineral GDP increased in Rwanda more than any other EAC member states. GDP 
mining in Rwanda was 62 Rwf billion in the third quarter of 2018 while it was only 12 billion 
Rwf in 2010 (Trade Economics, and National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2019). 
However, as said above mining plus other industrial sectors count for less than 17% of the 
total GDP. The mineral rent of Rwanda is 0.23197, much lower than many other states such 
as Tanzania 3, and DRC 13.2, and the mineral rent of Rwanda is comparable to that of 
Botswana , 0.3 (Lange et al, 2018). The mineral rent highlights the difference in the value of 
production for a stock of minerals at world price and their total cost of production (Trading 
Economics, 2017). 
The general economy-based problem that regularly occurs is the growing inequality rate in 
Rwanda and the uneven distribution of economic growth. Inequality is most prominent when 
examining salary arrangements between the workers education and their gender; education 
and gender induce the larger gaps on salary payment. Only 49% of workers are paid on or 
above the poverty line or 118,000 frw per month, workers without contracts are most 
vulnerable and only 26% of employees in informal jobs receive the salary above the poverty 
line (Besamusca et al, 2012). In terms of gender, these researchers highlighted that men are 
more likely to receive payment which is above poverty line at a comparison of 52% (men) to 
47% (women). The most affected category of workers on poverty line salaries are those 
working in commercial services rather than those in agriculture, manufacturing and 
construction (Besamusca et al, 2012). 
Due to the cost of commodities in a densely populated country, even the payment of little 
above the poverty line, for instance 1500 a day, is too little to survive. Rwanda is a densely 
populated country in eastern Africa comprised of 474.64 per km2 in 2019 (World Population 
Review, 2019). The cost of living is increasingly expensive, and the country is constrained by 
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the rapid transition from an agriculture-based economy to diversification – which is still 
mostly at its initial stage.  
In search for livelihoods alternatives in areas where locals do not have access to other 
tangible means of employment or sources of revenue, the looting of metals has become a 
common occurrence.  The value of tin ore, for instance, at LME is $20 and 3 kilos of rough 
tin ore is equivalent to a monthly salary of a primary school teacher. This hampers the 
development of other sectors in the metal mining region and accrues focus on mineral 
production as well as the resulting school dropout and smuggling, as we shall see when 
examining the challenge of government regulation of the mining sector.  
Inequality is high in Rwanda and in 2005 the Gini coefficient was 5.2, in 2013 it was 5.0. It is 
one of the highest inequality levels in East Africa and most of Central Africa apart from the 
Central African Republic which has an inequality level of 5.6 Gini coefficient in 2013. Most 
of the countries with a social democratic trend and advanced redistribution have low 
inequality levels, between 2 and 3, these are for instance Germany which has 2.8 Gini 
coefficient and Sweden 2.5 Gini coefficient, Belgium 3.3, and the UK, 3.6.   
This inequality level in Rwanda exacerbates the existing poverty level and the general human 
development indicators. Rwanda ranks on the HDI level of 158th among 189 states and 
territories, with middle range HDI of 0.524 in 2018 (UNDP, 2018). The best HDI performer 
in the same year was Norway at 0.9 HDI and the least was Niger with 0.35 HDI in 2018. The 
most affected areas in Rwanda in terms of HDI is the average years of schooling which is 
among the lowest globally at 4.1 years despite the effort to implement a 12-years-basic 
education – the least mean average year of schooling is that of Niger at 2.0 (UNDP, 2018).   
The effect is that in Rwanda there is still a large unskilled labour force and low socio-
economic sustainability at large. The skilled labour force per hundred is only 6.8 percent 
(UNDP, 2018). Unskilled labour force then increases the number of labour supplies on the 
market and results in the shrinking of labour salaries. Employment of the population rose to 
85% of the population above 15 years old but the number of working-poor is also high in 
global standards with 70.8% receiving global incomes that equals or is less than PPP$3.10 a 
day (UNDP, 2018). Moreover, trade and financial flows is 51.0% of exports and imports 
(UNDP, 2018).  
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However, life expectancy in Rwanda has increased from the 1990s (about 45 years) and 
reached 67.5 years in 2018, and the GNI income per capita is 1,811, with inequality adjusted 
HDI of 0.367 (UNDP, 2018). This income inequality adjusted HDI includes human life style 
and is different from the normal GDP per capita which only accounts for  a country’s 
economic revenues. 
Rwanda is however advanced in gender promotion policies and the Gender Development 
Index is 0.941 (UNDP, 2018). Rwanda is a country with a majority female parliament and a 
growing number of women activists in socio-political and economic affairs as of the 1990s. 
Women are increasingly appearing in other sectors that used to be exclusively for men such 
as mining, construction and public transport. Women have an equal right to inheritance, in 
particular land and property inheritance.  
Rwanda is environmentally stable except for cases of erosion due to the mountainous 
landscape. Plastics bags are prohibited, projects of reforestation have been engineered and 
there are new natural reserves including the Nyungwe national park and the coming Gishwati 
national park in 2020. The carbon dioxide emission is only 0.1, mostly due to lack of high-
level industrialisation and a minimum consumption of petroleum.   
  
Indeed, Rwandan human right legal terms, especially on child and women rights, are so tough 
that it curbs the pace of rape and child injustices that occur in the country, especially in the 
mining sector. In Rwanda, rape is heavily sanctioned compared to other CEA states. This has 
limited the cases mainly in mines surrounding the local vicinity. Moreover Rwanda’s recent 
history of genocide has aided in the low levels of violence, due to the country’s subsequent 
sensitivity to violence in any form. This section leads us to an analysis of the other conditions 
in the country including its political conditions.  
  
8.2. Mining malpractices with focus on the Rutongo tin mines 
 
Companies use sub-contracting systems in managing workers, which impede the mother 
company’s responsibility and accountability to the labour rights of miners. This is the 
mechanism of the company to contract with local entrepreneurs, giving them mining sites and 
collecting the minerals from them each day. Those entrepreneurs are managed by the mining 
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company though they are required to have their own registered companies through which 
they hire a large number of miners. In the case of Rutongo, for instance, the regular 
employees are almost 600 while another 3400 are miners directly controlled by local sub-
contractors. This allows the company to escape some responsibilities including paying 
salaries, health insurance and other provisions that employers are obliged to give to 
employees according to labour laws.  
This process of sub-contracting is typically the most efficient for companies in a capitalist 
system. The problem is that the ordinary employees do not have any power to decide on the 
share of the company’s revenues despite being the ones who produce the minerals. The 
association of miners and syndicates are too powerless in the country to bargain for miners 
even though some intervention has to come from workers syndicates in the case of labour 
rights in Rutongo mines. The sub-contracting system brings in a noticeable inequality among 
workers in terms of revenue share. Some may go home with millions of Rwanda money per 
month while the majority return home with less than a hundred or almost nothing. The lowest 
among the day laborers in Rutongo mines is 30.000 frw, less than $50 USD per month.  
The major problem related to sub-contracting is that the company is separated by miners in 
order to maximize its revenue and avoid insurance expenses and international legitimacy on 
the treatment of workers. The workers are under the control of sub-contractors of the 
Rutongo mines, who are locals and are required to create their own company. For instance, 
the sub-contractor named Ngiruwonsanga has a company called NGIRU Ltd, which does tin 
extraction in one of the nearest and most productive sites of the Rutongo Mines called 
Nyamyumba. The company does not own workers there directly but does control the sub-
contracting company directly hence it has the right to terminate and replace the sub-
contractor. However, the employees are controlled and paid by Rutongo mines, although 
through the administration and leadership of sub-contracting company.  
As mentioned above meagre salary accrue poverty and inequality at local level and form of 
exploitation of man to man in extraction regulated mostly by demand and supply. For the 
local miners, even though the salaries are low in mining and support team. It is better than 
having no job as the other sector economy do not work properly to employ them. Cheap 
supply of unskilled labour in mines increase the problem of poverty and socio-economic 
resource curse especially in the case of Rwanda – and in the mining vicinity more 
particularly. As there is no basic salary in base in most of EAC member states, companies 
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and sub-contractors fix prices for their own interest with high risk of human exploitation and 
poverty.    
In the case of Rutongo Mines, the miners are asked for an unnecessary repayment to the 
company, they give explosives to the miners, they buy pumps of water then they deduct these 
charges from the miners’ salary, as such the miners get little money. They have a system of 
sous-traitance (sub-contracting). The subcontracting system work in the following way: the 
company takes a person and gives him or her one of its mine sites, for instance Nyamyumba 
in exchange of minerals for digging materials which the company provides. Because he uses 
workers, he pays the remaining little money to miners according to what they asked him and 
therefore the workers receive a small salary. 
The declaration of annual losses enables the company to avoid paying a corporate income tax 
of 30%. Besides, there are some challenges in taxing MNCs apart from royalty tax in the 
Rutongo mines.  The reason is that the Rutongo mines declare only losses in their annual 
income almost every year, this allows the company to avoid paying 30 percent of corporate 
income tax. However, the company assert that they are paying other taxes including PAE 
(Pay as you Earn) to the government. However, the company leader mentioned that they 
compete with a lot of traders and as such they should pay less tax. According to the company 
manager, traders should pay higher royalties since they do not invest much, they only buy. 
Rutongo mines suggests that even the 4% royalty fees are high to pay to the government 
compared to what they invest. The government agent in RMB views this as a means of 
escaping tax regulations. An RMB personnel explained: “Still now, (Rutongo mine) said that 
it works but still gets losses (laughing) and many years ago the mines are there, and they 
accessed it with infrastructure already established. They used its mines without spending 
anything”.  
Asked whether they have a problem with production declarations of companies like Rutongo, 
he answered: “For declaration of production, they can’t, because if they don’t do it, they don't 
get the tags. That is the best tool we are using, you cannot declare it, but where are you going 
to get the tag? You can have the store, but you will not have the access to the market”. 
Another problem that occurs in taxation is on “transfer pricing” since it is the deal between 
daughter company and her external parent company. When the daughter company sells to her 
parents, price fixing is underestimated to reduce the local tax bill, the daughter company is 
typically located in Rwanda whilst its parent company will be in the UK. They have the 
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contract for buying and supplying the minerals and thus, the contract is made between 
daughter company and its parent company (interview, 2018). Devaluation of real mineral 
prices then occurs within the internal value chain of these companies as they set prices 
favourable to them, which weaken the tax base (interview with RMB officials, 2018). 
The government is planning to raise this issue in new mining regulation which was under 
preparation in 2018. Meanwhile, the mining audit was established in order to overcome the 
issue. The mineral auditing helps to analyse whether the mineral price is lower than the 
general trend of the local and international market prices. There is also a plan to establish a 
mineral laboratory to analyse the concentration of minerals and their ultimate value and 
percentage grade content of minerals. Selling to your own company is even prohibited in 
Rwandan mining acts (interview with RMB officials, 2018).  
However, the mining audit cannot overcome all channels of subsidiary companies and their 
parent companies. These companies have networks that determine price and business in cycle 
apart from state. The case of the Rutongo mines is an illustrative example. “We are a 
Rwandan company, you know, we get shareholders from South Africa and the UK, but it is a 
Rwandan company. Let’s call it an international shareholder, but it is a registered company in 
Rwanda. (for export) We go through a company called NOBLE, (and then) Nile resources, it 
is a big multinational company, but we sell to them then they export. (Interview with one of 
TINCO managers, 2018). 
More uniquely, the current resource management of the companies is making subsidiaries 
from the global levels to local levels and to the cell level of mining. The subsidiary company 
also form other small companies attached to it through sub-contracting. Since the sub-
contractors are required to form these companies, the whole network of resource extraction 
becomes subsidiary and sub-subsidiary. From the global to the regional level, there is a 
subsidiary link (for example contract between NOBLE, UK and TINCO, South Africa), and 
between region to the state we have a sub-subsidiary (TINCO with Rwanda rebrand itself as 
Rutongo Mine) then from the state level to local level there is sub-sub-subsidiary (for 
instance Rutongo Mines to Ngiru Ltd.). Ngiru Limited is a company of one of Rutongo Mine 
sub-subcontractors based in Nyambumba. Therefore, one can interpret that resource 
management through companies occurs in three nodes: between local and state level, state 
and regional level, and regional to global levels and have embedded the pricing, 
responsibility issues and efficiencies in extraction.   
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Among the permanent workers there is also a huge inequality among South African workers 
and local workers. The company pays about 3,000 to 5,000 USD to expatriates while paying 
about 800 USD to the same person with same qualifications from Rwanda. When pursing this 
question of employment inequalities, one of the company managers told me to compare 
apples with apples as for the case of Rwanda labour being the cheapest in the world 
(interview with Rutongo mine officials, 2018). 
The huge supply of unskilled labour on the market effect low salaries and the mistreatment of 
workers. This market environment induces the company to benefit more from abundant and 
cheap local employees. “You see, if you got to compare apples with apples, if I have got to 
take an accountant for instance let’s call qualifications, I will pay him around about 1,8 to 2 
thousand US dollars” (interview with Rutongo managers, 2018). 
Smaller salaries also encourage local cheating, corruption and smuggling in mines. The local 
people now have developed means of smuggling, though many young men have been in jail 
for that in Miyove prison, they continue it as a source of income. Interviews from one of the 
personnel, he told me: “They have various methods of smuggling minerals. You know, they 
can recruit people and smuggle the minerals by behaving as if they are in marriage activities. 
In case of their capture, you find it really surprising”. While the company claims that 
smuggling is a big issue and the reason why they are making losses, one of the agents in 
mines explained: “the eradication of mineral smuggling is impossible unless they increase the 
amount paid as remuneration to the miners” (interview in Rutongo mine, 2018). 
 
8.3. The challenge of Rwanda in regulation of mining sector 
 
8.3.1. Access to information on international market  
 
Access to information in international market of minerals is a hindrance to the state 
regulatory capacities. The fluctuation of mineral prices disables smooth planning and 
regulation. For instance, in 2015 the metal price fell but in 2016/17 it rose again especially 
because of the 3 Ts. However, cassiterite, cobalt, and wolfram have been facing the challenge 
of international price fluctuation (interview with RMB officials, 2018).  
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Furthermore, the regional bargaining power over the sale of minerals is too weak to shape the 
international price. This is due to the additional fact that few industries that process metals 
exist in EAC. Mineral sales hugely depend on Eastern markets including Malaysia, China, 
and India – something related to the lack of linkage due to smelting technologies that EAC 
members do not have yet. As an option, one of the Rwandan officials highlighted the need to 
diversify the products and increase smelting capacity. Moreover, they want to move from 3 
Ts to other minerals to find solutions to these challenges. One of the strategies to overcome 
fluctuation was to diversify mineral products, however, there was a challenge to do so 
regionally and consolidate the metal market in East Africa especially in Rwanda, Congo and 
Uganda (interview with officials in RMB, 2018). 
 
8.3.2. Transport infrastructure and local processing 
 
In Rwanda, companies are burdened by this landlocked territory, especially since most 
mineral cargo must be transported by roads. Though the state is trying to reach the Indian 
coast by negotiating with other EAC member states to establish railways, only Tanzania 
accepted one through Isaka. However, until now companies are using tracks to transport tin to 
the international market – costly and unsafe according to one manager of the Rutongo mine. 
Difficulties in transport and the lack of local products that miners use for digging and blasting 
costs extra money: “you import explosives at high prices, anything comes in, it is very costly 
and, these are the challenges” (interview with Rutongo mine officials, 2018) 
The cost of road transportation also includes security costs. For example, in 2018 Uganda 
decided to freeze two tracks of Rwandan minerals on allegations that the certification was not 
accurate. In this regard, transportation of minerals on roads where the regional politics is 
unstable hinders the interests of multinational companies and may cause more tensions 
between countries regionally.   
The other challenging issue for companies is to limit other mining dealers, including 
smugglers. The problem that still lingers on in the Rutongo mines is the failure of the 
government to stop the increasing smuggling in the Rutongo mines. This smuggling is 
difficult to fight against since it involves powerful elites as well as local miners who get more 
benefit from illegal selling as the company does not provide the same value as outside 
markets. For instance, a kilo of tin on international markets is around 18 to 22 USD, while the 
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company give only 2 USD to local miners and sub-contractors, the company dictates the low 
price. The local people who are normally miners can sell to other mineral dealers and get 
around 10 to 11 USD per 1kg of tin which is much higher than the 2 USD given away by the 
Rutongo mine. As a result, in Rutongo, the company is threatened by mineral theft and many 
traders in the sector. 
The officials in RMB disclosed that they know the problem with the traders and are dealing 
with the issue. However, traders are also necessary in terms of enabling an open market and 
competition. The only challenge of the government is to regulate internal markets of minerals 
and, therefore, to support the miners.  
  
8.3.3. Low local benefit  
 
The uniqueness of Rwanda was in adopting a policy which accommodates foreign companies 
without political selection. Bigger countries such as the USA, Russia, China, South Africa, 
Belgium and Canada companies are involved in mining in Rwanda and do so in harmony. US 
companies are involved in gas methane extraction in Kivu lake, Russia is involved in 
research and exploration which in a recent airborne survey has helped discover new mining 
opportunities including lithium. Chinese companies are more involved in small scale 
companies in coltan. South Africa in tin, Belgium in wolfram and Canada in gold 
exploration. This was possible due to the business-friendly strategies of Rwanda and the link 
between the Mining institution (RMB), investment promotion (RDB), and other key 
institution that facilitate open foreign policy. 
However, the cost of compliance with international bodies is high. For instance, the money 
paid to ITRI, to ISO, and to ITA is great compared to what the state earns. International 
NGOs from the UK for instance come and say: "we are going to support you to make sure 
that the minerals are traceable so that we don't face the issue of the black market, but still the 
problem is the cost of compliance” (interview in RMB, 2018). The mineral income going to 
international regulatory companies is high, such companies as ITA, an organization based in 
UK. Companies are required to pay money to ITA to be allowed to exploit and trade 
cassiterite. It seems to be the cost of international legitimacy on tin mining. Companies are 
obliged to pay that money which is a relatively high price compared to what the government 
really gets. 
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The traceability fee for tin and wolfram is USD 130 per ton and for coltan is 180 per ton. 
Both the companies partake in mineral traceability and the government receives the money. 
However, one official that I interviewed told me that companies that do traceability get much 
more revenues from mineral export processes, even more than what the government earns 
and therefore they do not find it unfair. 
In the case of the Rutongo mines, some people are coming in the mines, stealing the minerals, 
and then leaving. Both the state and the companies have the issus of managing local citizens 
interests over minerals that put them in conflict with state and company security agencies. 
The RMB decided to decentralize the mining inspector technicians at the district level and 
increase involvement of the district ownership in mining and security control (interview in 
RMB, 2018). 
 
8.3.4. Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
  
Even though rules and standards exist in EAC, enforcement of these rules is challenging. 
First, the government and mining companies do not strictly respect what they agreed upon in 
the contracts. For instance, in Rwanda, the officials informed me that the mining companies 
did not put into practice the agreed upon local content that includes reparation of the road that 
joins Rutongo mines and the main tarmac road at Nyacyonga (one of the Kigali city main 
road that join Uganda and Rwanda at Gatuna). This is a government priority since it is very 
convenient for locals and miners and comprises almost 16 kms of road from the mining zone 
to the tarmac road. The company agreed to repair the road to facilitate their developmental 
contribution, but as yet they have not done so (see the photo in annex). 
 However, companies in Rwanda do participate in CSR, though the planning and structure 
does not exist since it is done at a local leader request or the good will of company leaders. 
The Rutongo mine paid school fees to hundreds of local pupils of poor families. The 
company also gave several cows to poor families in the Girinka Munyarwanda programme, 
the one-cow-per-family program was initiated to boost up household nutrition. The company 
manager also affirms that the company provides job opportunities for genocide widows. 
Given the rates of poverty in rural areas in the mining vicinity, President Kagame requested 
that at least 5 percent of the mineral income would stay in local vicinities to boost the 
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livelihoods of local people, a case that applies to the tourism industry. However, this is still a 
project according to RMB officials.  
In an interview, the informant agreed that people at least benefit from jobs and affirm that the 
CSR depend on the will of the company leader: 
“Apart from being employed in mines, they get their daily bread from there, they 
build houses from the earned money, they buy domestic animals. That is what they 
benefit from mining industry. If they have something that they discussed with the 
government to do in this area, we don’t really know. Even, I think they are not the 
ones who built those schools. … the first white man (referring to the first company 
manager) had provided pupils with school fees, but this one did not do so, … yeah! 
He used to pay the school fees for pupils. He paid the school fees for pupils who come 
from the poor families, …around 70 pupils. (Interview in Rwanda, April 2018). 
In short, CSR was low in the mining areas, roads were still muddy and there was no real 
direct support for local issues especially schooling (see document and photos annex).  
 
8.3.5. Taxation and distribution 
 
Moreover, the company did not eagerly pay tax and loyalties to the state as required since, 
according to the officials, the company always declares annual losses to avoid corporate 
income tax, which is 30% of the annual income. Corporate income tax is hardly recoverable 
since it is paid on the income declaration of the company. The company declares an annual 
loss to evade income tax, it pays, however, others easily recoverable tax including VAT. 
According to one of mining advisors in RMB, the country is getting tax from minerals: “The 
taxes given are so many. The money we received is in dollars, which is transmitted through 
the National Bank of Rwanda. You understand that is an advantage which we have – that is 
tax I wanted to say” (interview, 2018). 
Some of the tax (the VAT) is now being paid by the sub-contractor’s companies. One of the 
sub-company leaders said that he owes the government 50.000.000 of tax and that he used to 
pay 20,000,000 per month and that this frustrated him. The tax accumulated because he was 
not used to paying it before and therefore did not declare it on time. It has become a new duty 
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since the taxes were mainly paid by the Rutongo mine, but the company managers 
decentralized VAT duties to the sub-contractors.  
The sub-contractors do not have the right to bargain and decisions including tax payment are 
dictated to them. This makes it hard for the state to hold the MNCs accountable and 
transparent in taxation since the duty is transferred to locals and in that period of uncertainty, 
government do not fix who is responsible to pay what. The local subcontractors receive huge 
amounts due on the government tax bill and then struggle to claim a reduction of the amount 
in court.  
While sub-contractors are second range labour according to the code of labour, as one of the 
sub-contractors mentioned, the company take them as responsible owners. However, as they 
responded, they cannot set up rules and regulations and the bargain over price of minerals 
they produce are dictated by them. Therefore, they have the business right to operate as 
companies, but decisions are dictated: 
“They do not accept our bargaining in terms of pricing. They only sit down, they 
calculate the profits to be made and then they fix the price for 1 kg of minerals; that is 
what they decide and tell us the price. When you try to negotiate, they call off the 
discussion by saying to act accordingly. That is why we immediately say “thanks” and 
then we cannot leave without further negotiations. So, you cannot leave your job 
because another person will replace you immediately after. You have nothing else to 
do, so you keep silent. (Interview with one of sub-contractors, April 2018).    
Not only does the country not know the annual declaration of income, they do not even know 
the amount of money invested in the area. Asking about this issue, the officer told me that 
this amount is unknown, and the trace does not exist in any national bank institution. “I asked 
people, they told me that the company money put into the investment business is unknown, 
they do not know where it’s gone or there is no institution through which to check how the 
money is used or whether it was sent in the right way because, if you don’t follow the 
regulation of law, you are not good businessman” (interview, 2018). For the informant, the 
necessary thing is that the company creates jobs, however, as said earlier it is crucial to also 
look at the fair treatment of workers. The official told me that the threshold of the basic salary 
for the Rutongo mine is around 5000frw – or 5 Euro per month for those who did not get 
chance to find minerals, which is not enough to sustain a good standard of living. Casual 
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workers or supporters of miners get 30,000 frw per month almost equal to the poverty line of 
$1USD a day and some even have families.  
In short, even though collections of tax happen, the distribution of money to the mining 
vicinity is low, and the infrastructure benefit is also too low. This is a challenge for the 
government and the mining companies.   
 
8.4. Summary 
 
This chapter has highlighted three major parts, the first was the assessment of probability of a 
resource curse in Rwanda. The second was the mining practice with the case of Rutongo tin 
mines. The third were the challenges that Rwanda has in terms of regulation and benefit of 
the mining sector.  
The approach used to get information was through interviews with the Rwanda Mining 
Boards and a two weeks desk research, as well as fieldwork visits to the Tutongo tin mine. 
These include interviews with directors and senior officials in charge of exploration, 
production, inspection, mining cadastre office and auditing in RMB and the company 
managers, traceability officers and miners in the Rutongo tin mine.  
On the case of whether Rwanda has a resource curse, the data shows that due to institutions 
and existing governance achievements, Rwanda has no resource curse at higher level because 
of at least basic human right of the local people including limitation of mining scandals 
including rape and violence between local people and company. However, there is aspect of 
economic resource curse when we talk about miners’ salaries; redistribution; infrastructure in 
mining vicinity; the economic share of the local stakeholder especially the local people; 
enclave character in mining due to the subsidiarity and sub-contracting effects at local levels; 
tax evasion, inequality and labour right in the mines.  
The good thing is that such mining malpractices occurred in only one company among other 
many as highlighted by the officials in RMB, but more research may be open to other 
companies and metal cites as well in order to prove that official facts. The interview 
conducted in RMB shows that only one company, the Rutongo mines, is showing the case of 
mining malpractices whilst several others are working well and respecting standards. There 
was no violation of human rights that take the lives of people after mining accidents in 
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mining tunnel spots. The enforcement of the law has managed to curb the struggle between 
mineral revenues and political elites.    
However, the case of Rwanda shows that the country is affected with a regional resource 
curse, due to a similar geology and resource endowment. As a Kibalan belt region, the 
Central East Africa mainly east Congo, Burundi, west Tanzania and southwest Uganda are 
metal mines. More cases of mineral conflicts were reported since the Congo war I and Congo 
war II in which Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda were involved from 1996 to 2003. Given the 
regional geopolitics and the situation of Rwanda, domestic stability and efforts to abide by 
the traceability mechanism is not a guarantee of a regional resource curse as, so far only 
Rwanda and Zambia are trying to follow rules. The region is unstable with several rebels, 
including Rwandans who operate in east Congo and have connections in Uganda and 
Burundi, getting financed and weapons through the exchange of minerals, with some regional 
and international support. Which makes Rwanda and the other states susceptible to becoming 
resource curses despite the relative stability and peace in Rwanda since the end of 1990s.  
Even though there is no resource curse in Rwanda, mining malpractices occur. The research 
highlights issues of corporate income tax evasion, especially due to declaration of loss and 
transfer pricing in the case of Rutongo Mine. Moreover, violations of labour rights of miners 
occurred due to sub-contracting. All these affect national revenues and the labour rights of 
miners. The company’s sub-contract with local miners enables them to hire a larger number 
of miners but pay them little since part of their salaries are said to pay for digging materials 
offered by the Rutongo mine. Sub-contractors directly control workers, but they do not have a 
say in designing the production and benefit of minerals – this appears to be a case of labour 
exploitation. The mother company does not provide health insurance or other labour rights 
and some of the casual workers are not even registered for other insurances.  
Even though the company provided CSR such as paying school fees for poor students, 
participating in 12 years basic education by providing 5 million Rwf, which can build at least 
one classroom, CSR in the country is still poor and disorganised. CSR progammes are not 
integrated into company policy and are only provided upon request from government 
officials. The local involvement is still low especially in terms of infrastructure like roads 
which remain muddy and unrepaired.  
The government still has challenges to regulate the mining sector and to make it more 
profitable to the community and country. They must first access information on the 
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international market to regulate taxation and value of 3Ts instead of relying on MNCs data. 
The second is providing transport facilities, infrastructure and enhancing local processing to 
add value to the mineral income. The third is enhancing local benefit. Organising CSR and 
local activities of MNCs in a more planned manner and taxation and redistribution to locals 
and especially near mines to curb smuggling cases.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter consists of the discussion and conclusion of this research on regulation of 
mining in East African Community in the context of globalisation. The discussion and 
conclusion draw on an outcome of assessments on cases of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.  
In the discussion we debate the results of the research in the context of existing knowledge in 
resource governance and regulation, especially the resource curse hypothesis, globalisation 
and sovereignty effect in the mining sector, the enclave economies in mining and the 
implementation of the global and local mining standards and acts. The conclusion includes a 
summary of the research outcome, the theoretical, methodological and practical implication 
of the research, its limitations and future research areas. 
 
9.1. Discussion 
 
9.1.1. Discussion on resource curse case in EAC 
 
There is a probability of a resource curse in the EAC member states even though levels differ 
from country to country. This comes in the form of an economic and political resource curse. 
For an economic resource curse, we see that the mining sector since liberalisation, in 1997 in 
case of Tanzania and the early 2000s in case of Uganda and Rwanda, has not contributed to 
the social and economic development of member states in the level it should be if we 
consider the unexploited endowment opportunities in the case of Uganda and lost 
opportunities of revenue collection in the case of Tanzania for almost 20 years since 
liberalisation. In the case of Rwanda, there is no economic resource curse at national level 
due to good collection of tax and royalty and anti-corruption measures, only fews cases 
related to income and labour rights of miners increase the effect of enclave character 
especially in Rulindo District where there is vibrant economic effect mining despite the long 
history in tin mining. Infrastructure is poor in mining vicinities. 
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In the case of Tanzania, despite the share of mineral export at 33% of total exports, the 
mineral revenues were affected by tax evasion and under-declaration of quantity and quality 
of mineral exports as well as internal corruption in resource management. Multinational 
companies have been trying all means to evade both tax and local developmental obligations. 
Government officials were also involved in corruption with MNCs, which undermined the 
collection of tax.  
The EAC economic resource curse is indicated by low levels of human capital development 
and manufacturing in all three cases. There is still considerably more reliance on the mineral 
export than manufactured goods, especially in that case of Tanzania and Rwanda. The mining 
sector still plays an important role in exports, with at least over 30 percent (in the case of 
Rwanda and Tanzania) and follows non-tradeable sectors such as services. There has been a 
delay in the manufacturing sector due to an overreliance on mineral revenues but, since the 
mid-2010s both Rwanda and Tanzania have embarked on manufacturing. However, this has 
been at a low pace compared to Uganda which started earlier after the copper and cobalt 
industry in Kilembe collapsed in the 1980s. In the case of Tanzania, reforms in 
manufacturing and in industrial policy orientation came with reforms in mining sector in 
2015, and in Rwanda reforms in manufacturing and industrial policy began first in 2007 after 
integration in the EAC and also in the mid-2010s with the “made-in-Rwanda policy” (see 
MINICOM, December 2017). However, EAC member states still have predominance of AIP 
(Autarchic Industrial Policy) rather than export based industrial policy and the export is still 
dominated by minerals, cash crops such as coffee and tea, cotton and other non-processed 
raw materials. The overreliance on mineral exports is leading to Dutch disease, which has 
already affected Tanzania and Rwanda.  
Despite the advancement of the industry in Uganda, especially in agro-processing, the 
research shows that loans and budget allocations associated with huge investments in the oil 
industry have a strong effect on the country’s economy. Besides, illegal mineral trading from 
both local and neighbouring territories, particularly the eastern DRC weakened the pace of 
development of the mining industry domestically and manufacturing industry locally. ASM 
occupies almost 90 percent of mining activities in Uganda, however it too brings with it 
problems of organisation, tax collection, as well as using children as labour. This weakens 
not only the sector but also the social conditions of development as far as education is 
concerned.   
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Uganda does not have a case of Dutch disease because it delayed the development of its 
mining industry and gave advantage to its manufacturing industry earlier. There has been an 
advancement of industry as a supplement to copper exports, but these nascent industries have 
started to decline due to other factors including, the domestic and regional market and, the 
political and economic environment. It has been clear that since 2008 that the economy of 
Uganda has become stagnant and slowed down due to domestic political issues between 
elites, the weakening of democracy, and decision making which has affected aid-giving to the 
country after emergence of rules sanctioning homosexuality, as well as revelations of corrupt 
bureaucracy.  
The EAC member states also have a political resource curse especially related to mineral 
rents and the shadow state. As Collier and Hoeffler noted, there is lack of resource 
distribution to the people. Since the extraction of gold, Tanzanite, tin and diamond, we find 
that the life and conditions of the people have not changed, as observed in local mining 
vicinity: no paved roads, no improvements in infrastructure and sometimes, no differences for 
populations without mineral access, all the EAC cases that we have focussed on look similar 
in this context. Projects of redistribution of mineral revenues to local people are stipulated in 
mining codes and policies but are not enforced and implemented in an efficient way. 
Consequently, we see the emergence of forms of violence in case of Tanzania mines and 
Uganda, need for territorial cession in case of Uganda, and smuggling in case of Rwanda’s 
mining vicinities. Forms of conflict in the sector are motivated by high levels of poverty and 
a lack of distribution whereby people look for livelihood alternatives. Such cases of conflict 
can easily break out into violence or protests, as indicated by the cases of North Mara gold 
and cobalt mine in Tanzania and the western Ugandan cession movement and protests. In 
Rwanda, the increase of local people in smuggling of tin in the Rutongo mines is a sign of 
greed related conflict (see the appendix of reported suspects that the company handed to 
police).    
However, we see progress in the integrating of local small-scale miners into large-scale 
mining by including them as paid company workers (see Rutongo mine case) and formalising 
the previously informal small-scale miners (Case of Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda). 
However, apart from the small-scale miners and those who can rush in and smuggle minerals, 
the rest of the citizens in mining vicinity do not benefit at all from mining deals – this creates 
a will to demand for redistribution.  
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Moreover, EAC members states have managed to contain resource-financed conflict 
internally, at least for internal factions or rebellion. Most of the resource-financed factions 
find refuge in eastern DRC where we find rebels from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. There 
are no internal factions in EAC domestic territory financed by minerals in the cases we 
assessed. However, conflict between the states has occurred related to minerals trading, 
smuggling and transportation, as illustrated in the conflict between DRC and Uganda for 
illicit gold and timber smuggling; conflict between Tanzania, India and Kenya on gold and 
Tanzanite smuggling and conflict between Uganda and Rwanda on mineral transportation. 
The effect especially on Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi is that the conflict is predominantly 
political and involves trade including minerals, facts that trigger a regional resource curse.   
The EAC member states have institutional problems in resource governance. Mining policies 
are overcentralised, and government leaders have a direct hand in mining, unlike the people 
and established institutions such as parliament, revenue authorities and auditing offices. 
Local government officials and some agents like the police have mostly been leaning on the 
side of MNCs to coerce local people and force them to abandon their territories without 
rational compensation. Such cases happened mostly in Hoima in Uganda and North Mara in 
Tanzania.  
Peaceful communication and negotiation between elites is made difficult by the occurrence of 
violence or career sanctions against those who try to speak out against mining malpractices 
(see cases of MP Zitto Kabwe, and MP Tundu Lisu in Tanzania). This highlights a serious 
issue with how public institutions work in the sector in the EAC.  
In the context of people’s livelihood, not only were they deprived of the right to land but also 
in some cases they were violently attacked when trying to return to harvest crops or to 
participate in artisanal mining in the place in which they used to reside. In the absence of 
redistribution of mineral revenues to people in the mining vicinity, and meagre salaries and 
uneven job contracts, especially in the Rutongo mine, and in the land compensation 
mechanism in Uganda and Tanzania, we can say that the extractive industry has negative 
effects on the ground.  
Political institutions have been leaning on companies to show that institutions of EAC 
member states, especially after liberalisation, have been inclusive in character. This was done 
to counterbalance previous characters of authoritarianism and a lack of institutional checks 
and balances. Political elites have had a culture of “art of associating together” as Samuel 
 189 
 
Huntington (1965) discusses; in the sense that groups of ruling elites control both political 
power and economic activities of the country while excluding local populations in poor 
mining vicinities. Such an association was pro-MNCs, and seriously against other groups 
including opposition, media and NGOs that were demanding a change in the status quo in 
mining. The “art of association” also evolved around dominant party systems in EAC 
member states and allowed the creation of central organisations that monopolised mineral 
resources.  
The level of corruption in the mining sector, embezzlement in budgets oriented to the mining 
sector and evasion of tax, display examples of subjugation of formal organisation such as 
states and its institutions to informal channels of mining regulation. This puts EAC member 
states at risk of becoming “shadow state”. The major characteristic of these shadow states in 
the EAC is that they are focussed on the struggle for political power.  It is just this orientation 
to power that causes mineral resources to be used as a means to power in elections, therefore 
not just for personal enrichment but also to extend and entrench elite power and contain 
opposition forces. It is crucial to note that the liberalisation of mining in the EAC contributed 
to institutional stability of extraction rather than to institutional stability of inclusion and 
modernisation. Central and political organisations have managed to increase their power and 
have benefitted greatly from the sector, just like the MNCs but to the detriment of many local 
and national citizens. This situation further weakens the societies ability to transition to a 
democratic process, as the mining investments continue to foster social and political 
exclusion and inequality. This is confirmed by the arguments of Ross (2001, p. 357), who 
states that mineral rents retard democracy; this is happening for the EAC states but in this 
instance with valuable metals like gold, tin, tantalum, copper and cobalt.  
EAC member states have also suffered from the repression effect especially in the case of 
Tanzania. As mentioned above, the Tanzanian government exercised repression against the 
opposition who requested mineral reform. We see some other forms of repression in other 
cases.   
We concur with Basedau (2005) who argues that resources are not a curse pe se and that 
socio economic, resource conditions and political situations in any given society matters. 
MNCs conform to the host states’ conditions and global position and value of certain types of 
resources – 3TGs, cobalt and oil in this case. Gold-cobalt concentrate extraction has 
complicated the situation in Tanzania, more so than metals in Rwanda and the nascent oil 
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industry in Uganda, which is fouling the political and economic landscape of the country 
more than before. However, the research does not criticize the type of resource concept of 
Basedau (2005) but supplements the idea by highlighting that types do not matter much but 
the revenues and position of wealth of certain minerals in the global and local markets. The 
country leans to the resource that accrues more revenues and rent than others. Tanzania has 
different types of minerals but an overemphasis on the gold revenues has caused the state to 
dismiss the development of other minerals such as diamond, cool, silver and tin. However, 
the position of gold and cobalt in the world strategic value has distorted the regulation of 
mines in Tanzania. Therefore, oil, cobalt and gold are more sensitive to a resource curse due 
to their value and use, which is why Tanzania has a higher probability of being a resource 
curse. Other sensitive and strategic minerals are 3Ts, which also mean that Rwanda could be 
more sensitive to a curse, the same is also true of Uganda.  
Institutionally, countries that had high levels of corruption in internal bureaucracy were easily 
cheated by MNCs in terms of evasion of tax and other forms of mining malpractices. Uganda 
and Tanzania have been very corrupt internally, which has thwarted proper regulation of the 
sector than was the case in Rwanda, which is relatively less corrupt among the EAC. This 
confirms the argument of Basedau (2005) that local conditions matter.  
Other values and norms internally matter, for instance the general culture surrounding human 
rights, children rights and property rights. The level of rape and human rights abuse for local 
citizens that occurred in Tanzania and Uganda mining did not occur in Rwanda. The reason is 
that sanctions of such crimes are heavily enforced in Rwanda, more so than in any other EAC 
member state, meaning that public and private security organisations are aware of these 
sanctions. 
 
9.1.2. Discussion on globalisation and sovereignty in mining sector of EAC 
 
Globalisation has influenced the EAC mining sector especially in relation to increasing 
plurality in state sovereignty as Agnew (2009) argued, enclaving and new forms of extractive 
industry, which includes subsidiary companies and subcontracting. There are forms of 
enclaving in gold and tin mines especially, however, these forms of enclaving are mostly 
different from the Ferguson definition of offshore oil model of enclaves. The reason is that 
though MNCs display an enclave character in extraction, there are lot of possibilities for local 
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people to rush in other gold and metal sites, which has increased shared opportunities on 
resources even though the extractive capabilities differ much from industrial MNCs to artisan 
mining of ASMs. Oil is exclusively industrial and the effect of an oil enclave whether 
offshore and onshore is greater than gold and metal mine enclaves, especially when the state 
allows ASMs to carry out mining activities.  
 
9.1.2.1. Plurality in state sovereignty of the mining sector in EAC 
 
Multinational companies increased in the EAC territory and at large scale, Tanzania has a big 
number of multinationals that are strong and recognised worldwide including Barrick Gold, 
Anglo Gold Ashanti and Tanzanite One. Uganda as well, despite the low level of large-scale 
industrial mining, has taken on CNOOC in oil exploration who leads the consortium that 
includes Total and Tullow Oil. In Rwanda, there are different companies investing in 3Ts 
including TINCO and WMP. Not only in metals, oil and gemstones, but also in gas has the 
EAC received foreign investment and these inflows of MNCs influence state sovereignty as 
they share the former hegemony of states over territorial control of mineral rich zones.   
However, as the research shows, this pluralism is not working well, especially as gradually 
states continued to lose both mineral rents and legitimacy, especially in the case of Tanzania 
and Uganda because the impact of the mining in these two cases is too low while the mining 
malpractices and corruption are too high. Working pluralism in political ecology means that 
actors involved share costs and, benefit from the resource in the environment. However, the 
state and MNCs have been playing a big role in the mining space, more than local people and 
ASMs. This is true for the state especially since mining liberalisation at the end of 1990s in 
Tanzania and early 2000s for Rwanda, but as discussed below, states gradually lost their 
position in the mining space especially in terms of maximising rents. The Mining laws aimed 
at attracting MNCs with minimised tax burdens facilitated this decline in the state’s position 
during the liberalisation processes.. Besides,I concur with James Ferguson (2006) that 
companies have been able to manage the security of the territorial zones and sometime with 
states security agents. It was clear that in the case of Tanzania for instance, companies did not 
only influence security measures in the mines and surroundings but also involved public 
security in mining scandals. At some level, companies were in negotiation with officials and 
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in some cases bribing officials to facilitate extraction and export of unprocessed minerals (see 
case of Uganda for instance).  
In Rwanda pluralism in territorial sovereignty worked relatively well, it worked because the 
government was able to efficiently share and balance the control of mineral rich territory with 
other actors including MNCs, global organisations and enforced the implementation of global 
and local mining standards in mines. To create a balance, the government deployed security 
forces near the mines, which helped to maintain balance between MNCs and the local people 
but also limited violence between local people and the company security guards. Moreover, 
interviews with officials shows that most companies in Rwanda comply with state and 
international regulations and, both state and companies share the control of the resource 
territory peacefully. This is different in Uganda because the government utilizes foreign 
forces to control mining rich zones and, the exploration and extraction of minerals and oil has 
not yet materialized tangible economic results. Similarly, Tanzanian companies in the mining 
sector have been thriving but, as they generally do not comply with either local or 
international standards. Additionally, the state has been weak in controlling and managing the 
security and property rights of people and MNCs in mineral rich zones. However, progress 
has been seen since 2015 under President Magufuli.  
 
9.1.2.2. Enclave economies in mining of the EAC 
 
Companies use advanced technologies in extractive industries in Tanzanian gold and metal 
mines, especially those which save time and labour. Such cases occurred in Acacia mining in 
Buryanhulu and North Mara mines.  This occurs alongside ever-increasing demands for a 
share in revenues and better redistribution for the population.  
Mines are located in remote areas that are economically poor and have almost no 
infrastructure. In the case of Bulyanhulu for instance, people had to travel 20 km to get to 
health services, the mine owned by Barrick Gold started in 1999 after it was purchased from 
Sutton Resources. However, it was not until 2019 that the company started to contribute by 
donating materials to build dispensaries in Nyang’hwale District in 32 villages. The company 
donated 67.8 million Tsh and committed 500 million to the completion of the project. Access 
to health services in that district is about 22% (Matowo, 11 February 2019).  Still, the local 
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developmental effect is meagre as state institutions, local organisations and MNCs applied 
the enclave character from earlier.   
The same is true of North Mara, people still live in poverty and the company (Acacia) has not 
repaired the problem created in this mine in relation to local people. This is the trigger for 
most cases of conflict and anger in the sector. The first effect of the enclave economy in 
North Mara was violence in 2014, where hundreds of people invaded the mines and risked 
the shooting from company security guards and Tanzanian police forces. Acacia security 
guards and police agents were involved in the killing of several hundred people, international 
human rights agent including NGOs from Canada and UK highlighted that almost 300 people 
were killed in the mining vicinities since Acacia started mining in Tanzania in 2001. There 
have also been incidences of rape reported in North Mara.    
Instead of engaging in corporate social responsibility and local content, Large Scale Mining 
in Tanzania does little for sustainable development. Only the case of Anglo-Gold Ashanti, a 
company that carries out gold mining in the Geita region, shows tangible activities in 
supporting the local school, contributing to education, and the livelihood of people in Geita. 
There are three reasons for that: firstly, AngloGold Ashanti has more experience in mining in 
Africa than Acacia. Acacia only operates in Tanzania and is a subsidiary company, while 
AngloGold Ashanti operates on 21 sites throughout the world as the main company. This has 
ensured a professional relationship between the company and local population. Second, the 
geological component of minerals was more specific in Geita than in North Mara and 
Bulyanhulu. In Geita the company extracts only gold, which is easy to trace and quantify. 
Whilst in North Mara, the company extracts both gold and copper concentrate, this enables 
them to cheat in quantification by having containers hold both gold and copper. Third, 
AngloGold Ashanti is not a subsidiary company like Acacia, which is a subsidiary of Barrick 
Gold. Subsidiarity is a new form of organisation for extractive industries that exacerbates the 
negative effect of the industry, as Ferguson (2006) argues. The company works under loans 
from its main company and under the pressure of maximisation of profits putting all the risks 
at the local level. Moreover, the subsidiary companies have little concern for the market and 
legitimacy in the international market as they work for and sell to the mother company, which 
has access to the international market. 
The indirect relationship of the main company to its subsidiary causes harm in host societies 
because the mother company only focuses on production, not the local society. This 
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happened in the case of Barrick Gold; the company listed Tanzanian mines controlled by 
Acacia in London Stock Exchange with estimated market value of $3.7 billion USD but 
actually did not consider or properly manage reparations and malpractices of the Acacia mine 
on the ground. On the contrary, the Geita mine owned by AngloGold Ashanti, which is not a 
subsidiary, has had an impact in the development of the city of Geita and has relatively 
minimum cases of tax evasion and mining malpractices. The report from the government and 
the EITI-Tanzania also recognises such contribution of Anglo-Gold Ashanti. However, this is 
only one company among many in Tanzania with a relatively good reputation and good 
mining-practices. 
Subsidiarity is a major problem in mineral resource governance in Africa and especially in 
the EAC. The case of Acacia in Tanzania and TINCO in Rwanda, as well as the Tibet Hima 
Company in Uganda, indicate the inefficiencies and harm of subsidiary companies in 
extractive industries. Moreover, subsidiary companies increase the issue of transfer pricing. 
Transfer pricing means rules and methods governing pricing and transactions within 
companies under common ownership or common control of properties. Subsidiarity comes 
with the problem of inequality in the ownership of mines whereby most main companies 
control the subsidiary up to and beyond majority shares of 60% (case of Barrick Gold and 
Acacia in Tanzania).  
Such control enables the main company to exercise indirect control of remote subsidiary in 
the peripheral mineral rich territories without being accountable to the operations in the 
periphery. Such unequal contracting (fiduciary principle) is different from the equal 
relationship of companies with the same ownership (arm’s length principle). In such fiduciary 
contracting, subsidiary companies are like guards of properties or mines, while the main 
companies are the rentier. In the EAC we see such relationships, for example in the case of 
Rwanda, where the Rutongo company looks like a guard company.  
Moreover, this research finds out that there is a new form of organisation in the extractive 
industry that facilitates cheating and irresponsibility within companies on the ground, this is 
subcontracting. Through the creation of sub-contracting at the local level, the subsidiary 
companies create other sub-subsidiaries through enabling a nominal autonomy of the local 
company which sign a contract with a subsidiary (see case of Rutongo mine in Rwanda). This 
system allows a contracting company, especially composed of one person (sub-contractor), to 
collect rent from miners and mineral production for the subsidiary company on the ground. 
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The latter becomes both a guard company, for the main company internationally, and the 
rentier company locally. At the same time, the sub-contractors appear like mineral guards and 
at the same time “mineral production lord” at the local level with direct control of a large 
number of miners and support teams who work in poor conditions with low salaries and 
insecure working contract.  
Enclaving in Rwandan mining, especially in the Rutongo mine, is not related to oil enclaves 
where the company monopolises the mining space due to technological conditions that is 
exclusively for the company or offshore distancing from the villages. Enclaving in Rwandan 
mines is more related to the organisation of the extraction, as explained above. The company 
has a lot of mines around the inhabited mountains of Masoro, Murambi and Shyorongi 
sectors in the Rulindo district. Even though the company has private security guards, it was 
difficult to deploy them in all mining surroundings and, in private properties it is always hard 
to stop entrances. The company is integrated with the local people, using both artisan, and 
mechanised mining, and employing many miners and support team. The company of Rutongo 
employs 4000 people but they neglect vital organisational aspects – on the payment system 
and labour rights. As discussed in the case of Rwanda, smuggling has been one of the ways 
of countering such enclaving.  
At the national level, forms of enclaving happen through subsidiary systems. Subsidiarity 
systems allow a mother company to buy minerals extracted by the sister company cheaply. 
Through this process, corruption, evasion of tax and other mining malpractices happen 
because the price at the local level is minimized, while the subsidiary operates directly with 
national elites who control some percentage of the national shares (sometime 25% of the total 
shares). The involvement of the local agents in administration allows the company to have 
local legitimacy but also to be free from administrative failures and corruption that happen 
locally through the employment and treatment of local miners. What the MNC does is it 
focuses on the mineral being produced and not necessarily on how it was produced.  
Other forms of enclaving include a lack of tangible local commodities to sell to MNCs in the 
EAC. In the case of Rwanda, even materials for blasting are imported. However, the 
company did not want to invest in infrastructure, instead they chose to use existing 
infrastructure rather than creating or building anew. This form of enclaving happens because 
the company has no need for settlement or integration, which in turn effects the repatriation 
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of revenues and local development. There is also quite a difference in the salaries of 
expatriate workers and local employees.  
 
9.1.3. Discussion on implementation of global mining and national mining acts 
  
The implementation of global standards in the EAC has many challenges, the first is the lack 
of harmony of mining laws in the whole EAC territory. Tanzania is a member of EITI while 
others are not yet a member of the international organisation. Though all EAC member states 
are in ICGLR traceability mechanism, only Rwanda follows the traceability rules, others only 
follow reluctantly. This causes problems in the regional trading of minerals as some abide in 
traceability rules while other do not. During fieldwork, Tanzania showed a need and will to 
embark on the traceability mechanism in both tin and gold.  
Companies are starting to understand the relevance of CSR but there are no annual plans for 
CSR projects. The companies generally participate in CSR at the request of local government 
authorities. In addition, enforcement of global standards occurs mainly in Rwanda in 3Ts and 
follows ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Franks Acts guidelines. These enforcements are binding 
and induce sanctions of market access. Though binding and costly to comply with, the state 
and MNCs follow these rules because of the serious effect they have on mining. They work 
through hybrid and multilevel governance, the former through private companies doing 
traceability and tagging and the other through the help of global institutions in capacity 
buildings such as DFID and GIZ.  
However, global mining acts still do little to enforce redistribution of resources to the local 
people, traceability and tagging do not benefit local people at all. They only help to 
harmonise interests of big players in mining, these being the state, MNCs, and global powers. 
EITI has standards that request the transfer of revenues to people but in Tanzania where it 
operates, the transfer of mineral revenues to local people appears difficult, as shown in 
different reports of EITI and the national budgeting of Tanzania. For Uganda, it is even worse 
because the country has neither EITI binding rules nor embraces the traceability rules for 
ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Frank Acts mining regulations.  
Inclusion and formalisation of ASMs started in most of the EAC member states. However, 
there are problems with the proper organisation of ASMs in EAC mining which must be 
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addressed, so that they can play a role in national revenues, respect formal rules, labour 
rights, and protect the environment. In Tanzania and Uganda, ASMs employ many miners 
and contribute to economic and social livelihoods. 
National mining acts work with challenges of politicisation of mining in the region. Too 
much involvement of the political and military elites in the enforcement of mining acts distort 
the normal procedures of enforcement. For instance, in case of Tanzania, the president has a 
direct say on mining activities and is allowed to stop any mining activity without necessarily 
recurring to organisational procedures. Companies also choose to talk to senior leadership in 
matters of the enforcement of domestic mining acts, more than people in charge in the 
Ministries and Boards of mining regulations. This puts the sector at risk of corruption and 
favouritism, and more subjugation of laws into the bargain of MNC and political elite. 
However, in recent reforms, especially in Tanzania, we see positive outcomes in the will of 
companies to follow regulations especially in reworking on CSR as mentioned above in the 
case of Bulyanhulu.  
 
9.2. Conclusion 
 
The liberalisation of mining in the EAC started at the end of the 1990s and since then, the 
effect of global mining investment to social, political and economic development has 
remained low. Instead, we see the probability of a resource curse in the member states and in 
the whole region. Especially in the case of Tanzania, there have been little benefits from the 
extractive industry since the country opened it mines in 1997, despite a huge investment in 
gold and metal in resource rich region from Central and the North West, surrounding Lake 
Victoria. On the contrary, tax evasion occurred through the under declaration of mineral 
quantities and through corruption. There were cases of violence in the mining vicinity and 
conflicts opposing MNCs and local populations, repression of opposition by political elites, 
especially those who were requesting mining sector reform. There is also a probability of a 
resource curse in Rwanda as well, related to the redistribution of mineral resource revenues to 
people, lack of basic salary to miners and treatment of workers, and lack of local content in 
general, including infrastructure.  
There have been forms of enclaving in all the EAC member states but ASMs have reduced 
their detrimental effect. In the case of Uganda, the mining sector is mostly artisan except for 
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the nascent oil industry in west Uganda, which is also causing a lot of problems associated to 
harmonising the MNCs consortium who invest in the oil project. The government has taken a 
lot of risk in the oil industry and have been investing a lot in the sector, delaying benefits for 
the rest of society. There is also a close association of political elites and companies, which 
has undermined transparency and accountability in the Ugandan mining project. The country 
is receiving loans from China and France, related mostly to oil development projects – 
countries that are leading in the oil industry projects in Uganda, this creates more of a risk of 
indebtedness amidst a poor population. 
As is clear in the cases highlighted above, mining standards and acts are working in different 
ways among EAC member states.  In some cases, we find more forms of hybridity and multi-
level mining regulations (case of Rwanda) while in other cases we find formal mining acts, 
overpassed by forms of informal mechanisms of acting or states agents working in a private 
way, this fosters corruption (case of Uganda and Tanzania). Therefore, we see that mining 
regulation in the context of globalisation works better in Rwanda than in Uganda and 
Tanzania, even though there have been problems in the mines of a small number of 
companies. The malfunctioning of regulation in Tanzania accrues the probability of a 
resource curse, as do mining scandals and missed development opportunities by the mining 
companies. In Uganda, the dysfunction of regulation thwarts the development of the mineral 
industry, increases mining scandals, and threatens people’s benefit and territorial sovereignty. 
In short, the mining industry in the EAC member states does not benefit the local and 
national society in general and the local people in the mining vicinity, this fosters in turn 
anger, conflict and violence.  
 
9.2.1. Implication of research 
 
This research has both theoretical, methodological and practical implications. The theoretical 
implication is that there is a difference in oil enclaves and that of gold and metals in sub-
Saharan Africa. The difference is that in gold and metals, even though local people do not 
profit from this situation made by government or companies, they can easily recur to artisan 
mining to supplement their income. 
However, the management of MNCs and local artisan miners always brings in problems 
because both want to exercise influence and interest at the local level. Mostly local people are 
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exclusively interested in livelihoods in the EAC, they demand changes in this area and not, 
for example, the preservation of cultural heritage in mining zones. This is quite a different 
case for Karma in Burkina Faso (see Werthmann and Ayeh, 2017) where the locals are 
concerned with the preservation of cultural heritage in mining areas and resisted company 
and states orders as a form of protest. This research also rejects the notion of national 
sovereignty over resource rich territories by highlighting that this notion does not exist in the 
cases of the EAC member states, especially in the case of Tanzania and Rwanda. The 
research concurs with Agnew (2009), and Emel, Huber and Makene (2011); there are always 
shares of authority and hegemon over resource rich zones with other different actors 
including MNCs, global powers, and global and regional organisations. What we do not see 
is much space in mining for local organisations apart from ASMs and international NGOs.  
In addition to that, EAC member states changed their position in the mining space. Before, 
they appeared to preference MNCs, who had the support of state agents, not only in licencing 
but also in committing malpractices. However, these days, states changed the course by 
regulating, repositioning and imposing themselves to ensure a space for the state in mining. 
This is shown by different processes such as (1) setting up new mining acts that allow the 
state a space in mining activities and more control (see mining reforms in Tanzania, 2016, 
2018 and new mining act in Rwanda which started since August 2018), creating public 
agencies that tightens the control of mining activities. However, research shows that self-
imposing of the state in the mining sector in the EAC aimed at looking for more space in 
mining activities rather than monopolising the entire space, as happened in 1970s and 1980s.  
The current respacing is therefore business friendly in mining but more oriented to collection 
of rents. For instance, in the case of Tanzania, the state has almost lost control of mining 
activity and therefore lost benefits in these activities at least from 2000 to 2015. As a 
response to that loss, the government threatened to close mines, to nationalise and control 
exports and tax collections. The government also imprisoned some of the workers of the 
MNCs who participated in violations of human rights to regain legitimacy, to prevent them 
from becoming a betrayer or bystander of the malpractices of MNCs. The state also 
formalised ASMs alongside other international organisations such as the World Bank, this 
was done with the aim of creating alternatives to LSMs. More interestingly, despite the 
seemingly strong reforms, none of the mines became non-operational or were nationalised, 
even Acacia continues to function. Instead, what we see is more shared frameworks and 
negotiations for benefits between the state and companies. What is not yet known is whether 
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this respacing and self-imposing of the EAC members states in mining will make a difference 
to the local and national benefit.  
The sovereignty regime that emerges here then is state-MNC sovereignty. This means the 
hegemon of MNCs and state agents in controlling the mining zones especially in the case of 
Tanzania and Uganda. However, in the case of Rwanda, we see forms of hybrid and 
multilevel sovereignty regimes or global sovereignty regimes, which means state agents, 
MNCs, and global private and inter-state institutions have a say and share in the control of 
mining activities. However, their appears to be no role for local organisations in the state-
global sovereignty in mines in Rwanda.  In all cases, especially in Tanzania and Uganda, 
companies and states can contain the people and the factions that claim to speak for the 
people who share and access the mines.  In short, the sovereign regime is different in Rwanda 
and the rest of EAC member states: in Rwanda it is a global-state sovereignty while in 
Tanzania and Uganda it is an MNC-state sovereignty.   
Methodologically, this research supports the political ecology approach in terms of focussing 
on the value and type of minerals that prompt resource conflicts and, in this context, the 
research highlights the relevance of a study of the 3TGs (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold), as 
was mentioned by the global institution involved in the regulation of mining in Central East 
Africa.   
The research also extends the stakeholder approach (see Werthmann and Ayeh, 2017). This 
approach focuses on the relationship between the MNC, state and local people to assess 
enclave economies in Burkina Faso’s gold mining. This research increases the scope by 
considering the stakeholder relationship between MNCs, states and local people but also 
between global powers involved, global agents and institutions such as EITI, ICGLR and 
OECD in the shaping of mining regulation in the EAC member states.  
While this research relies on the political ecology approach, it contributes to it by including 
the aspect of mining standards as an important factor in generating changes in the behaviour 
of actors in the EAC mining environment. The law has had implications and continues to 
have implications for mining in Africa. As the UN resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962 triggered 
the nationalisation of mines in Africa, the liberal laws of the 1990s triggered the opening-up 
of mining spaces. During the nationalisation period, MNCs, states and many local employees 
in the mines did not profit. In the liberal mining acts, MNCs and ruling elites benefitted but, 
the state, at the national level, and people did not. In the new mining acts, called post-liberal 
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laws or new global standards, people are claiming for a share in local and global forms of 
governance of mineral resources but this has faced several challenges: (1) State resistance 
and repositioning have increased and threaten a return to nationalisation. (2) Elite and 
bureaucracy have been increasingly inefficient in enforcing major standards such as those 
related to holding MNCs accountable and transparent and, collecting mineral revenues. (3) In 
this new era of mineral resource governance, we see that the local population is not 
benefiting, this has fostered much anger, protest and violence at the local level and remains a 
puzzle as the absence of accountable and transparent MNCs and state, creates a loophole in 
global mining enforcement preventing the local level from benefitting from fair distribution.   
We concur with the hypothesis of political ecology as argued in introduction: (1) 
opportunities and changes in the environment affect the society in different ways and social, 
political and economic differences induce an uneven distribution of cost and benefit. In the 
case of the EAC, this research shows that social, political and economic conditions have 
induced an accumulation of mineral rents for MNCs and ruling elites to the detriment of the 
local people in the mining vicinity. (2) Changes in the environment have induced changes in 
the political and economic status quo, and EAC member states not only changed their 
domestic politics but also foreign policies have been changing following metals, gold, and oil 
discoveries. These changes include a focus on the mining sector and delays in manufacturing 
and human development as seen in the case of Tanzania and Rwanda. This is due to an 
overreliance on mineral exports, an increase in political repression and delay in the creation 
of a proper democratic process and look-east policies. (3) Unequal distribution of costs and 
benefits increases or decreases pre-existing social and economic inequalities, and eventually 
change the power relationships (Bryant and Baily, 1997, p.28). This research agrees with that 
and highlights that in the case of EAC member states, unequal distribution of mineral 
revenues accrued revenues and powers of MNCs and increased social and economic 
inequalities and poverty in the region, especially in the mining vicinities.   
Practical implications include an emphasis on and harmonisation of international, regional 
standards with national, public and private mining regulations, as well as greater benefit, at 
least at the national level (see case of Rwanda). This is because increased traceability and 
value chain analysis prevents companies from hiding the quantity of minerals exported (see 
cases of ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Frank Act). Issues remain only with the analysis of real 
price and quality of the exported mineral, as there have been incidences of underestimation in 
all three countries. Analysis of these values require the establishment of transparent 
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laboratories instead of relying on company data which consequently has implications for 
taxation.  The establishment of state level mining laboratories and the introduction of an 
international level certification of mineral quality, such as ITA in case of tin, help all the 
value chain channels and provide both national and internationally shared benefits. 
Stakeholders share mining revenues as the production of minerals give a certain percentage 
share to these national and international certifying organs.  
The probability of a resource curse increases where states are more corrupt, and where 
political elites have no sense of democratic political competition. This supports the theory 
highlighted by Basedau (2005) that resources are not a curse per se, the country specific 
conditions also matter. The research highlights that the political condition is in fact 
paramount especially because of the politics in the institutional setting, agent behaviour and 
the implementation of laws. Regulatory processes become dysfunctional because of 
clientelism, corruption and rent seeking by ruling political parties. State institutions that 
would help the extractive industry to function in an accountable and transparent manner, such 
as the parliament, revenue authorities, government institutions including mining auditing, 
inspection and mining cadastre agencies, become subject to the will of political decision 
makers who are directly linked with MNCs.  
It is difficult to fight a resource curse or to achieve objectives of international and national 
mining regulation without first correcting internal governance issues. These include anti-
corruption mechanisms, and democratic governance in areas of freedom in institutional 
checks and balances, military and police professionalism and rigour in human rights 
(individual rights, and rights against abuses and rape), property rights (land and security of 
assets and investment for both local people and MNCs), and labour rights (especially on 
salaries and income in general).  As companies are rational actors, it is easier for a company 
to commit malpractices in a country that is also internally disorganised – this chimes with 
Campbell (2004) who emphasizes that state empowerment is important for the effectiveness 
of mining regulation. However, the problem is knowing to what extent the occurrence of  a 
dictatorship or rampant nationalisation would be permitted under the guise of state 
empowerment. 
Initiatives that are not more proactive, such as EITI, seem to be ineffective since they do not 
have direct sanctions to MNCs and states. The EITI limits itself to just reporting but without 
rigorous sanctions on states and MNCs on ground. If we compare EITI initiatives and others 
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analysed in this research such as ICGLR, Dodd-Frank Act and OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance, the latter is more effective as it provides certain measures and sanctions that 
directly affect non-compliant parties, including production and export rights through 
certification and other constraining obligations. MNCs and states fear sanctions from non-
compliance, but once a country is understood to be ineffective at carrying through these 
sanctions, the sanctions no longer act as a barrier to bad practice (see case of Uganda).  
In the cases of local benefit, the extractive industry still relies on the will of the company and 
state leadership. This posits a serious problem for the regulation of the sector. Existing global 
and national norms care less for local livelihood, except for regional security. Indeed, there is 
no binding agreement on local distribution and livelihoods, a necessary counterbalance to 
some of the conflicts and violence produced by the industry.  
This research contributes to the theoretical debate by illustrating that companies, and 
especially MNCs, which have subsidiaries in the EAC become rentiers, similar to states in the 
former period. There are indicators that shows through subsidiary mechanism and sub-
contracting that mother companies become and tended to replace state in rent seeking. This 
brings in an academic debate on whether rent seeking MNCs are like rent seeking states, to 
what extent the competition over mineral rent between states and MNCs affect the regulation 
of mines and the development in general of the sub-Saharan African states.  
The other academic and practitioner debate is whether mining sector reform that has started 
to occur in Africa and especially in sub-Saharan Africa will facilitate states to catch up lost 
opportunities in the last two decades of mining liberalisation. This liberalisation created an 
enabling environment for global flows of investment (see Ferguson, 2006, and Emel et al, 
2011) during which states lost rents, revenues and were threatened by ruling elites. This was 
the case for the CCM who was losing local legitimacy due to side-lining with MNCs. 
However, it is still unclear as to whether the reforms we see in Tanzania and Rwanda can 
reposition the state in the mining sector and if so, in what way. What is clear is that it cannot 
be done through the former conception of nationalising but through a new mechanism of 
reconfiguring the state and ruling elite position in mines. This occurs through retaining some 
aspects of regulatory capacity (not to stop private mining) whilst also finding a negotiation 
space with MNCs so that a share of rents is possible. This then prevents MNCs from 
obtaining monopoly status and gives them some local legitimacy, instead of protests over 
MNC-state side-lining in mining malpractices. This is called reconfiguring the state or 
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respacing the state in mines or in the extractive industry, as the cases of Tanzania and 
Rwanda show.  
Sovereignty does not exist in the context of mining and resource governance in Africa 
because of two conditions. One, the aspect of the population sharing in mining revenues has 
been absent and two, MNCs have overpowered states in both rent collection and territorial 
control, this happened through enclaving in both Tanzanian gold mines, Rwandan tin mines 
and Ugandan oil industry. What is called positive sovereignty for Emel et al. (2011, p. 76) 
includes the local population. Currently, the research shows that locals mainly pay the cost 
and the benefit goes mainly to MNCs and some political elites in the government. Positive 
sovereignty is where local resident near mines are included or generally, the rest of the 
society profit from the state-capital power that exists in mining. This confirms also that there 
is no such thing as sovereignty in the case of EAC mining sector.   
Considering the state-citizen relationship and the already weak, corrupt and inefficient 
budgetary allocation that we see in EAC members states, it is not possible to predict that 
reform and respacing the state in sector would be productive for the population. This means 
that the regulation of mining sector in Africa and especially in sub-Saharan Africa still 
represents a challenge.  
There are new forms of extractive industry which, researchers have suggested, limit 
international conflict over resource use and control such as a consortium of actors in mineral 
rich territories including the Great Lakes Region of Africa (see Mushimiyimana, 2011). This 
consortium aims to unite regional stakeholders, including global powers, in order to avoid 
conflict in the mining sector and the regional proxy resource wars. Finally, this applies to the 
case of the Ugandan oil industry where the French, British and Chinese oil companies made a 
consortium. But it is still too early to know whether this system will work as it is too early to 
assess the oil industry of Uganda, moreover this consortium does not include regional states 
and companies, as was planned before, giving rise to tension in the young oil country of the 
EAC.   
Conclusively, global mining acts and local mining acts do not address the core issues that 
remain in the regulation of mines, such as the inclusion of locals as highlighted by Emel et al, 
2011, p. 76) in both access and control of resource wealth and territories or inclusion of local 
actors, especially states in rent collection. The recent state mining acts and mineral reforms 
aimed at repositioning the state in this mining hierarchy is oriented towards rent rather than 
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distribution and reallocation. Yet, although some global mining standards aim at fostering 
security and stability (ICGLR, OECD and Dodd-Frank Acts), they do not address the above-
mentioned issues and are not efficient enough to cover the whole region. The EITI regulation 
tries to include aspects of budgeting, redistribution and reallocation of mineral resources but 
it too does not cover the whole region and is more informative than enforcing. Local mining 
acts are more concerned with reconfiguring the state’s position in rent collection, which does 
not guarantee fairer redistribution due to said social and political condition in the EAC 
countries. All these facts enable us to conclude that there are still challenges in regulation of 
the mining sector in the EAC and that global and national mining is not yet efficient in 
fostering the regulation of mines and extractive industry in a more developmental way.  
 
9.2.2. Limitations and future research 
 
This study has not covered the system of taxation, especially in the mining sector in the EAC. 
There is an important research gap on how taxation works, who the agents are, how they 
work and the key networks that MNCs have in state taxation bodies. A comparative study on 
taxation could also look at both MNCs and ASMs. For the former, effect of subsidiarity and 
subcontracting would be taken into consideration and for the latter, the recent formalisation 
and legalisation of ASMs and their structural and organisational gap would be considered. 
Taxation is relevant in the regulation of mines because forms of organisation in extractive 
industry can either enable or disable the taxation system as we discussed on the transfer 
pricing effect. Moreover, taxation would also help to foster formal ways of repositioning the 
state, at least in the collection of mineral rents because the states themselves have been 
gradually losing this position since the liberalisation of mines, though it is not yet a guarantee 
of good use of those rents in socio-economic and political development.  
What is more important and practical is to understand in which ways global and local mining 
acts and other regulatory mechanism can be used to improve local conditions and alternatives 
to local livelihoods, either through redistribution or through other political and economic 
strategies. In this regard, district to district comparison is recommended to assess local level 
implementation of global and national mining standards and acts. This would help to 
understand  incidents of greed and its associated violence in mining vicinities and depict 
difference in district levels of extractions, and to know deeply the reasons behind the 
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continuing failure of governments and MNCs in terms of redistribution of mineral revenues  
and enhancement of CSR and local contents in favour of  local people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
REFERENCE 
 
Agnew, J. (2009). Globalization and Sovereignty. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Aliu, A., Aliu, D. (03.07.2014) “Hybridity, Multilevel Governance and Decentration: Supra 
versus Infra” TMS ALGARVE 2013-International Conference on Tourism and Management 
Studies, University of Algarve in Portugal. 
APA news (21.02.2018) “Kenya: Tanzanian arrested smuggling gold worth 100 million 
Shilling”. Available online at https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/kenya-tanzanian-
arrested-smuggling-gold-worth-987k/ , last consulted on 28.01.2018.  
Auty, R.M., (2006), “Mining Enclave to Economic Catalyst: Large Mineral Projects in 
Developing Countries”. Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter, Vol. viii issue 1, p. 135 
Auty, R.M. (2001) The political economy of resource-driven growth. The European 
Economic Review, Vol 45, Issues 4-6, pp 839-846) available online at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001429210100126X , last consulted 
10/04/2019. 
Auty, R.M. (1993) Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse 
Thesis, Routledge. 
Ayobu, M. and Lewis, Z. (3 October 2011) “Conflict Minerals: An Assessment of the Dodd-
Frank Act”, Brookings, available online at https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/conflict-
minerals-an-assessment-of-the-dodd-frank-act/ , last consulted on 30/04/2019.  
Basedau, M. (2005) “Context Matters – Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, German Overseas Institute (DÜI) Institute of African Affairs, No 1. 
Basedau, M. and Mehler, A. (eds.), (2005) Resource politics in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde/Institute for African Affairs-Institut des Etudes 
Africaines. 
Beevor, E. and Titeca, K. (2018) “Troubling times for the Rwenzururu Kingdom in Western 
Uganda” LSE Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa, available online at 
www.blogs.lse.ac.uk/africatlse/2018/08/29/troubling-times-for-the-rwenyururu-kingdom-in-
western-Uganda/ , last consulted on 03.02.2019. 
 208 
 
Besamusca, J., Tijdens, K.G., Ngeh Tingum, E., Mbassana E.M. (2012) “Wages in Rwanda” 
Wage Indicator.org available online at 
https://wageindicator.org/wageindicatorfoundation/publications/2013/wages-in-rwanda , last 
consulted on 15/01/2019. 
Biryabarema, E. (2018) “China’s CNOOC sees Uganda Oil production starting in 2021” 
Reuters. 
Biryabarema, E. (March 22, 2017) “Uganda say Seeking $500 million loan from China for 
road in oil area” available online at https://www.reuters.com/article/uganda-loans/uganda-
says-seeking-500-million-loan-from-china-for-roads-in-oil-area-idUSL5N1GZ2CS last 
consulted 1/1/2019. 
Börzel and Hönke (2012) Security and Human Rights: Mining Companies between 
International Commitment and Corporate Practice, Schriften des Münchner Centrums für 
Governance-Forshung, 7, Nomos.  
Bowen, G.A., (2009) “Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method”, A Qualitative 
Research Journal, Vol. 9 Issue 2, pp 27-40, available online at 
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3316/QRJ0902027 , last consulted on 
08.04.2019.   
Brautigam, D. (2009) The Dragon Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.   
Bryant, R.L. and Baily, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology: An Introduction, Routledge, 
NY. 
Campbell, B. (2004) Regulating Mining in Africa: for whose Benefit? Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, Elanders Infologistics Vast AB, Goteborg, Sweden.  
Carisch and Rickard-Martin (2013) “Sanctions and the Effort to Globalise Natural Resources 
Governance”, International Policy Analysis, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, New York, available 
online at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/09578.pdf , last consulted on 09/04/2019. 
Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. (2005) “Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution”, 49, 625-633. Available online at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277551 , last consulted on 9/04/2019. 
 209 
 
Corporate Digest (2013) “Government to provide loans to small scale miners” available 
online at http://www.corporate-digest.com/index.php/governmnet-to-provide-loans-to-small-
scale-miners , last consulted 03.02.2019. 
Cote, M and Korf, B. (2018) “Making Concessions: Extractive Enclaves, Entangled 
Capitalism and Regulative Pluralism at the Gold Mining Frontier in Burkina Faso”, World 
Development Volume 101, January 2018, pp 466-478.  
Daily Monitor (20/03/2014) “Oil activities spark rights abuse in Albertine” Daily Monitor 
News. Uganda. 
Daily Nation (14 February 2018) “Chadema party leader beaten to death”, Kenya. 
Darnton, J. (8 April 1979) Tanzania's Nyerere Seems to Have Emerged as a ‘Giant Killer’, 
New York Times, available online at 
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/08/archives/toppling-amin-tipped-african-myths-too.html 
, accessed on 01/09/18. 
Deloitte (2016) “Uganda Economic Outlook 2016: The Story Behind the Numbers”, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ug/Documents/tax/Economic%20Outlook%
202016%20UG.pdf EAC (1999) EAC Treaty, available online at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/subregional/docs/eac4.pdf . 
EAC (2007), "Co-operation in Environment and Natural Resources Management", The 
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community as amended on 20th August, 
2007, EAC Publication 1. 
EAC (2018, a) Investment in mining, available online at https://www.eac.int/investment/why-
east-africa/investment-opportunities/mining . 
EAC (2018, b) Export Processing zones, available online at 
https://www.eac.int/investment/investment-framework.  
EAC (2018, b) Why Investing in EAC, available online at 
https://www.eac.int/investment/why-east-africa 
EAC, (2017) “Development and Promotion of Extractive Industries and Mineral Value 
Addition”, available online at: https://www.eac.int/industry/eac-and-industrialisation/73-
sector/industrialization-sme-development  
 210 
 
EEAS (23 February 2018) “The local Statement on the rise in politically-related violence and 
intimidation in Tanzania”. Dar es Salaam.  
EITI (2016b), “What the EITI does: building trust through transparency”, 
http://progrep.eiti.org/2016/glance/what-eiti-does  
EITI (24 May 2016a), The EITI Standard 2016, International secretariat, available online at 
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/the_eiti_standard_2016_-_english_0.pdf last 
consulted on 08.12.2017 
EITI Tanzania (March 2018) “Final report for the period of July 1 2015 to June 30, 2016”, 
available online at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TANZANIA-EITI-
2015-2016-FINAL-REPORT.pdf , last consulted on 23.01.2019.  
Embassy of France in Uganda (2018) “Defence and Military Cooperation”, available online 
at https://ug.ambafrance.org/-Defence-and-Military-cooperation- , last consulted 01/01/2019. 
Emel, J., Huber, M. T., and Makene, M. H. (2011) “Extracting Sovereignty: Capital, territory, 
and gold mining in Tanzania”, Political Geography 30 (2011) 70-79.  
Engel, Ulf & Paul Nugent, 2010: Introduction: The spatial turn in African studies. In: Ulf 
Engel & Paul Nugent (eds.), Respacing Africa. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 1-10. 
Engel, Ulf, 2015: Africa’s „1989“. In: Ulf Engel, Frank Hadler & Matthias Middell (eds.), 
1989 in a Global Perspective. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 331-348.  
Engler, Y. (7 December 2015) “Ottawa backed Idi Amin, but let's talk about the good 
Canada's done in Uganda, available online, rabble. Canada, 
http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/yves-engler/2015/12/ottawa-backed-idi-amin-lets-talk-about-
good-canadas-done-uganda  
Exchange Rates (2019) US Dollar (USD) to Guinea Franc (GNF) exchange rate history, 
https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/USD-GNF-exchange-rate-history.html , last consulted on 
19.03.2019. 
Feenstra, R. C. (2004). "The Heckscher–Ohlin Model". Advanced International Trade: 
Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 31–63. ISBN 0-691-11410-
2. 
 211 
 
Ferguson, J. (2006) Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, Duke University Press, Durhanm 
and London. 
France Diplomatie (2018) “France and Uganda” available online at 
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/uganda/france-and-uganda/  
Hönke, J. (2009) “Transnational Pockets of Territoriality: Governing the Security of 
Extraction in Katanga (DRC)”, Research Academy Leipzig Working Paper Series, No. 2., 
Leipzig.  
Huntington, S. P. "Political Development and Political Decay." World Politics v. 17 (3) 
(1965): 386-430.  
ICJ (2006) “Press Release: ICJ delivers its judgement in DRC v. Uganda” The Hague Justice 
Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=2204 , last consulted on 03.02.2019.  
ICMM, (2016) Role of Mining in National Economies: Mining Contribution Index, 3rd 
edition, available online at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD ,  
Ihucha, A. (30 March 2016) Collapse lies in wait for EA regional bloc. The Citizen, available 
online at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Collapse-lies-in-wait-for-EA-regional-bloc-
/1840340-3138140-9lwwrjz/index.html . accessed on 01/09/18.   
Jacobsen,S. and Obuluba, G., (November 15, 2018) “Tanzania loses Denmark aid over rights 
concerns after World Bank scraps loan”, Jason Nelly, and Raissa Kasolowsky (eds.) Reuters, 
available online at https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1NK1IR-OZATP , last 
consulted 28.01.2019. 
Jones, p. and Smith, D (June 20, 2012) “UN Report on Rwanda fuelling Congo Conflict 
‘Blocked by USA’” available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/20/rwanda-congo-conflict-blocked-us last 
consulted on 9/1/2019. 
Kabona, E. (12 September, 2015) Failure to secure licences slows export of Rwanda’s 
minerals” available online at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Failure-to-secure-
licences-slows-export-of-Rwanda-s-minerals/2560-2867848-wh3e47/index.html last 
consulted on 12/01/2019. 
 212 
 
Kabona, E. (August 20, 2016) “Rwanda Tin Smelter Audit Postponed” The East African, 
available online at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Rwanda-tin-smelter-audit-
postponed-Phoenix-Metals/2560-3351614-y570moz/index.html last consulted on 8/1/2019. 
Kafumu, P.D. (7.8.2014) Reforming Tanzania’s mineral sector, The Citizen, available online 
at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/oped/Reforming-Tanzania-s-mineral-sector/1840568-2411594-
ltvg2gz/index.html  
Kato, J. (15/12/2017) “Congolese arrested in Uganda with Shs300m fake gold” 
https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Congolese-arrested-Uganda-Shs300m-fake-
gold/688334-4229778-vaa0hx/index.html, last consulted on 31/12/2018. 
Kazeem, Y. (12 September 2017) “Tanzania has seized a UK miner’s diamond shipment and 
spooked the global mining world again”, Quartz Africa, available online at 
https://qz.com/africa/1074700/tanzania-has-seized-15-million-of-diamonds-from-petra-
diamonds/ , last consulted 28.01.2019.  
Keenan, J (2012) The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Pluto Press. 
Kenya Chronicles (24 June 2017) “President Magufuli says no to pregnant schooling girls” 
Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1M1GxFc_QW4 last consulted on 03.02.2019. 
Le Billion, P. (2001) „The Political Ecology of War: natural resources and armed conflicts“, 
Political Geography, 20, pp. 561-584. Available online at: 
http://www.elsevierscitech.com/pdfs/JPGQ/2001_The_political_ecology_of_war.pdf  
Le Billon, P. (2001). “The Political Ecology of War: natural resources and armed conflicts”. 
Political Geography 20 (2001)561-584. 
Le Billon, P. (2014) Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources, Oxford 
Scholarship Online, available at 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333462.001.0001/acpro
f-9780199333462 last consulted on 04.03.2019. 
Leamer, E, E. (1995). The Heckscher–Ohlin Model in Theory and Practice. Princeton Studies 
in International Finance. 77. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-88165-249-0. 
Lee, S. (2012) “Working Conditions in Tanzania” European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Condition, available online at 
 213 
 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1095
en.pdf , last consulted on 23.01.2019. 
Leopord, E. (19 December 2001) “UN Extends Probe on Looting of Congo’s Minerals” 
Reuters. 
London Metal Exchange (9/1/2019) “Featured LME Price: Setting The Global Standard” 
available online at https://www.lme.com/ last consulted 9 January, 2019. 
Lusekelo, A. (29 January 2009) “Mkapa Implicated in Tanzania mine privatisation deal”. 
Daily Nation, Kenya. 
Lusekelo, A., (29 January 2009)”Mkapa implicated in Tanzania mine privatisation deal” 
Daily Nation, available online at https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/440808-521364-
gq1qi8z/index.html , last consulted 28.01.2019.  
MAC, (24, April 2001), “Buried Alive? The Bulyanhulu accusations”, Mining And 
Communities, Published by MAC on 2001-04-23    
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=430 last accessed on 26.10.2018. 
MacFerson, H.M. (2009) Governance and Hyper-Corruption in Resource-Rich African 
Countries, available online at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract:1552113 , last consulted on 
09/04/2019.  
Magai, P.S. and Marquez-Velazquez (2011). Tanzania´s Mining Sector and its Implications 
for the country`s Development. Working Paper No. 04/2011. Berlin Working Papers on 
Money, Finance, Trade and Development Competence Center.  
Magai, S.P., and Marquez-Velazquez (August 2011) “Tanzania´s Mining Sector and its 
Implications for the country Development” Berlin Working Paper on Money, Finance, Trade 
and Development” Working paper No 04/2011, available online at: https://finance-and-
trade.htw-
berlin.de/fileadmin/HTW/Forschung/Money_Finance_Trade_Development/working_paper_s
eries/wp_2011_04_Magai-Marquez_Tanzanias-Mining-Sector.pdf , last consulted at 
28.1.2019. 
Magrin, G. (2013) Voyage en Afrique rentière. Une lecture géographique des trajectoires du 
développement, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris. 
 214 
 
Malanga, A. (12 September 2017) “Diamond firm denies attempt to swindle govt” The 
Citizen, available online at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Diamond-firm-denies-attempt-
to-swindle-govt/1840340-4092248-urq019/index.htm , last consulted on 03.02.2019.  
Markram, B. (January 21, 2015) “Rwanda Reopens Tin Smelter” metal bulletin, avaialabel 
online at https://www.metalbulletin.com/Article/3420399/Rwanda-reopens-tin-smelter.html 
last consulted on 8/1/2019.  
Masanja, P. M., (27 September 2013), “ASM activities and Management in Tanzania” 
available online at http://im4dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ASM-in-Tanzania.pdf , last 
consulted on 28.01.2019.  
Materu, B, (24 February 2018), “Second Opposition Politician Killed in Tanzania”, Daily 
Nation, available online at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Opposition-politician-killed-
in-Tanzania/1066-4317646-731mgdz/index.html , last consulted on 28.01.2019.  
Mbelle, A.V.Y (2000) “The Manufacturing Sector in Tanzania”, Report, Confederation of 
Tanzania Industries and Confederation of Danish Industries, Economic Department, 
University of Dar es Salam. Available online at: 
http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/themanufacturingsectorintanzania.pdf accessed 05/09/2018 
Mégret, F., (2010) “ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist 
Toolkit”, SSRN, available online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1933111 , last consulted on 
11/04/2019. 
Mining and Community (27 September 2001), “New evidence links Canada to death of 
Tanzanian miners (OTTAWA)” available online at 
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=430 , last consulted on 28.01.2019. 
MINIRENA (2014) “Newsletter: Unfolding the Rwandan Mining Sector” available online at 
www.minirena.gov.rw/fileadmin/Media_Center/Announcement/NEWSLETTER.pdf , last 
consulted on 15/01/2019.  
Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Planning –Uganda (2018) “Sector Budget 
Documents” available online at http://www.budget.go.ug/budget/sector-budget-docs , last 
consulted 27.12.2018. 
 215 
 
Mosenda, Jacob, (18 September 2018), Polepole: No Chance for Opposition to Win Under 
Magufuli. The Citizens, available online at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Polepole--No-
chance-for-opposition-to-win-under-Magufuli/1840340-4765464-uhwnxx/index.html , last 
consulted on 28.01.2019.  
Matowo, R. (11 February, 2019) “Bulyanhulu Gold Mine donates Sh 68 million worth of 
building materials for village dispensaries” The Citizens, available online at 
https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Bulyanhulu-Gold-Mine-donates-Sh68-million-worth-of-
building-/1840340-4977046-lrir1az/index.html . Last consulted on 10/04/2019.  
Mugarura, R. (December 8, 2014) “Rwanda Marks International Mining day, best players in 
the sector awarded and exhorted to do better” Hope Magazine, available online at 
http://www.hope-mag.com/index.php?com=news&option=read&ca=1&a=1832 last 
consulted 12/1/2019. 
Mugerwa, Y. (26, June 2017) President Cancels Shs600b mining project, Daily Monitor, 
available online at http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/President-cancels-Shs600b-
mining-project/688334-3987370-13mo365z/index.html  
Mugisha, A.M. (2011) “International SAICM Implementation Project (ISP): Uganda” 
available online at 
https://ipen.org/sites/default/files/documents/PROBICOU%20final%20ISIP%20Mercury%20
Country%20Situation%20report.pdf  
Muhanga, M. I. (2016) Tanzania’s Mining Sector Reforms: Towards or Away from Mwalimu 
Nyerere’s Ujamaa Ideology. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318641025_Tanzania's_Mining_Sector_Reforms_T
owards_or_Away_from_Mwalimu_Nyerere's_Ujamaa_Ideology [accessed Aug 31 2018]. 
Mulisa, M. (August 18, 2017) “Kagera, all set to reap from Kabanga’s nickel project”, Daily 
News, available online at https://www.dailynews.co.tz/news/kagera-all-set-to-reap-from-
kabanga-s-nickel-project.aspx , last consulted on 28.01.2019.  
Mumbere, M. (30 december 2015) “Uganda: Kilembe Mines sacks 10 workers” AllAfrica, 
available online at https://allafrica.com/stories/201512300562.html  
Mushimiyimana, E. (2011) Divergent Interests of Actors in the Great Lakes Region: A Threat 
to Peace and Development in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and in the whole 
 216 
 
Region, MSc. Dissertation, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of 
Antwerp, Belgium. 
Musisi, F (28 may, 2018) “How Uganda’s mining Industry ground to halt” available online at 
https://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/How-Uganda-mining-industry-ground-
halt/688342-4582680-1kodsqz/index.html last consulted on 2.1.2019. 
Musisi, F. (2 July 2017) “Kilembe: How the Once Vibrant Copper Mines ended up in ruins” 
available online at https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Kilembe-once-vibrant-Copper-
mines-ended-up-ruins/688334-3995918-6bxjnvz/index.html , last consulted 29.12.2018.  
Mwai, C. (June 6, 2018) “How Rwanda grew its mineral exports revenues by 124 percent” 
The New Times, available online at https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/how-rwanda-grew-its-
mineral-exports-revenues-124-cent, last consulted on 15/1/2018.  
Mwizerwa, J.C., (July 5, 2017) “Rwanda Economy grew 1.7 pct in Q1, 2017” National 
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, Kigali, available online at 
www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/rwandas-economy-grew-17-pct-q12017 , last consulted 
15/01/2019.  
Namyaro, J. (11.09.2017), Govt sued over eviction of Mubende gold miners, Uganda 7 
available online at:  https://uganda7.com/info/govt-sued-over-eviction-of-mubende-gold-
miners/ , last consulted on 24.10.2018 
Namkani, G. (1979) Development Problems of Mineral-Exporting countries. World Ban Staff 
Working Paper No. 354. 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (N.A) “Ndi Umunyarwanda: 
Isobanurampamvu kuri Gahunda ya “Ndi Umunyarwanda”” available online at 
www.nurc.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/nur/documents/NDI_UMUNYARWANDA.pdf , last 
consulted, 18.01.2019. 
Nellist, R. (1 September 2017) “The Mineral Sand Export Saga” Tanzania Affairs, available 
online at https://www.tyaffairs.org/2017/09/the-mineral-sand-export/ , last consulted on 
02.02.2019. 
Ng’wanakilala, (19 October 2011) “Tanzania seen raising royalties on gold by year-end”, 
Reuters, available online at 
 217 
 
https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7LJ2JS20111019?sp=true, last 
consulted on 28.01.2019. 
Ng’wanakilala, F (26/02/2018) “Tanzania politicians jailed for insulting president”, IOL  
Nilsen, O. (1980), Bibliography of the Mineral Resources of Tanzania. Scandinavia Institute 
of African Studies, Uppsla.  
Nimubona, A. (17 Juin 2014), Exploitation du Nickel de Musongati a été octroyée à la 
société BMM, Agence Bujumbura News, available online: 
https://bujanews.wordpress.com/2014/06/17/exploitation-du-nickel-de-musongati-a-ete-
octroyee-a-la-societe-bmm/  
Office of the Auditor Gerneral Uganda (June 2015) “Report of the Auditor General on the 
Financial Statements of Kilembe Mines Ltd for the Financial year ended 30thJune 2015”. 
Republic Of Uganda, available online at http://www.oag.go.ug/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/KILEMBE-MINES-LTD-REPORT-OF-THE-AUDITOR-
GENERAL-2015.pdf last consulted 29.12.2018. 
Ohlin, B. (1967). Interregional and International Trade. Harvard Economic Studies. 39. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ollio, E. (27 March 2001) “Uganda, Rwanda Officers Cited in DR Congo Looting” New 
Vision. 
Onyango, E. (6 November 2018) “Tanzania: Wall Around Tanzanite Mines has Started 
Paying Off, The East African, available online at 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201811110083.html , last consulted on 03.02.2019. 
Pankaj (2016) “Political Ecology” International Journal of Research and Scientific 
Innovation (IJRSI), Volume III, Issue IX. 
RDB, 2018 “Manufacturing” available online at: www.rdb.rw/investment-
opportunities/manufacturing/ last consulted on 15.01/2019. 
Rehema, A. (22 August 2013), “Exploring my Uganda: The Kilembe Mines”, available 
online at: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1329766/exploring-uganda-
kilembe-mines  
 218 
 
Reno, W. (2002) “The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States”, Development and Change 
33 (5): 837-858, Institute of Social Studies 2002, Black Well Publishers, 108 Oxford.   
Reno, W. (2001a) “How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the political 
Economy of weak states”. Intervention and transnationalism in Africa: Global, local networks 
of power, Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, available online at 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-7660.t01-1-00251 . Last consulted 
10/04/2019.  
Reno, W. (1998) Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
London.  
Republic of Botswana (5 February 2018) “The 2018/2019 Budget in brief”, Ministry of 
Finance, available online at 
http://www.gov.bw/contentassets/1c5907f150d144fa81fef3f1cbb72b8d/budgetinbrief201802
01.pdf , last consulted 28.01.2019.  
Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Finance and Planning (2017) “Government budget for 
Financial year 2016/2017” Citizen Budget Edition, available online at 
www.mof.go.ty/mofdocs/budget/Citizens%20Budget/CITIZENS%20BUDGET%2016-
17%20%20%20(English).pdf , last consulted on 02.02.2019. 
Republic of Uganda (15/6/2016) Uganda – Mining and Export, Uganda Ministry of Energy, 
Department of Geological Survey and Mines of Uganda. Available online at 
http://www.export.gov/article  
Republic of Uganda (2018), Mining and Mineral Policy of Uganda, Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development, Kampala, Uganda. 
Richards, C. (March 4, 2014) “Uganda Looks to China: A New anti-gay law underscores the 
West’s declining influence, as Uganda pivots East”, available online at 
https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/uganda-looks-to-china/ last consulted 1/1/2019. 
RMB (2019) “Mining in Rwanda” available online at http://rma.co.rw/mining-in-rwanda/ last 
consulted 8/1/2019. 
 219 
 
Robinson, J. A. and Torvik, R. (2004) “White elephants” Journal of Public Economics 89 
(2005) 197-210.  
Roder, K (April 2019) ““Bulldozer politics”, State-making and (neo-) extractive industries in 
Tanzania’s gold mining sector”, Industry and Society, Volume 6, Issue 2, Page 407-412.  
Ross, M. L. (1999) “The Political Economy of the Resource curse” World Politics 51.2 
(1999) 297-322. 
Ross, M.L. (2001) "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-361. 
10.  
Ross, M.L. (2012) The Oil Curse: How Petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA. 
Rwanda Governance Board (June 2018) “Good Governance and Decentralisation in Rwanda” 
Rwanda Governance Review, ISSN: 2306-9236, vol. VI Special Issue. 
Sachs, J. & Warner, (2001) “Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse of 
Natural Resources”, European Economic Review, 45, Pp 827-838.  
Same, T.A. (April, 2008) Mineral-Rich Countries and Dutch Disease: Understanding the 
Macroeconomic Implications of Windfalls and the Development Prospects: The Case of 
Equatorial Guinea, The World Bank, Africa Region Economic Management Department, 
Policy paper, available online at: 
https://books.google.de/books?id=m7k_jClAAh8C&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=appreciation
+of+currency+in+mineral+rich+zones&source=bl&ots=4lI0V7kjR6&sig=ACfU3U0Lno1D
mAtOaz58cdR7T-
uEgdE4Hw&hl=de&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjGtfWcrY7hAhVDLVAKHYe7BK4Q6AEwBXo
ECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=appreciation%20of%20currency%20in%20mineral%20rich%20z
ones&f=false , last consulted on 19.03.2019. 
Schubert, J. Engel, U. Macamo, E. (2017) (eds) Extractive Industries and Changing State 
Dynamics in Africa: Beyond the Resource Curse, 1st Edition, Routledge Studies in African 
Development, Routledge.  
Seattle, W.A. (30 November 2013), “Sinclair boots up nickel-cobalt PGM focussed 
company”. Available online: http://www.miningnewsmagazine.org/?p=276, last consulted 
02/02/2019. 
 220 
 
Shop LC (2019) “One by One Program: Meal for a Hungry child” Shop LC available online 
at https://www.shoplc.com/oneforone , last consulted on 02.02.2019. 
Sonesson, C., Davidson, G., Sachs, L. (July 2016) “Mapping Mining to Sustainable 
Development Goal”, An Atlas, Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment, UNDP, UN 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network, and World Economic Forum. 
Ssekika, E. (13 September 2017) “Illicit copper export forced government to cancel Kilembe 
deal” available online at https://observer.ug/businessnews/54904-illicit-copper-export-forced-
govt-to-cancel-kilembe-deal , last consulted on 29.12.2018. 
Taib, M. (2016) “The Mineral Industry of South Sudan” 2014 Minerals Year Book, USGS, 
Science for a Changing World 
Tanzania Invest (2018) “Gold”, available online at https://www.tanzaniainvest.com/gold , last 
consulted on 28.01.2019. 
Tanzania Mineral Audit Annual Report, 2014, “Quantity and value of mineral Exported by 
major Gold Mines”, Export.Gov. USA. 
The Citizen (24 June 2015) “The Irony of Kikwete’s legacy on corruption: How corruption 
rocked Kikwete’s govt in the past decade” TZ. 
The Citizen Reporter (8 July 2008) “Protest Barrick: Activists urge support for stigmatised 
victim” The Citizen, available online at http://protestbarrick.net/article.php@id=299.html , 
last consulted on 03.02.2019. 
The Citizen, (15 June 2015) “Tabloid banned for 2 years for linking former presidents 
Kikwete and Mkapa to mineral dispute”, The Citizen Reporter, TZ.  
The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (2003) “Amendments” Official Gazette No1 of 
02/12/2003, available online at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/rw/rw032en.pdf , 
last consulted 18.01.2019. 
The East African (2007). The Treaty of East African Community as amended in 2007, 
available online at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/eac/trt_eac.pdf  
The East African Reporter (Monday, June, 5, 2017) “Just how much gold does Tanzania 
has?” The east African, available online at https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/How-
 221 
 
much-gold-does-Tanzania-have-/2560-3956294-11li4jt/index.html last consulted on 
28.01.2019. 
The eat African Legislative Assembly, (May 2017) Four Key Bills sail through the first 
reading, Arusha, Tanzania. Available online at http://www.eala.org/media/view/four-key-
bills-sail-through-the-first-reading  
The Republic of Rwanda, (2014) Law n° 13/2014 of 20/05/2014 on mining and quarry 
operations, Official Gazette nᵒ 26 of 30/06/2014, 
http://www.minirena.gov.rw/fileadmin/Mining_Subsector/Laws__Policies_and_Programmes/
Laws/1.Law_on_Mining_and_Quarry_Operations.pdf  
The United Republic of Tanzania (23rd April, 2010) The Mining Act, 2010. Dar es Salam 
The United Republic of Tanzania (28thJune, 2017) Special Bill Supplement to the Special 
Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No 4. Vol 98 28thJune, 2017, Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam, Also available online at 
http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/bills/1498723111-
EXTRACTIVE%20INDUSTRY%20AND%20FINANCIAL%20LAWS-4.pdf  
The World Bank (2017) “Uganda Country Indicators CPIA Rating” IBRD and IDA available 
online at http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/country/uganda , last consulted 29.12.2018. 
Titeca, K. and Reus, A. (4 July, 2017) “Uganda: Why the Unrest in Rwanzori is far from 
over” African Argument, News Websites. Available online at 
http://africanarguments.org/2017/07/04/uganda-why-the-unrest-in-rwenzori-is-far-from-over/ 
last consulted 3.1.2019. 
Trade Economics (2019) “Rwanda GDP per capita PPP”, Trading Economics/ World Bank, 
available online at https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-per-capita-ppp , last consulted 
31.01.2019.  
Trade Economics (2019) “Tanzania GDP from Mining” available online at 
https://tradingeconomics.com/tanzania/gdp-from-mining , last consulted on 28.01.2019.  
Uganda Legal Information Institute-ULII (2018) “Minerals (prohibition of exportation) Act 
1975: Chapter 147” available online at https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/147  
last consulted 2.1.2019. 
 222 
 
Uganda News Today (3 April 2017) “Uganda Unlikely to pay DR Congo 10 BLN USD 
Awarded by ICJ, Parliament Told” available online at https://www.uganda-
newsrelease.com/Uganda-unlikely-to-pay-dr-congo-10-bln-usd-awarded-by-icj-parliamnet-
told/ , last consulted 03.02.2019.  
Ulimwengu, Jenerali, (2018) “The Voice of people is the voice of God, heeding it will save 
us descent into chaos”, The East African.  
UN (1960) Resolution 15(XV). Concerted action for economic development of economically 
less developed countries, Resolutions adopted on the reports of the second Committee, pp 9-
10. Available online http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGA/1960/42.pdf  
UN (1962), General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent 
Sovereignity over natural resources”. Available online at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/resources.pdf  
UNECA, (30 December, 2004), “Harmonisation of Mining Policies, Standards, Legislative 
and Regulatory Frameworks in Southern Africa”, 
http://www.sadc.int/files/8813/5825/8305/Mining-_Harmonisation_Study.pdf  
UN Security Council, (23 October 2003) Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. Chaired by Mahmoud Kassem, UNSC.    
UNDOC (2011) “2011 Global Study on Homicide: trends, contexts, Data” United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime, Vienna, available online at www.unodc.org/documents/data-and -
statistics/Homicide/Global_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf , last consulted on 
17/01/2019.  
UNDP (2013) |Human Development Report: Income Gini Coefficient” available online at 
www.hdr.undep.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient , last consulted on 17/01/2019.  
UNDP (2016) Humana Development Report. Human Development for Everyone, USA 
available online at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf  
UNDP (2018,b) “Human Development Report: Rwanda” available online at 
www.undep.org/en/countries/profiles/RWA , last consulted on 17/01/2019.  
 223 
 
UNDP (2018a) “Human Development Report”, available online at 
www.hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update , last consulted 17/01/2019.  
UNECA (2018) “Uganda ASM Profile”, African mineral Development Centre, available 
online at http://knowledge.uneca.org/ASM/uganda , last consulted 3.1.2019. 
UNICEF (15/3/2018) “Uganda Political Economy Analysis”, available online at 
https://www.unicef.org/esaro/UNICEF_Uganda_--_2018_--
_Political_Economy_Analysis.pdf   
United Republic of Tanzania – ministry of Finance (2015) “Government budget for financial 
year 2014/2015” Ministry of Finance in Collaboration with Policy Forum, available online at 
https://www.policyforum-tz.org/sites/default/files/citizensbudget201415.pdf , last consulted 
28.01.2019. 
University, Available online at: 
http://www.uvm.edu/ieds/sites/default/files/Botswana_Minerals.pdf , last consulted 2016-06-
01 
UN-Sustainable Development (2010) “Statement made by prof. Abdulkarim H. Mruma, chief 
Executive Officer of Geological Survey of the United Republic of Tanzania during the round 
table discussion on managing mining for sustainable development of the 18 Session of 
Commission on Sustainable Development:  New York,  12 May 2010, available online at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/859Tanzania.pdf , last consulted on 
28.01.2019.  
URN (12/11/2018) “Uganda first oil production now pushed to 2021” Observer.  
US DOL (2016) “Uganda: Prevalence and sector Distribution of Child labour” available 
online at: https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ilab/Uganda2016Report.pdf , last 
consulted 27.12.2018 
US LEGAL (2017), Mining Lease law and legal Definition, American Lawyers-Attorneys in 
the USA available online at https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/mining-lease 
Watts, M. (2004) Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria. Geopolitics, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
 224 
 
Werthmann, K. and Ayeh, D. (2017) “Processes of Enclaving  under the Global Condition: 
The Case of Burkina Faso” SFB 1199 Process of Spatialisation Under Global Condition, 
available online at http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~sfb1199/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/197-
SFB_Publication_WorkingPaper_Enclaving-Apr.-2017.pdf, last consulted on 09/04/2019.  
Wesonga, N. 6 december, 2018) “US Court Convicts a man accused of bribing Kutesa” 
available online at:   https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/US-court-convicts-man-
accused-of-bribing-Kutesa/688334-4883880-fjmqbbz/index.html 
Wesonga, N. (27 July 2018) “Ministry Moves to Register All Miners”, Daily Monitor, 
available online at http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/national/Ministry-moves-register-all-
miners/ , last consulted 29.01.2019. 
Whiting, A. (26 February, 2014) “Ugandan law criminalising homosexuality leads several 
Western donors to halt aid or review aid programmes to show disapproval, pushing down 
value of Ugandan currency” The Thomson Reuters, available online at  
http://news.trust.org//item/20140226160032-td4jl/  
World Health Organisation (2014) The Health of the People: What works – The African 
Regional Health Report, WHO/AFRO Library Catalogy 
World Population Review (2019) “Rwanda Population 2019” available online at 
www.worldpopulationreview.com/countries/rwanda-population/ , last consulted on 
15/01/2019.  
Yager T.R. (2016), “The Mineral Industry of Burundi, 2014 Minerals Year Book, USGS, 
Science for a Changing World 
Yager, (2016) “The Mineral Industry of Rwanda”, 2014 Minerals Year Book, USGS, Science 
for a Changing World 
Yager, (2016) “The Mineral Industry of Uganda”, Yager, T. R. (2016) “The Mineral Industry 
of Tanzania”, 2013 Minerals Year Book, USGS Science for a Changing World 
Yager, (2016) “The Mineral Year Book of Rwanda”, 2014 Minerals Year Book, USGS, 
Science for a Changing World 
Yager, T. R. (2016) “The Mineral Industry of Tanzania”, 2013 Minerals Year Book, USGS 
Science for a Changing World 
 225 
 
Yager, T.R. (2016), “The Mineral Industry of Kenya”, 2014 Minerals Year Book, USGS, 
Science for a Changing World 
York, G. (22 September 2016) “Police killed 65, injured 270 at Barrik mine in Tanzania, 
inquiry hears”, The Globe and Mail, last updated May 16, 2018, available online at: 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/african-and-
mideast-business/police-killed-65-injured-270-at-tanzanian-mine-inquiry-
hears/article32013998/ , last consulted on 28.01.2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226 
 
APPENDIX 
Interview protocol 
1. How access to and control of mining territories by MNCs affect sovereignties of EAC 
member states? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. What kind of role do MNCs play in managing mineral resources and the consequences of 
that to the functioning of states institutions? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………........................................  
3. What are the difficulties of EAC member states in managing/settling conflict of interests 
among multiple actors in EAC mining including MNCs, global and regional states, 
citizens, artisanal and small-scale miners, mineral (illegal) traders, and civil society? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. What are the challenges that EAC member states have in holding MNCs accountable and 
transparent and in enforcing the implementation of global and national mining 
standards?...............................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................ 
5. What are the forms of resistance, to global capital flow of EAC mining, that member 
states face and their effect over resource management and regulation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. What is the relation between ASM (Artisanal and small-scale mining) and LSM (large 
scale 
Mining)?.................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................ 
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Observation guide 
Observation hinges on assessing the probability of resource curse in East African (EAC) 
Member states and it is based on the approach of Basedau (2005, pp8-19). 
1. The social-economic development  
1.1.Whether extractive industry has damaged other tradable sectors and eventually 
decreased other sources of economic growth at local and national levels of EAC 
member states 
1.2.Whether extractive industry stimulated unwise economic policies and activities 
such as buying off popular support, setting up bigger unprofitable projects “white 
elephants”, and promotion of unnecessarily import substitutions and subsidies. 
1.3. Whether extractive industry has subjected the countries to the economic 
vulnerability because of external price shocks of exported natural resources in 
EAC member states 
1.4.Whether extractive industry triggered the decline of human capital development 
including education at local and national levels 
1.5.Whether extractive industry triggered macro and micro economic inefficiencies on 
local savings and productions, high level of inequalities and incapability local and 
national level.   
2. State institution and Governance 
2.1.The types of mineral rents and corruption occurring in EAC and the way they 
manifest.  
2.2.Aspect of shadow states, rentier states and informalities in EAC member states 
bureaucracy because of global capital flows in mining. 
2.3.Violation of property rights, human and labour rights. 
2.4.State citizen relationship associated with mineral extraction 
2.5.State company relationship 
2.6.State diplomacy status associated with resource extraction. 
2.7.Security dangers associated with mineral resources  
2.8.Local political mood vis à vis the extraction  
2.9.The psychology of extraction of actors interested in mineral resources in the 
regions.  
3. Democracy and human right 
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3.1.Whether there is modernisation effect, responsibility of states to provide 
infrastructure and development project in mining vicinities including urbanisation. 
3.2.Whether there is taxation and accountability in mining sector more specifically. 
3.3.Repressive governments mainly financed by mineral resource rents 
3.4.Whether there is some aspect of dictatorship associated to mineral resource 
management 
3.5.Whether there is extreme-nationalism, elite misunderstanding associated with 
resource management and extraction. 
3.6.Whether there is lack of participation of people, especially the local population, in 
management and control of resource and in the formulation of resource policies. 
3.7.Whether formal institution including national parliaments and civil society have a 
say in management of resources and able to hold governments and MNCs 
accountable. 
3.8. Whether there is some aspect of changes in geopolitics and foreign affairs 
associated with extraction of mineral resources in the region.  
4. Peace and security 
4.1.Whether there are aspects of mineral conflicts (latent or open) because of 
resources extraction. 
4.2.Whether there are some cases of greed and grievances associated to mineral 
resources extraction.  
4.3.Whether there are territorial claims and territorial conflicts including cross border 
conflicts in the region associated with control of mineral rich territories. 
4.4. Whether there is aspect of need of central government to monopolize resources 
control in mineral rich territories and neutralise the existence of secessionist 
factions.  
4.5.Whether there is extreme environmental damage at large-scale accident that cause 
resentment of residents. 
4.6.Proxy wars and mercenaries associated to need of resource control 
4.7.Regional wars fostered by mineral resources    
4.8.Capacity to handle resource claims and adjudication in EAC institutions. 
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Photoes  
 
Figure 1: muddy road that Rutongo mine and the vicinity use to reach Kigali City 
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Figure 2: tags for mineral traceability from BSP company in Rutongo mine 
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Figure 3: BSP woman agent who is taking data with her laptop connected with other senior official’s devices who monitor 
the traceability mechanism through interconnected software in Rutongo mine 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 232 
 
 
Figure 4: traditional and artisan mechanism still exist in Rutongo mine 
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Figer 5: Cheaper labour at Rutongo Tin Mine, Miners support team, 1 Euro per day: equal or less 
than 8 hours. 
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